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Introduction 
Consumer credit is an integral part of consumers’ everyday lives around the world. The 
concept is socially accepted as a way to finance personal consumption needs (Merskin, 1998; 
Watkins, 2000). In many cases, credit use is a consequence of economic necessities and a tool 
used to deal with financial insecurities (Weller, 2007). However, with increased accessibility, 
credit is also used to finance purely enjoyable consumption like parties, alcohol and cigarettes 
(Autio, Wilska, Kaartinen, & Lähteenmaa, 2009). In general, the possibility to acquire needed 
products now and pay for them later with an interest premium sounds like a good option, when 
present financial means are low. Nevertheless, it obviously requires a certain level of financial 
skills and knowledge about the future income situation to make sound decisions. A lack of these 
can easily lead to overindebtedness (Lusardi & Tufano, 2015) with consequences as severe as 
decreased psychological well-being (Shen, Sam, & Jones, 2014) or even private bankruptcy 
(Jappelli, Pagano, & Di Maggio, 2013). 
With research on consumer credit covering a multitude of disciplines like economics, 
psychology, sociology, mathematics and computer science, it becomes clear that credit is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that touches on many aspects of human life and entails numerous 
implications on various levels. Despite the complexity of the topic, it can be argued that the 
individual decision to enter a specific credit contract lies at the core of it. This is where needs, 
attitudes, hopes, and ideas translate into actual behavior and thus unfold into various tangible 
consequences. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of this credit decision by regarding the 
cognitive processes that lead to it from a psychological point of view. To this end, seven lab 
studies were conducted that can be grouped into three major sections.  
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The first section focuses on the idea that preferences for specific credit aspects, like low 
annual percentage rate, short credit duration, or low total costs may change, depending on the 
level of mental abstraction of the consumer. A person sitting at home in front of the computer, 
shopping online and being offered to use a credit for the purchase might therefore decide for a 
different credit than a person analyzing several credit alternatives with his bank advisor, figuring 
out the individual differences in these offers. Thus, this section aims to answer the question 
whether mental abstraction influences credit choice. 
The second section follows-up on the idea of mental abstraction and transfers it to a 
relatively new form of credit: 0%-interest credit offers, defined as credits with an annual interest 
rate of 0%. It is argued that the number 0 is more abstract in nature than positive numbers. The 
prominent display of 0 in advertisements for 0%-interest credits might induce a higher level of 
mental abstraction, which in turn could influence which product consumers want to finance with 
a 0%-interest credit. Furthermore, consumers with a high level of mental abstraction might find 
0%-interest credit offers particularly tempting because of a perceived fit with the abstract 
number. Thus, this section aims to answer the question how mental abstraction and the 0 in 0%-
interest credits interact to influence credit evaluation as well as the choice of the product that is 
to be financed. 
The third part continues to examine cognitive processes in the evaluation of 0%-interest 
credits, but follows a different theoretical conception. Often, such credits are offered directly at 
the point of sale, where consumers have limited time to make a decision and are distracted by the 
noisy environment. This could lead to consumers adopting a processing style that is less analytic 
and rather relies on heuristics. In this context, it is examined whether heuristic processing leads 
to more positive evaluations of 0%-interest credits, as the central feature of a 0%-interest rate 
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may divert attention from less advantageous aspects of such credits like for example mandatory 
residual debt insurance or high dunning fees. Thus, this section aims to answer the question 
whether consumers are more willing to take up a 0%-interest credit when they process 
information in a more intuitive and heuristic way. 
In the following sections of the introduction, a short overview will be provided, regarding 
the recent development and current situation of consumer credits in the western world and in 
Germany in particular. Next, the consequences of increasing credit use will be highlighted, with 
a special emphasis on psychologically relevant aspects. Afterwards, it will be explained how 
credit use can be conceptualized as a process of consecutive stages with characteristic decisions 
and investigated from different psychological perspectives. Previous research will be reviewed 
with a focus on results regarding the decision to enter a specific credit contract from a cognitive 
perspective. In this context, the importance of specific credit characteristics for the credit 
decision like annual percentage rate and credit duration will be presented in detail. After this, the 
three empirical sections will follow with preceding individual subsections that concentrate on the 
theoretical concepts used in the respective set of studies. At the end, a discussion will sum up the 
results and come back to the question how a consideration of cognitive processes can facilitate 
understanding of how consumers decide for a specific credit offer. 
Consumer Credits – Recent Trends and Status Quo 
Definition of consumer credit. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (n.d.), consumer credit is defined as “credit advanced 
to consumers for the purchase of goods or services”. This corresponds to a literal interpretation 
of the term and illustrates the everyday understanding of consumer credit. Although most people 
would probably agree to it, they differ in their opinions on what exactly constitutes a credit. In 
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Germany, 96% of the target population agree that going to the bank and borrowing money there 
is an act of taking credit. In contrast only 42% agree that overdrafting one’s bank account is 
another form of credit an just 19% agree that buying something on credit card also represents the 
use of credit (SCHUFA Holding AG, 2010).  
In the majority of articles on the topic, the authors do not specify their understanding of 
the concept. However, with different research objectives, it becomes clear that a further 
differentiation is often implied. For example, Lea (1999) defines credit as an agreement between 
borrower and lender about planned postponed payments. For him, credit turns into debt as soon 
as a borrower is in arrear of payments. Thus, he clearly differentiates between the two terms and 
uses them in a rather specialized way.  
From an economic point of view, credit and debt are synonymous. The present thesis 
follows this understanding, but uses a more elaborated concept of consumer credit. Specifically, 
it follows the understanding of the Federal Reserve System (2016). Accordingly, consumer credit 
is defined as all credit for individual consumers to finance “household, family, and other 
personal expenditures, excluding loans secured by real estate” (Federal Reserve System (2016). 
This definition excludes mortgages for home purchase as well as home equity lines of credit. 
This seems legitimate, because for most people, acquiring real estate is a one-time situation with 
much higher stakes and different regulations credit-wise as compared to, for example, buying a 
new laptop or even a car. 
Consumer credit can be broken down to two forms of credit: Non-revolving credit and 
revolving credit (Federal Reserve System, 2016). Non-revolving credit is characterized by a 
fixed amount and a prearranged repayment schedule. Only changes in the contract allow for an 
adaption of these terms. Non-revolving credit includes mainly credits for cars and other vehicles 
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as well as educational loans, but also 0%-interest credits for consumer electronics. In contrast, 
revolving credit allows the consumer to borrow money up to an individual limit with repayments 
not following a specific plan and in most cases stretching over an indefinite period. Nevertheless, 
consumers often have to make minimum monthly payments, to avoid penalties. Revolving credit 
includes mainly credit cards and overdraft plans. In most cases, the interest rates for revolving 
credit are higher than for non-revolving credit.  
Recent history of consumer credit. 
The general idea of credit dates back a long time. The practice of loaning money and the 
implementation of interest dates back to Mesopotamia at around 3000 BC (Graeber, 2011). 
However, the modern understanding of consumer credit is quite new. The reason is that for a 
long time, there was no significant demand for it. Despite some furniture or sewing machines, 
average people did not make large acquisitions. Only with the increasing urbanization, industrial 
production of consumer goods and the growth of the middle class did the need for credit rise, 
because people started to buy cars as well as large amounts of durable goods and wanted to 
secure a good education for their children, requiring college tuition (Durkin, Elliehausen, Staten, 
& Zywicki, 2014). 
Recently, consumer credit has greatly increased in the U.S. The outstanding amount of 
consumer credit balances increased from $1.54 trillion in January 2000 to $2.46 trillion in 
January 2007, before the first signs of the upcoming financial crisis, stalled there until around 
2011 and since then increased to $3.77 trillion in January 2017 (Federal Reserve System, 2017). 
To put this figure into perspective: It equals the combined GDP of Belgium and Germany in 
2015 (World Bank, 2017). Of this sum, one quarter corresponds to revolving credit, with credit 
cards being the most common example in this category. The increasingly high levels of credit are 
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not a phenomenon that is restricted to the U.S. Although the figures are much lower for other 
countries like Great Britain (£0.19 trillion in January 2017; Bank of England, 2017) or France 
(€0.16 trillion in January 2017; Banque de France, 2017), one has to take into account that these 
countries have smaller populations, i.e., less people who can take credits, and weaker economic 
performances. Germany represents a somewhat special case. Contrary to other countries, 
Germany did not see a rather linear or even exponential increase in outstanding consumer credit 
balances after the financial crisis: The figures dropped from €8.38 billion in January 2007 to 
€4.38 billion in December 2012 and then rose again to €8.60 billion in January 2017 (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2017). Besides the fluctuations and the lack of a general trend, the present total 
credit amount is also much smaller than in the above-named countries. However, this is rather an 
exception to the more general trend of increasingly high levels of consumer credit.   
Economic Consequences of an Increase in Credit Use 
Rising amounts of outstanding credit are not necessarily problematic. Rather they are a 
logical consequence of rising income levels and living expenses. However, too high outstanding 
balances are often seen as alarming. Economists argue that this debt burden could lead to a 
decrease in future spending behavior and thus thwart economic growth (Barba & Pivetti, 2009). 
On the individual level, the worst financial consequence would be private bankruptcy, designed 
to actually limit the damage that individuals can suffer after being unable to repay their credits. 
So far, there was no financial crisis that could be traced back to the steep increase in consumer 
credit in the present definition and the development of private bankruptcies is also quite assuring. 
For example, in the U.S. 597.97 thousand people filed bankruptcy in 2006. The figure increased 
to 1,536.80 thousand in 2010, probably as a reaction to the financial crisis, and from then kept 
decreasing constantly to 770.85 thousand in 2016 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
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2007, 2011, 2017). This equals 0.24% of the population (United States Census Bureau, 2017). In 
Germany, the trend is exactly the same, with lower numbers: 127.29 thousand people filed 
bankruptcy in 2006. The figure increased to 136.46 thousand in 2010, and from then kept 
decreasing constantly to 101.00 thousand in 2016 (German Federal Statistical Office, 2017). This 
equals 0.12% of the population (German Federal Statistical Office, 2016).  
Psychological Consequences of Credit Use 
Overall, the economic consequences of high credit levels seem to be less worrisome than 
expected – at least regarding the extremes. Nevertheless, that does not imply that extensive credit 
use comes without disadvantages. Psychological consequences go beyond economic figures and 
can be classified as direct consequences for the consumption of the financed product, 
consequences for the individual in general and consequences beyond individuals. 
In the context of direct consequences, mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) represents 
an important theoretical framework. The general idea is that people keep track of mental 
accounts for specific expenditure categories. Taking up credit leads to more fine-grained mental 
accounting, i.e., a stricter allocation of budgets for specific expenses (Antonides, de Groot, & 
van Raaij, 2011). As a consequence, it could be that people cut back consumption in a specific 
domain after depleting the respective mental account and buying a last product in that domain on 
credit, despite the fact that they still have money available because of low spending in other 
mental accounts. 
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) linked pain of paying and pleasure of consumption to 
refine the theory to the double entry mental accounting theory. It specifies the conditions under 
which people either integrate or separate the pain that comes with making a payment and the 
pleasure that comes from consuming a desired product or service. In comparison to paying cash, 
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paying with a credit card separates these two, because the payment of outstanding balances is 
temporally disconnected. Furthermore, a single payment for a specific good is not felt that 
specific, because the outstanding balance is a sum of a number of payments, making it hard to 
identify single purchases. In the purchase situation, credit card payment is therefore related to 
rather low pain of paying (Soman, 2003). This has several implications. For example, Thomas, 
Desai, and Seenivasan (2011) found that vice products like cakes or chocolate trigger impulsive 
purchase decisions due to the associated desire. Pain of payment steers in the opposite direction 
and tends to prevent such decisions. However, when participants in their study paid by credit 
card, this counter-measure was missing, leading to an increase in vice product purchase. Thus, 
credit use has an impact on what consumers spend their money on.  
Furthermore, research suggests that credit use also influences post-payment connection to 
the product. Specifically, consumers interpret cash payments as an investment in the product, 
whereas purchases on credit lack this perspective. Thus, immediate feelings of psychological 
ownership, defined as the extent to which a product is perceived as really belonging to the owner 
and being part of him (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003), are lower for products purchased on 
credit than for those purchased on cash (Kamleitner & Erki, 2013). In addition, this lack of 
emotional attachment to the purchased product leads to increased commitment to other 
alternatives, in case of donations a decreased likelihood to show signs of commitment to the 
target organization and a decreased likelihood for repeated purchases and transactions (Shah, 
Eisenkraft, Bettmann, & Chartrand, 2016). These results demonstrate, that credit use not only has 
an influence on what products or services people buy but also how the choice of payment mode 
affects how they perceive these products and services immediately after the purchase. 
Furthermore, credit use has implications for future consumption encounters.  
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Credit use also comes with consequences for the individual itself. The most intensively 
investigated topics are probably, consequences for economic hardship, mental health and well-
being.  
Regarding economic hardship Despard et al. (2016) found from a sample of students with 
low-to-moderate incomes that holding student debt was associated with a higher chance to be 
unable to repay installments in full, to skip bills and be unable to afford the food that they 
desired, as compared to students who did not hold student debt. In part, this represents typical 
strategies to cope with outstanding credits. Especially, lower income individuals rely strongly on 
debt juggling, characterized by repaying bills in a rotating manner, taking new credit to make 
due repayments and paying less than the minimal repayment amount, as well as on a strategy of 
ignorance, characterized by a rejection of responsibility and ignorance against financial 
obligations (Tach & Greene, 2014). Controlling for lifestyle and a range of economic factors, 
Meltzer et al. (2011) showed that credit holders were twice as likely to think of suicide as a 
solution to their financial situation. When they held multiple debts or fell behind on their 
repayments, the risk was particularly high. This direct effect even held true after controlling for 
hopelessness. 
In the context of credit use and mental health, recent results demonstrate that student 
loans are associated with poorer psychological functioning, meaning that students dependent on 
student loans feel more often nervous, downhearted and depressed and less often calm, peaceful 
and happy (Walsemann, Gee, & Gentile, 2015). The results are not restricted to the specific 
subgroup: Especially a long time in debt and a change from moderate to high debt levels leads to 
an increase in depressive symptoms (Hojman, Miranda, & Ruiz-Tagle, 2016). In contrast, a 
decrease in credit levels reduces the occurrence of the symptoms, offering a way out for those 
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who can afford it. In contrast to the results above, Hodson, Dwyer, & Neilson (2014) found that 
the frequent use of short-term credits does not contribute to heightened levels of stress. 
According to them, people with particularly low incomes show weaker signs of emotional 
suffering from debt. For them, securing the necessary money to afford basic necessities seems to 
be more pressing than repaying outstanding balances.  
Closely linked to health is the construct of well-being. Brown, Taylor, and Price (2005) 
found a strong relationship between outstanding credit and reported well-being. The negative 
impact of holding credit outweighed the antagonistic effect of saving behavior by a factor of over 
two, demonstrating the harmfulness of credit. The perception of the current financial situation 
plays a major role, compared to the actual amount of outstanding credit, highlighting 
interindividual differences in the effect on well-being. Interestingly, mortgages do not affect 
well-being. The effect is limited to consumer credit. Longitudinal analyses show that the effect is 
stronger for short-run debtors as compared to long-run debtors (Shen et al., 2014), contrasting 
the afore-mentioned effect on depressive symptoms (Hojman, et al., 2016). This speaks for some 
form of habituation. Financial assistance from family members can attenuate the negative 
influence of credit use on well-being. However, assistance from friends or banks rather has the 
opposite effect, as it resembles a last-resort option that is likely to result in a debt trap (Tsai, 
Dwyer, & Tsay, 2016). 
 As can be seen from the examples above, the psychological consequences of credit use 
for the individual consumer are manifold and touch on different aspects of her life. Despite the 
complexity, the consequences of credit do not stop here but go beyond individual persons, 
affecting interpersonal relations and the society as a whole. For example, being indebted and 
especially being unable to repay outstanding credits is seen as a sign of irresponsibility, 
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selfishness and the inability to deal with monetary issues. Being confronted with stigmatization, 
even from close others, debtors feel ashamed and withdraw from situations where their credit use 
could become apparent (Hayes, 2000). At the same time, creditors have the feeling of following 
societal rules when they engage in heavy consumption. They interpret their individual credit 
limit for a value of their person in the eyes of others (Peñaloza & Barnhart, 2011). In this light, 
visibility of credit use is an important element. As Sotiropoulos and D’Astous (2012) 
demonstrated, this is particularly true for young adults. They found that in this group, 
perceptions of close peers’ credit card balances affect individual overspending on credit because 
the young adults feel an expectation towards themselves to consume on similar levels. 
As can be seen from these findings, credit use affects how people interact with others and 
shapes their views of themselves. Furthermore, it influences behavior in social networks and 
leads to social norms that in return influence people’s perception.  
Overall, the aspects covered in this section make clear, that credit use is a phenomenon 
with many more facets than just the economic point of view. Specifically, the psychological 
consequences constitute a complex body of research that underline the statement that psychology 
can greatly contribute to the understanding of credit use. More so, the discipline should commit 
even more strongly to the topic, as the consequences of credit use are broad and substantial. With 
the individual decision to enter a credit contract at the core of the matter, the relevance for 
psychological research on how people come to that decision becomes clear. 
Psychological Perspectives on the Process of Credit Use 
After highlighting the relevance of the topic, the present section aims to provide a scheme 
that allows a more fine-grained consideration of the manifold psychological aspects of credit use. 
Empirical findings are presented to provide a broad understanding of the psychology of credit 
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use. The section also points out where and how the present thesis is embedded in this field of 
research. 
Contrary to everyday understanding, credit use should not be seen as an isolated event. 
Some of the previously reported consequences of credit use already stressed the point that credit 
use stretches into the future. At the same time, signing a credit contract does not represent the 
starting point of the process. For example, the decision to either buy a product on credit or to pay 
the price immediately can be situated far in advance to the purchase situation. Therefore, 
Kamleitner and Kirchler (2007) suggested to conceptualize credit use as a process, distinguishing 
between individual essential steps. Their process model identifies three distinct phases: Processes 
prior to the decision to use credit, processes related to the actual take-up decision, and processes 
that are situated after credit take-up. While the order is chronological, the model also takes into 
account that consumers might skip phases, or revert to preceding ones, in some cases. For 
example, a person might decide to purchase a product on credit and then start to compare 
different credit offers. If she cannot find an offer that suits her needs, she could return to the 
previous step and think about saving money and postponing the purchase into the future. In 
addition, the model takes into account that external factors can influence the processes in each 
step (e.g., limited access to credit because of a low credit score). 
In addition to this conceptualization of credit use as individual processes grouped into 
distinct steps, Kamleitner, Hoelzl, and Kirchler (2012) identified four different psychological 
perspectives on credit use. According to them, credit use can be understood as a reflection of the 
situation, a reflection of the person, a cognitive process or a social practice. The first perspective 
concentrates on situational factors that influence credit use, such as sociodemographic factors or 
access to credit. In contrast, credit use can be conceptualized as a phenomenon situated within 
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the person. Thus, the perspective of credit use as a reflection of the person concentrates on the 
influence of personality traits and similar stable causes. Furthermore, credit use can be analyzed 
from a cognitive perspective. This shifts the focus to cognitive processes and puts special 
emphasis on decision making. While these cognitive processes are influenced by situational and 
personal factors, they also highlight the dynamic nature of credit use. The last perspective 
construes credit use as a social phenomenon. Thus, it places great emphasis on shared values, 
social norms and interactions between individuals and groups, instead of on the specific 
characteristics of the individuals involved or the situational factors.  
Together, the process model of credit use (Kamleitner & Kirchler, 2007) and the four 
psychological perspectives on the phenomenon (Kamleitner et al., 2012) can be used to form a 
matrix, serving as a map for the landscape of psychological credit research. Columns provide the 
structural fragmentation of the process model, while the rows provide the different viewpoints of 
the distinct psychological perspectives on the individual steps. The following subsections will 
present selected empirical findings on the resulting cells of this classification, to give a structured 
overview of psychological research on credit use. 
Processes prior to the decision to use credit. 
Autio et al. (2009) investigated the use of instant loans (e.g., applied for via SMS and 
transferred immediately) among young Finnish consumers. They found that younger people, 
single parents, people with low income and those in marginal employment are most likely to 
consider credit use as an option to finance their consumption. Furthermore, such situational 
factors also influence the prospective purpose of credit take-up. For example, typical purposes of 
credit use are leisure activities and partying. However, young people with low income rather 
strongly consider credit use as mean to buy food or repay interest. Investigating the role of 
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gender in college students’ credit behavior, Hancock, Jorgensen, and Swanson (2013) found that 
women were 2.4 times more likely to own two or more credit cards than men. Assuming similar 
expenses for male and female students, this can be interpreted as a sign that women have better 
access to credit or as a preference to spread credit use across several creditors.  
In addition to this situational perspective, the phase before credit take-up can also be seen 
from a personal perspective. More specifically, Wang, Lu, and Malhotra (2011) found that 
attitudes and personality factors had greater explanatory power in regard to debt behavior than 
demographic factors. In their survey, participants with higher scores on the affective and 
behavioral dimensions of credit attitude were more likely to consider revolving credit frequently, 
while the opposite was true for the cognitive dimension of credit attitude. A possible explanation 
might be that the cognitive dimension correlates with credit knowledge. Thus, people who score 
high on the cognitive dimension are more likely to be aware of the relatively high interest rates 
of revolving credit, therefore trying to avoid this kind of credit. Furthermore, self-control, self-
efficacy, deferring gratification and locus of control were associated with the frequency of 
revolving credit use (Wang et al. 2011). Participants with high scores on these variables were 
able to manage their financial accounts better and avoid high debts. Investigating the antecedents 
of credit attitude, Richins (2011) found empirical support for the idea that materialism on the one 
hand leads to a more positive attitude towards credit use and on the other hand strengthens the 
belief that purchases lead to positive life transformations. Taken together, for highly materialistic 
persons this implies a higher likelihood to rely on credit in order to consume more.  
From a cognitive perspective, mental accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) has important 
implications for processes prior to the decision to use credit. As already noted in the general 
introduction, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) added the linkage of pain of paying and pleasure of 
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consumption to the theory. In the present context, this means that thoughts about outstanding 
installment rates can attenuate the pleasure of consumption for credit financed products. Thus, 
the theory predicts a general aversion of outstanding credit. At the same time, the fact that mental 
accounts are endowed with specific budgets could render credit use more likely. When an 
account is empty, because of high spending in the respective time period, mental accounting to 
some degree prevents people from spending even more, because the preset limit in this account is 
reached and remaining money is allocated to other accounts. The existence of mental accounts 
should prevent people from simply spending more money on a given account and therefore 
reduce the budget in other accounts. Credit represents a possibility to overcome this problem and 
continue spending in the otherwise depleted account. This represents a possible explanation for 
the common phenomenon of co-holding, i.e., having outstanding credit and at the same time 
holding liquid assets, thus being able to pay the credit off in part or completely (Gathergood & 
Weber, 2014). Asides from this, Helion and Gilovich (2014) demonstrated that people try to 
align the source of money with the characteristics of the products that they buy. Their results 
imply that people should be more likely to consider credit use for functional products while other 
payment forms like gift cards should be considered for rather hedonic products. Thus, the desired 
product also influences whether credit use is even considered as an appropriate option. 
Finally, from a social perspective, it is important to note that many products are not just 
bought because of their necessity or utilitarian character. They also serve the purpose to 
communicate one’s standard of living (Veblen, 1899). In this context, people feel the need to 
‘keep up with the Joneses’, i.e., not to fall behind in comparison to the consumption of neighbors 
or one’s peer group (Kriete-Dodds & Maringer, 2015). Credit use represents one way to reach 
this goal, because it allows to increase visible consumption even in case of low financial means. 
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Thus, perceived peer pressure can cause an increase in consumption and for that reason intense 
credit use. Using bank account data, Berlemann and Salland (2016) were able to show that the 
average income in one’s residential area influences the decision to raise debt. More specifically, 
higher comparison income leads to an increase utilization of overdrafts. Moreover, the authors 
demonstrated that one reason for this increased utilization is conspicuous consumption. It can be 
concluded that the social network in which people are embedded affects their decision to use 
credit. Through this and other pathways, society contributes to the current normalization of credit 
use (Jiang & Dunn, 2013; Peñaloza & Barnhart, 2011). 
Processes related to the actual take-up decision. 
Processes related to the actual take-up of credit focus on peoples’ beliefs about the take-
up procedures and related requirements, their perception of credit alternatives and the individual 
credit components as well as their behavior in the take-up process (Kamleitner & Kirchler, 
2007). Taking a situational perspective, an example for research in this area comes from Pulina 
(2011). Using data on a group of Italian banking customers she investigated demographic and 
socio-economic determinants of credit choice. Woman rather use credit cards that have to be 
paid in full at the end of the month, than revolving credit cards. In comparison, men prefer gold 
cards with additional benefits, such as transaction insurance and around-the-clock helpline 
service. Young people acquire revolving credit cards, people in their prime working age prefer 
credit cards that are to be paid at the end of the month and older people opt for gold cards with 
additional benefits. On the one hand, these results demonstrate that the specific need for credit 
influences the choice of credit. Young people are probably not always able to repay the credit at 
the end of the month, due to liquidity constraints. This represents an explanation via situational 
preferences. On the other hand, it could be that the situation does not just influence credit 
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preferences but also constrains the access to credit. The fact that women seem to avoid revolving 
credit cards could also be owed to the circumstance that their income is lower in comparison to 
men (Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebmer, 2005), thus limiting their choices. 
The personal perspective can add to the picture by highlighting the impact of individual-
specific factors. Back in 2012, Kamleitner et al. noted that research was silent about such factors 
in the stage of credit acquisition. Recently, this changed, allowing to draw empirically founded 
conclusions in this area. For example, objective credit knowledge prevents young consumers 
from using credit for impulse purchases. While the opposite is true for the impact of materialism, 
Cakarnis and D'Alessandro (2015) also found that materialism is positively related to better 
search behavior when looking for credit options and more advantageous credit card choices. 
Prior credit experience – as opposed to factual knowledge – led to impulsive choices of credit 
cards. Extending the picture to the choice of different forms of credit, Gathergood (2012) found 
that impulsive spending tendencies increase the likelihood to choose store cards and pay day 
loans, which represent credits with fast availability. Being financially literate increases the 
likelihood to choose personal loans and to avoid mail order purchases on credit and the use of 
credit union loans. According to Gathergood (2012) the relationship between impulse spending 
and choice of specific credit options partly mediates the relationship between impulse spending 
and over-indebtedness. This highlights the importance of the personal perspective in this stage of 
credit use. 
As already noted in the beginning of this subsection, processes related to the actual take-
up of credit focus on peoples’ perception of credit in general as well as credit alternatives and 
individual credit components (Kamleitner & Kirchler, 2007). The strong emphasis on perception 
already points out the cognitive perspective in this context. Investigating the impact of mental 
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abstraction and different modes of information processing on credit evaluation and credit choice, 
the present thesis mostly relates to the cognitive perspective on processes during credit take-up. 
Most research in this area concentrates on how people perceive specific aspects of credits like 
the annual percentage rate or monthly installments. Because these results are especially relevant 
for the subsequently presented studies in the empirical parts of this thesis, they are presented in 
more detail after this overview on different stages of the credit process and different 
psychological perspectives. However, the cognitive perspective also covers further research. For 
example, Khan, Belk, and Craig-Lees (2015) recently demonstrated that positive emotions 
related to card based payment modes are stronger for people who own more credit cards and 
make frequent debit transactions. It is likely that the frequent usage of credit leads to a more 
favorable perception of credit use but also that a favorable perception in the first place leads to a 
more frequent use of credit. Thus, consumers form cognitive associations with credit use that 
affect actual credit behavior. Besides from these associations, the cognitive perspective also 
considers secondary credit aspects like payment protection insurances (Ranyard & McHugh, 
2012). Here, it was found that such insurances are bought in part because of the anticipated 
worry reduction that they offer. People who perceive a high probability of repayment difficulties 
anticipate to worry more about the repayment and thus are more likely to purchase an insurance 
in order to prevent these worries.  
Turning to the social perspective on credit take-up, Sotiropoulos and D’Astous (2012) 
found that perceptions of close peers’ credit card balances affect individual overspending on 
credit because people feel an expectation towards themselves to consume on similar levels. 
Broadening the view from close friends to larger groups of neighbors, empirical evidence 
suggests that the education level in a given zip code significantly influences financial literacy of 
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individual residents, which in turn is related to credit use (Lachance, 2014). Thus, the social 
surrounding also influences various credit measures. Specifically, via one’s zip code education 
the social surrounding influences various credit measures such as having a credit card, use of 
high-cost loans, carrying over balanced on credit cards and using credit cards for cash advance. 
However, the specific mechanism remains unclear with social learning and social norms being 
possible candidates to play a role. Furthermore, the social network can also serve as a source for 
informal credit. While this might sound good for people who have limited access to formal credit 
alternatives, results point into another direction: Espvall and Dellgran (2010) analyzed 
representative survey data on Swedish citizens and found that especially people in economic 
hardship have problems to receive credit from informal sources. The situation might be less 
severe for young adults, because they can to some degree rely on family members (Heath & 
Calvert, 2013). As a consequence of such transfers, the boundaries between gifts and credit is 
blurred in this group. Thus, social ties in general greatly influence the access to credit as well as 
specific credit use and as a consequence also shape individuals’ perceptions of the concept or 
credit. 
Processes after credit take-up. 
Research on processes after credit take-up mainly focuses on how people perceive their 
credit burden, how they manage the repayment and how the process of dealing with outstanding 
credit influences consumption and future credit use (Kamleitner & Kirchler, 2007). Carter (2015) 
found that experience with payday loans increases the likelihood to turn to other rather expensive 
kinds of credit like pawnshop usage, but only for those debtors with relatively low income. This 
could lead to even higher debts in the long run. Aside from the economic hardship, this is 
problematic because indebted people report a higher frequency of suicidal intentions than people 
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without debt (Meltzer et al., 2011). In this context, debt accumulated by shopping is a more 
serious concern as compared to debt from housing or expenses for utilities. However, the 
combination of several sources leads to a higher likelihood to report frequent suicidal intentions. 
While these results highlight the need to get out of debt, McHugh and Ranyard (2012) 
investigated whether credit information can help consumers to achieve this goal. They 
demonstrated that precise information on total cost and credit duration lead to higher credit 
repayments in a given time period. However, the positive effects of disposable income and 
education were stronger than the effect of precise information.  
Taking the personal perspective, Ganzach and Amar (2017) extended these findings by 
adding insights on the impact of intelligence and personality factors on repayment. According to 
their results, more intelligent people more seldom miss to make a due repayment than less 
intelligent people, when the consequences of doing so are high. In case of low consequences, 
there was no difference in their repayment data. It was assumed that this is because higher 
consequences lead to a higher involvement, calling for the mobilization of cognitive resources, 
whereas less severe consequences do not lead more intelligent people to make use of their 
advantage. Similarly, personality factors also just affected repayment behavior for credits with 
severe consequences in case of missed repayments (Ganzach & Amar, 2017). Specifically, 
people high on conscientiousness and low on neuroticism were more likely to make their 
repayments on time. Further research on processes after credit take-up, taking a personal 
perspective, concentrates on the link of credit and well-being. In this regard, Shen et al. (2014) 
found that outstanding credit balances cause stress, leading to decreased psychological well-
being. The authors further found a habituation effect: Being indebted for longer time periods led 
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to a decrease in stress and an increase in well-being. However, long-term debtors still reported 
lower levels of well-being than non-debtors. 
Under the cognitive perspective, recent literature concentrated on repayment strategies 
for multiple credits. In case of multiple credit accounts with outstanding balances, people tend to 
pursue subgoals rather than the superordinate goal of getting out of debt as fast as possible. 
Regardless of the annual percentage rate, they try to pay off small credits first, in order to reach 
the goal of closing an account – even if that account has a comparably small annual percentage 
rate (Amar, Ariely, Ayal, Cryder, & Rick, 2011; Besharat, Carrillat, & Ladik, 2014). This 
behavior is even more pronounced when the smaller credits are related to hedonic spending in 
the far gone past because of the mental coupling with the decreasing pleasure of consumption 
over time (Besharat, Varki, & Craig, 2015). This shows that on a cognitive level, debt repayment 
is not just an issue of economic rationality. It would be hasty to conclude that this is a 
disadvantage for consumers in the long run, due to the monetary loss associated with such 
strategies. Kettle, Trudel, Blanchard, and Häubl (2016) demonstrated that consumers interpret a 
great proportional balance reduction in any one account as a signal of success in their way to 
complete debt repayment. This motivating aspect might help them to stick to high repayments 
throughout longer time periods. Aside from multiple debt account management, research in this 
area concentrates on perceptions of the repayment processes and associated biases. For example, 
Soll, Keeney, and Larrick (2013) found peoples’ perceptions of how much they had to repay 
each month in order to repay a given credit in 3 years to be biased, depending on their numeracy. 
Furthermore, people have problems to estimate the required payments when they still use the 
credit card that they pay off. 
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Finally, under the social perspective, the impact of outstanding credit on family life 
gathered some attention. Being indebted increases the likelihood of financial conflict with the 
partner, thus lowering marital satisfaction and increasing the likelihood of getting divorced 
(Dew, 2011). Considering that financial disagreements are one of the strongest predictors of 
divorce in comparison to other areas of disagreements (Dew, Britt, & Huston, 2012), this is of 
particular importance.  
Cognitive processing of credit offers. 
Because of the high relevance for the present thesis, this section focuses on the 
perception of credit aspects and their influence on the credit decision as a specific case of the 
cognitive perspective on processes during credit take-up (Kamleitner & Kirchler, 2007).  
In general, outstanding balances is something that people prefer to avoid, resulting in a 
preference for shorter credit durations over longer credit durations (Wonder, Wilhelm, & 
Fewings, 2008). This even holds when credit is offered free of costs. However, people also 
prefer credits with duration aligned to the expected life-cycle of the financed product (Hirst, 
Joyce, & Schadewald, 1994).  
Ranyard, Hinkley, Williamson, and McHugh (2006) presented their participants with a 
minimal description of three credit options, among which they had to choose one after asking as 
many questions about all offer as they wanted. If the product that was to be financed by the 
credit was more expensive (a car instead of a washing machine), people generally asked more 
questions. Nevertheless, the rank order of the credit aspects that they asked about was the same: 
Around two thirds asked about the annual percentage rate and about half of the participants 
asked about the monthly repayments. Credit duration and total cost seemed to be less important 
with only around one third and one fifth of participants asking respective questions. Only 5% of 
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participants asked for a deposit, framing this aspect the least important one. However, when the 
deposit is high, rebates also become important for peoples’ credit choice (Wonder et al., 2008). 
Herrmann and Wrickle (1998) even demonstrated that the deposit is more important for the 
formation of price judgements than the credit duration. In their experiments, monthly repayments 
was the most important credit aspect. For a comparison with the previously reported results it is 
important to note that they did not provide information on the annual percentage rate in any of 
their experiments. In a similar experiment, Ranyard et al. (2006) found that their participants’ 
credit choice was influenced mainly by information on the annual percentage rate. This effect 
vanished when information on total cost was provided as well. In this experiment, monthly 
repayments were not an important aspect for credit choice.  
The fact that people do not necessarily ask for the same things that they look for when 
information is provided suggests that people do not always have a predefined idea of what is 
most important for their credit decision. Furthermore, given the respective information, they use 
the information on credit aspects in a rather heuristic way (McHugh, Ranyard, & Lewis, 2011). 
For example, people tend to follow a heuristic that favors the credit offer with the lowest annual 
percentage rate. Part of this is probably owed to the finding that peoples’ understanding of the 
measure is rather limited (Stango & Zinman, 2009), especially in case of low financial literacy 
(Disney & Gathergood, 2013). Regardless of other possible reasons, this heuristic processing 
then leads to underestimations of later costs (Stango & Zinman, 2009). Similarly, calculations of 
total cost also follow rules of thumb, leading to an overestimation of this credit aspect. When the 
duration of a credit is not provided, people tend to underestimate the time it takes to repay the 
outstanding balance completely, with mental accounting (Ranyard & Craig, 1993) and 
hyperbolic time preferences (Overton & MacFadyen, 1998) offering only partial explanations. 
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Regarding monthly repayments, people tend to focus on the first digit, especially when education 
is low (Wonder et al. 2008).  
All these results speak against a perfect understanding and rational processing of credit 
offers. In sum, people have limited understanding of the individual credit aspects and use 
heuristics instead of clear calculations, when detailed information is not provided. The 
interrelations of the credit aspects is not always clear and their importance for the credit decision 
varies to some extent. 
Overall, a credit decision presents people with a variety of information in different units 
of measurement (e.g., percentage, € per month, years, etc.). Next to the perception and cognitive 
processing of individual credit aspects, the complexity of the overall credit offer may be 
confusing for many people. High perceived price complexity leads to lower perceived price 
fairness and product choice (Homburg, Totzek, & Krämer, 2014). This is because people 
evaluate the respective seller’s pricing practices negatively and expect the total price to be 
relatively high. Köcher and Holzmüller (2014) demonstrated this effect in the credit context and 
found the relationship between complexity of information and credit evaluation to be particularly 
strong when trust in the creditor was low. 
Part I – Construal Level and Credit Attractiveness 
The main purpose of this first part of the thesis is to extend research on credit choice by 
examining the importance of different credit aspects on the credit decision in low and high 
construal level. To this end, two laboratory experiments were conducted in which construal level 
was manipulated using concrete or abstract mindset manipulations. 
The following subsections will first outline the core ideas of construal level theory, 
followed by an in-depth presentation of the dimensions of psychological distance and their 
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influence on consumer decision making. A final subsection will concentrate on different ways to 
manipulate construal level, before the actual studies are presented. Hypotheses are derived from 
the theoretical background and introduced individually with each study.  
Construal Level Theory 
Direct experience is limited to the self in the here and now: The past has gone by, the 
future is yet to come and only in the present moment do people experience themselves and their 
direct surrounding which they perceive through their senses. Yet, this immediate and direct 
experience is not the sole basis for thoughts, emotions and behaviors. Instead, people have the 
ability to also process more abstract information: For example, they can imagine their last 
birthday, the upcoming holiday in a foreign country, alternatives to watching a basketball game 
and their friends’ reactions to a surprise party. According to construal level theory (CLT; 
Liberman & Trope, 2008; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, 
Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007), such memories and predictions or speculations are psychologically 
distant from the self in the here and now. More precisely, psychological distance increases with 
the distance of an event, person or object to the self in the here and now in terms of time, space, 
social distance and hypotheticality. The central idea of construal level theory then is that 
psychological distance influences mental construals and vice versa (Soderberg, Callahan, 
Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2015). For example, the more psychologically distant an 
event, the more abstract do we construe it mentally and the more concrete our mental construal 
of an object, the less psychologically distant do we perceive it from our self in the here and now. 
In contrast to psychological distance, construal level thus specifies how concrete or abstract an 
event, person or object is represented mentally. In the following paragraphs, the concept of 
construal levels and the interrelation with psychological distance will be further clarified. 
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High-level construals are relatively more abstract mental representations focused on 
central aspects. Contrary, low-level construals are relatively more concrete mental 
representations focused on specific aspects that are relevant in a given context (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). The activity of writing a scientific journal article can be construed as 
“advancing a career in academia”, thereby highlighting the goal of this activity but neglecting 
more precise information. At the same time, the activity can be construed as “forming sentences 
and paragraphs, using a computer”, thereby highlighting the process of this activity but 
neglecting the bigger picture. The activity is one and the same in both construals but the former 
is a more abstract representation – a high-level construal, while the latter is a more concrete – a 
low-level construal. Each of them focuses on the information that is important to the respective 
level. For the high-level construal, it is not important whether the activity is performed using a 
computer or using pen and paper, therefore it does not include information on this aspect. In turn, 
for the low-level construal, it is not important whether the activity is performed to advance a 
career or to practice a form of scientific communication, therefore it does not include 
information on this aspect.  
It is important to note, that increasing the level of abstraction does not just imply a loss of 
specific information but also an enrichment with new information on the meaning. Describing 
high-level construals as simply more vague compared to low-level construals would therefore 
fall short of the general idea of construal levels. Furthermore, the shift from context specific 
information towards more core information also implies a hierarchy that argues for an infinite 
number of construals levels, instead of just a low construal level and a high construal level. To 
stick with the previous example, the activity of writing a scientific journal article could also be 
construed as “getting pleasure from achievements in working life”, which is an even higher 
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construal as compared to “advancing a career in academia”, because it focuses on an even higher 
goal and thus more central aspect of the activity.  
Trope and Liberman (2010) introduced two criteria to distinguish between higher-level 
aspects and lower-level aspects of an event, person or object: Centrality and subordination. 
Centrality refers to the fact that the meaning of an event, person or object is more strongly 
affected by a change in high-level aspects than by a change in low-level aspects. Changing from 
writing a scientific journal article at home to writing it at the office does not influence the 
meaning much. However, changing from writing a scientific journal article to advance the 
personal career to writing it to earn money as a ghostwriter does have a relatively large influence 
on the meaning. Subordination refers to the fact that the meaning of low construal level aspects 
depends stronger on high construal level aspects than it is the other way round. When thinking 
about writing a scientific journal article, the location of writing only becomes relevant if one 
already decided to pursue the goal of advancing a career in academia. However, the question 
whether that is the case is relevant regardless of whether one would pursue it at home or in the 
office.  
While centrality and subordination represent the criteria to distinguish between high-level 
aspects and low-level aspects of an event, person or object, other characteristics have been 
brought forward to distinguish between high-level construals and low-level construals (Table 1). 
 As already said, high-level construals are more abstract and goal relevant, while low-
level construals are more concrete and goal irrelevant. Because high-level construals focus more 
on the primary aspects of an event, person or object, they tend to be rather simple and detached 
from context. In contrast, low-level construals focus more on secondary aspects and tend to be 
rather complex and embedded in context (Leiser, Azar, & Hadar, 2008). Similarly, construals of  
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objects or goals differ such that desirability of attaining an object or end-state is characteristic of 
high-level construals, whereas feasibility of attaining an object or end-state is characteristic of 
low-level construals (Liberman & Trope, 1998).   
Psychological Distance and its Dimensions 
Construal level theory states that events, persons or objects are mentally construed on a 
higher level, the further away they are from the self in the here and now. Trope and Liberman 
(2010) argue that this is the case because one perceives objects differently from different 
distances. For example, a bike as seen from a distance of 500 meters can be distinguished from a 
car. One can identify the two wheels and the general shape. Thus, it can be construed as a means 
of transportation that is powered by physical strength. The same bike as seen from a distance of 2 
meters looks quite different. Now, the observer can see the broken suspension fork, a flat tire, 
rust on the spokes, and an engraved name on the frame. Thus, the bike can be construed as Tim’s 
old mountain bike waiting to be picked-up and scrapped. This connection of construal level and 
distance is very useful: Given the choice, one might decide from the distance to ride the bike or 
the car. To make the decision, high-level construals of both objects are well suited, as they make 
Table 1 
Characteristics of High-Level Construals and Low-Level Construals 
High-level construals Low-level construals 
Abstract Concrete 
Simple Complex 
Structured, coherent Unstructured, incoherent 
Decontextualized Contextualized 
Primary, core Secondary, surface 
Superordinate Subordinate 
Goal relevant Goal irrelevant 
Desirability Feasibility 
Value Probability 
Note. Adapted from “Psychological Construal of Economic Behavior,” by D. Leiser, O. H. 
Azar, and L. Hadar, 2008, Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, p. 765. Copyright 2008 by 
Elsevier. 
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it clear that the bike is the healthier option. Approaching the bike racks, the low-level construals 
of the individual bikes are well suited to pick one’s own bike instead of Tim’s old mountain bike, 
as they focus on the individual differences and details. 
The given example highlights psychological distance in the spatial domain. However, as 
already noted, psychological distance refers to more than just one dimension. In fact, construal 
level theory identified four underlying dimensions of psychological distance. Asides from the 
spatial dimension, events, persons or objects can also be distant in time (e.g., doing something 
now or in a year), socially distant (the best friend or a stranger from another country) and 
hypothetically distant (the chance of missing the bus or winning in the lottery; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). All four dimensions have in common that the self in the here and now 
represents a zero distance point and that they stretch out infinitely from this point, thereby 
increasing the distance to this point. Furthermore, it holds true for each of the dimensions, that 
increasing the distance requires a higher level of abstraction because only the self in the here and 
now and its immediate surrounding can be the subject of direct experience (Bar-Anan, Liberman, 
Trope, & Algom, 2007).  
If psychological distance is a common aspect in all four dimensions, it seems appropriate 
to assume that they are mentally associated with one another (Liberman & Trope, 2008, 2014), 
such that for example thinking about a faraway place should rather bring to mind the distant 
future than the near future. In order to test the proposed interrelation of the distance dimensions, 
Bar-Anan et al. (2007) conducted a set of Stroop tasks. Participants saw a picture of a landscape 
with an arrow pointing to either a distant or a nearby location (spatial distance). The arrow was 
labelled with words that either signaled high distance (e.g., year, others, maybe) or low distance 
(e.g., tomorrow, we, sure) on the dimensions of temporal distance, social distance and 
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hypotheticality. Participants’ task was to indicate whether the labelled arrow pointed to a distant 
location or a nearby location, regardless of the label or to identify the label, regardless of the 
position of the arrow. The result that participants reacted faster to distance-congruent trials than 
to distance-incongruent trials was interpreted as evidence that psychological distance is a shared 
aspect of the four distance dimensions that is accessed automatically.  
Further research building on this assumption also suggests that the distance of a given 
stimulus on one of the dimensions also affects the perception of its distance on the other 
dimensions. For example, Stephan, Liberman, and Trope (2010) showed that social distance, 
manipulated as formal and polite or colloquial and less polite, influenced the perceived spatial 
and temporal distance towards the communication partner. Complementary, Williams and Bargh 
(2008) found that high spatial distance, as compared to low spatial distance, induced by an 
unrelated task, led to less self-perceived strength of participants’ bonds to their siblings, parents 
and hometown – that is to higher social distance. Wakslak (2012) presented similar evidence for 
the link between hypotheticality and spatial as well as temporal distance. While the dimensions 
of spatial, temporal and social distance as well as hypotheticality are not essentially the same, 
these results show that the concept of psychological distance unites them to some extent. 
Manipulating Construal Level 
Studies utilizing construal level theory usually rely on experimental manipulations to 
induce low construal level or high construal level. With regard to this goal, two broad categories 
of studies can be distinguished: A first category of studies manipulates one or more dimensions 
of psychological distance. This is because the theory links higher psychological distance to more 
abstract construals. In contrast, studies from a second category take a more direct approach and 
manipulate mental abstraction directly using experimental mindset manipulations. Both 
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approaches have been used frequently and consistently proved their effectiveness throughout 
different contexts (Yan, Hou, & Unger, 2014). The following paragraphs will outline the 
procedures in more detail. 
  Studies that focus on manipulating psychological distance usually concentrate on the 
manipulation of one specific dimension of psychological distance. Within that context, the 
manipulations are quite similar. For example, with regard to temporal distance, participants in 
two distance conditions were asked to imagine their lives or to perform an activity either 
tomorrow or in a year from today (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004). Regarding spatial 
distance, participants were asked to imagine helping a friend to move into a new flat. The 
location of the new home was described to be either close by or several thousand miles away 
from the location where the study took place (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 
2006). While it is common in manipulations of psychological distance to ask participants to 
imagine a situation or action, this is not typical for all manipulations. For a manipulation of 
social distance, for example, participants either received a certain piece of information from an 
in-group member (e.g., someone from the same university) or an out-group member (e.g., 
someone from another university; Zhao & Xie, 2011). Finally, regarding hypothetical distance, 
Kanten (2011) informed his participants about a task that they would complete later in the study. 
In the low distance condition that task was said to follow for sure, while in the high distance 
condition the task was said to follow maybe. An overview on further often-used psychological 
distance manipulations is printed in Table 2. 
The majority of studies that uses manipulations of psychological distance like the 
described ones concentrates on manipulations targeting temporal distance (Soderberg, et al., 
2015). A possible explanation is that Liberman and Trope (1998) developed the present version  
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of construal level theory coming from the idea of temporal distance. Later on, the concept of 
psychological distance was extended to encompass spatial distance and afterwards social 
distance and hypothetical distance as well (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Thus, manipulations of 
temporal distance have a longer history and are therefore well-established. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence points towards an equal treatment of the various manipulations: A recent 
meta-analysis found that the effectiveness of psychological distance manipulations is not 
affected by the distance dimension that the manipulation focusses on (Soderberg et al., 2015). On 
average, a reliable and medium-sized effect of the manipulations on participants’ level of 
Table 2 
Example Psychological Distance Manipulations 
Distance type Manipulation 
Temporal • Participants imagine their life tomorrow vs. a year from now and write 
about it for 5 minutes  
• Participants imagine making a choice tomorrow vs. a month from now 
 • Participants make predictions about events that will occur in the near or 
distant future 
  
Spatial • Participants imagine they are going on a trip to a nearby or distant location 
 • Participants are told that the study materials were created at a nearby or 
distant location 
 • Participants believe they are talking to or making judgments about others 
who are in a nearby or distant location 
  
Social • Participants are asked to make a choice for themselves or for another 
person 
 • Participants make judgments about a similar (same birthday) or dissimilar 
(different birthday) individual 
 • Participants made judgments about ingroup or outgroup members 
  
Hypothetical • Participants believe there is a high or low likelihood that they will 
complete a task later in the study 
 • Participants make judgments about an event that has a high or low 
probability of occurring 
Note. Retrieved from “The Effects of Psychological Distance on Abstraction: Two Meta-
Analyses,” by C. D. Soderberg, S. P. Callahan, A. O. Kochersberger, E. Amit, and A. 
Ledgerwood, 2015, Psychological Bulletin, 141, p. 527. Copyright 2014 by American 
Psychological Association. 
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abstraction was obtained. 
In contrast, another set of studies manipulated construal level directly using experimental 
mindset manipulations focusing on mental abstraction. Two very common manipulations of this 
sort are the reasons-means task (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004) and the categories-
exemplars task (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). In the reasons-means task 
(Freitas et al., 2004), participants in the high construal level condition are asked to think about 
why they would pursue a goal, while participants in the low construal level condition are asked 
to think about how they would pursue a goal. Questions for reasons target the purpose of an 
activity or event, which is a primary concern. In contrast, questions for means target the process 
of an activity or the way to an event, which are secondary concerns. Therefore, it is argued that 
thinking about questions for reasons activates high-level construals by bringing to mind the 
bigger picture that is rather abstract, while thinking about questions for means activates low-level 
construals by bringing to mind the procedural details that are rather concrete. In the categories-
exemplars task (Fujita, Trope et al., 2006), participants in the low construal level condition are 
asked to generate subordinate exemplars for a number of stimulus words (e.g., pasta), whereas 
participants in the high construal level condition are asked to generate superordinate categories 
for the same words. The idea behind this is that generating superordinate categories is a cognitive 
process that is linked to high construal level, while generating subordinate exemplars is a process 
linked to low construal level (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). Thus, engaging in one of 
these processes leads to an activation of the respective construal level.  
According to Gilead, Liberman, and Maril (2014), up to 2012, more than 50 studies used 
the reasons-means task and around 20 studies used the categories-exemplars task to manipulate 
construal level. With a continuing employment in the present, these two measures are the most 
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widely used direct manipulations of construal level but not the only ones. For example, in 
another manipulation (e.g., Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007; McCrea, Liberman, 
Trope, & Sherman, 2008), participants read about a set of activities (e.g., open a bank account). 
In the low construal level condition they then had to write two sentences on how they would go 
about each of the activities. In contrast, in the high construal level condition, they had to write 
two sentences on what characteristics are implied by each of the activities. This manipulation is 
centered on the idea that thinking about implied traits is associated with higher construal level as 
compared to thinking about the way to engage in an activity. Many further direct manipulations 
of construal level exist in the literature (e.g., Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010; McCrea et 
al., 2008; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). While they are not as often used as the two predominant 
manipulations outlined above, they all rely on the same mechanism: Participants are asked to 
think or write about a certain stimulus in a specific way that either focuses on more concrete or 
more abstract aspects of the stimulus, in order to activate either a low construal level mindset or 
a high construal level mindset.  
Research on Construal Level Theory in Economic Contexts 
While initial utilization of construal level theory focused on intertemporal choice 
problems (Liberman & Trope, 2003), theoretical improvements that led to the current state of the 
theory were paralleled by applications in the area of individual economic judgement and decision 
making (Leiser et al., 2008). An early example comes from Sagristano, Trope and Liberman 
(2002): They demonstrated that when choosing between two gambles in the distant future, 
participants mainly based their choice on payoffs. In contrast, participants mostly based their 
choice on the probabilities of the outcomes, when the two gambles were situated in the near 
future. Sagristano et al. (2002) argued that this is the case because the payoffs represent an aspect 
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of desirability and are therefore high construal features that are relevant to construals in the 
distant future, whereas the probabilities represent an aspect of feasibility and are therefore low 
construal features that are relevant to construals in the current situation or the near future. 
Related to gambling, but taking the perspective of consumer protection, Orazi, Lei, and Bove 
(2015) more recently investigated the role of construal level in advertisements against excessive 
gambling. They found that high-level construals of gambling outcomes contained rather social 
consequences, while low-level construals of gambling outcomes contained rather material 
consequences. Therefore, advertisements against gambling in the public should concentrate on 
the social consequences of gambling, because it matches people’s construal level when an 
instance of gambling is rather far away. Contrary, advertisements in arcades and on betting 
websites should concentrate on the financial consequences of gambling, because it matches 
people’s construal level when an instance of gambling is very close to them. 
While construal level theory was broadly applied in the context of risky decisions 
(Savadori & Mittone, 2015), other areas of individual economic judgement and decision making 
embraced the theory as well. The following sections will highlight some findings with regard to 
consumer preferences and buying decisions, retirement provision as well as charitable giving, to 
convey the large variety of contexts in which the theory has been used to offer explanations and 
foster understanding. 
Regarding the judgement of alternatives, Henderson (2013) found that high-level 
construals decrease the attraction of large choice sets. This is because the alternatives are more 
likely to be seen as similar and therefore redundant, as compared to perceptions of the same 
choice set in low-level construals. Similarly, Goodman and Malkoc (2012) showed that 
consumers’ preference for large assortment sizes (e.g., Broniarczyk, Hoyer, & McAlister, 1998) 
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only holds true for choices close to the here and now, but not for choices in the distant future. 
Facing a large variety and asking for a recommendation is also affected by construal level, as the 
social distance to the recommending person is related to the probability of preference shifts 
(Zhao & Xie, 2011): If the recommendation is from a more distant person, it is more likely to 
lead to a preference for a certain product in the distant future, whereas if the recommendation is 
from a close person, it is more likely to lead to a preference for a certain product in the near 
future. When facing a set of products on a shelf, their individual vertical positioning is also an 
important aspect through the lens of construal level theory (Aggarwal & Zhao, 2015). 
Kerckhove, Geuens, and Vermeir (2015) found that looking upward evoked high construal 
processing, while looking downward evoked low construal processing. This is because when 
people look downward, they usually see and process nearby stimuli, whereas when they look 
upward, the stimuli are further away from them. Participants in the experiment preferred to buy a 
printer with good print quality as an aspect of desirability over one with high reliability as an 
aspect of feasibility, when looking upwards and vice versa when looking downwards. Thus, 
products that are dominant on desirability characteristics should be placed at the top shelf, while 
products that are dominant on feasibility aspects should be placed at the bottom shelf, to increase 
sales. Furthermore, it is important how the alternatives are presented to potential customers: 
Attribute-based information leads them to consider consumption rather in the distant future and 
thus to make a choice based on high construal attributes, whereas alternative-based information 
leads them to consider consumption rather in the near future and thus make a choice based on 
low construal attributes of the products (Pizzi, Scarpi, & Marzocchi, 2014). The authors argue 
that attribute-based information activates high construal processing because attributes can be 
abstracted from the specific products and represent general features. In comparison, alternative-
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based information is clearly restricted to the alternatives at hand and thus less abstract, activating 
low construal processing.   
In the domain of saving behavior, Ülkümen and Cheema (2011) investigated the interplay 
of saving goal specificity and construal level on anticipated and realized saving success. They 
found that for people in a high construal level, specific goals work better. This is because these 
people focus on the question of why they pursue the goal. In this context, specific goals are seen 
as more important and are thus prioritized over unspecific goals. In contrast, for people in a low 
construal level, unspecific goals work better. In contrast to their high-construal peers, they focus 
on the question of how to pursue a goal. In this context, specific goals are seen as harder to 
reach, resulting in diminished goal achievement. Although the authors do not use the terms, the 
explanation is close to the idea of emphasizing aspects of desirability in high-level construals and 
aspects of feasibility in low-level construals. This is in line with other findings on the effect of 
time frames on saving behavior (Tam & Dholakia, 2011): Thoughts about saving in a specific 
future month instead of the next year led to a focus on means to attain the saving goal. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider the period of life in which people find themselves. 
Thoughts on retirement rather evoke desirability goals for younger people, because the event is 
rather far away from them, and feasibility goals for older people, because the event is closer to 
them (van Schie, Dellaert, & Donkers, 2015).  
Research on charitable giving and gift giving has as well benefited from construal level 
theory. With respect to giving intentions, Choi, Park, and Oh (2012) found that social desirability 
is a motivational aspect that is rather activated when thinking about donating blood in the distant 
future than in the near future. Thus, donation intentions are stronger influenced by idealistic 
aspects when the potential donation date is rather far ahead. Donation centers could make use of 
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this by highlighting the good cause in advertisements some months in advance and highlighting 
the simplicity and painlessness of the donation process in advertisements a few days before the 
donation appointment. Similarly, Aknin, Van Boven, and Johnson-Graham (2014) showed that 
people adopting high-level construals predict their donation to be more emotionally rewarding as 
compared to people adopting low-level construals. Regarding two other frequently considered 
resources in the domain of charitable giving, Macdonnell and White (2015) showed that appeals 
for money should be framed concretely, whereas appeals for time should be framed abstractly. In 
the context of giving, the former is considered a rather concrete resource, whereas the latter is 
considered a more abstract resource. The authors demonstrated that a fit between the cause of the 
donation and the requested resource led to an increase in donation intentions and the respective 
behavior. This fit effect is further supported by the finding that donators who perceive 
themselves as temporally or socially distant from the cause of the donation are more willing to 
donate to charitable organizations than to identifiable victims because the former is seen as more 
abstract, whereas the latter is construed more concretely (Ein-Gar & Levontin, 2013). This 
finding further highlights the multidimensionality of psychological distance in the form of 
temporal and social distance in the charity context. Finally, in the domain of gift giving, 
construal level theory might explain why people often don’t get the things they really need 
(Baskin, Wakslak, Trope, & Novemsky, 2014). For the gift-giver, the perceived distance to the 
gift is relatively high as, while the gift-receiver perceives her distance relatively low. As a 
consequence, gift-givers tend to form high-level construals of the gift, empathizing desirability 
attributes. In contrast, gift-receivers tend to form low-level construals of the gift, empathizing 
feasibility attributes. As a consequence, it is unlikely that both parties are equally happy with the 
gift, because they value different aspects of it.  
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Applications of construal level theory are not limited to the areas of research outlined 
above. For example, environmental psychology (e.g., Ramirez, Jiménez, & Gau, 2015; Sacchi, 
Riva, & Aceto, 2016), moral psychology (e.g., Mentovich, Yudkin, Tyler, & Trope, 2016; Xiao 
et al., 2015) and social psychology (e.g., Rizvi & Bobocel, 2016; Stephan et al., 2010) also 
greatly benefited from the theory. Thus, the theory has proven to be valid in its general assertions 
regarding interrelated dimensions of psychological distance and the interaction with the degree 
of abstractness of mental construals (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Furthermore, the broad 
applicability demonstrates both, the flexibility of the theory as well as the robustness of its 
outcomes. 
Construal Level Theory in the Consumer Credit Context 
In contrast to other areas of research, construal level theory has seldom been applied to 
the context of consumer credits. The few studies that touch both of them rather do so in an 
ancillary way. For example, talking about the alignment of benefits of consumption with 
payment streams, Auh, Shih, and Yoon (2008) point out that future research should focus on 
potential links between abstract and concrete benefits of credit financed goods and periodic 
payments. Although not directly linked to credit, Hansen, Kutzner, and Wänke (2013) 
demonstrated that being reminded of the concept of money triggers abstract mental construals. 
As a consequence, participants paid greater attention to central (as opposed to peripheral) aspects 
of products in a product judgement task, when reminded of money. Extending the finding by 
taking a more detailed look at specific forms of money, Chatterjee and Rose (2012) found that 
consumers primed with credit card payment focus on the benefits of a product, while consumers 
primed with cash payment focus on costs of the product. In an attempt to align their results with 
an established theoretical framework, the authors identified construal level theory as a potential 
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candidate. Specifically, they argued that credit payment could be construed on a more abstract 
level as compared to cash payment, because the use of credit shifts the payment situation to the 
future, whereas payments with cash are immediate. Asides from the temporal distance, credit 
payments are part of a monthly set of payments for different goods and services, while cash 
payment is more specifically tied to a single identifiable purchase. In line with these ideas, Chen, 
Xu, and Shen (2016) presented further evidence for a link of construal level and consumer credit. 
In one of their studies, participants primed with the concept of credit card payment showed a 
stronger preference for a job with a big-picture orientation, while participants primed with the 
concept of cash payment showed a stronger preference for a job with a detail orientation. 
Construal Level and Consumer Credit Offers 
As can be seen, there is not a large body of research on construal level in relation to 
consumer credits yet. Nevertheless, the existing results unanimously point to a link between the 
two concepts. Most studies touching both concepts focus on the implications of different 
payment forms on construal level. The other way around, none investigated the impact of 
construal level on credit decisions. As the present studies want to contribute to closing this gap, 
this section will focus on how construal level might be related to specific aspects of consumer 
credit offers. 
Credits differ from each other on a set of credit aspects like annual percentage rate or 
total cost. The main idea here is that some of the aspects are more prone to be part of high-level 
credit construals, while others are more prone to be part of low-level credit construals. In 
Germany, creditors advertising their products have to state the annual percentage rate, the credit 
duration, the monthly installments, and the total cost of any credit offer. The monthly installment 
can be further subdivided into monthly redemption payment and monthly interest fee.  
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According to construal level theory, high-level construals focus on central and goal 
relevant aspects of a product (Leiser et al., 2008). From an economic point of view, the main 
goal in every decision between several credit offers should be to maximize the personal benefit 
and to minimize the cost. As the benefit is the same in all offers – being able to purchase a good 
now instead of later – the cost is the key element in reaching the goal. Furthermore, the total cost 
of a credit is a figure that emerges as a product of several other credit aspects, being simple and 
superordinate in comparison to these aspects. These characteristics are also typical for high-level 
construals. Lastly, the aspect of total cost refers to what a debtor has to pay over the entire credit 
duration. Therefore, it spans a timeframe with an end that is quite far away from the debtor in the 
situation of deciding between several credit offers. It follows that total cost should be related to 
rather high temporal distance. Taken together, these points show that the total cost can be seen as 
a central high construal level aspect, i.e., one that is central to abstract construals of credits.  
Next to total cost, the annual percentage rate can also be considered to represent a high 
construal aspect. Defined as the average interest rate for a one-year period, it is in its essence a 
quite abstract figure. Considering the idea of an annual percentage rate for a credit with a 
duration of only 9 months does not seem intuitive. Its advantage is that is discloses the cost of 
borrowing in a standardized form. That means that annual percentage rate is well suited to 
compare different credit offers. Thus it is decontextualized in the sense that a simple comparison 
is possible even when one credit has a duration of 4 months and the other credit a duration of 17 
months. Decontextualization is a feature that is typical for high-level construals. As already 
stated in relation to total cost, the same is true for simplicity. While it would seem odd to refer to 
the calculation of the annual percentage rate as simple, its application is in fact very simple: A 
lower annual percentage rate signals a lower cost of borrowing. Furthermore, the annual 
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percentage rate is a percentage rate. Bonner and Newell (2008) argue that within the realm of 
numerical information, percentages and probabilities are more abstract than frequencies and 
absolute numbers. Just like in the case of total cost, the annual percentage rate also refers to a 
rather long timeframe of one year and thus should be related to rather high temporal distance. In 
light of these arguments, the annual percentage rate can be seen as a high construal level aspect, 
i.e., one that is central to abstract construals of credits. 
In contrast to total cost and annual percentage rate, monthly redemption payments and 
monthly interest fee can be conceptualized as low construal level aspects. For one thing, they are 
subordinate to total cost. Furthermore, they are context specific: They describe the cost of 
borrowing in a given month. Without the credit duration, that is, the information how often these 
monthly costs are due, monthly redemption payments and monthly interest fee do not provide 
much information on the overall financial burden. The two figures are more important for 
answering the question how a potential debtor would have to adapt her monthly budget in order 
to repay the credit. According to Leiser et al. (2008), such questions for means are typically 
related to low construal level. Also, monthly redemption payments and monthly interest fee 
become relevant when thinking about the near future which is the coming month, regardless of 
how far one already advanced in the credit duration. Therefore they should be related to rather 
low temporal distance. Taken together, this speaks for monthly redemption payments and 
monthly interest fee to be seen as low construal level aspects, i.e., those that are central to 
concrete construals of credits. 
In contrast to the previously listed credit aspects, credit duration is harder to reconcile 
with either low or high construal level. As outlined in the beginning of this section, a credit 
decision should be guided by the main goal to minimize the total cost of credit. For this goal, 
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credit duration is irrelevant. However, previous research on mental accounting showed that 
people have a preference to match continuing payments with the operating life of products (e.g., 
Auh et al., 2008; Hirst, et al., 1994; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998). Taking this preference into 
account, selecting a credit with an appropriate duration may become a primary goal. In such a 
situation, credit duration would be the most central aspect of the credit. Maybe it is not so much 
the aspects of credit duration itself, which can be aligned with either low or high construal level, 
but the specific value that it takes. A shorter credit duration might be perceived as closer to the 
self in the current situation, while a longer credit duration might be perceived further away from 
the self. This link to psychological distance would speak for short credit periods to be construed 
on a more concrete level and long credit periods to be construed on a more abstract level.  
Study 1 – Construal Level and Credit Choice 
Study 1 examines how different construal levels influence the importance of different 
credit aspects for evaluations of credit attractiveness and credit choice. Drawing on the 
previously presented literature on construal level theory and consumer credit offers, the 
hypotheses read as follows: 
H1: Credits with a low annual percentage rate and low total costs are evaluated more 
positively in high construal level than in low construal level, while credits with low monthly 
redemption payments and low monthly interest fees are evaluated more positively in low 
construal level than in high construal level. 
H2: Credits with a low annual percentage rate and low total costs are chosen more often 
in high construal level than in low construal level, while credits with low monthly redemption 
payments and low monthly interest fees are chosen more often in low construal level than in high 
construal level. 
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The hypotheses were tested using a laboratory experiment on a hypothetical purchase 
situation. 
Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from January 20th to 21st, 20131. Participants were approached 
on the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part in a study 
on “ways of funding and social networks”. They were informed that they would get some candy 
as a token of appreciation. Furthermore, they could take part in a lottery where five winners 
would receive € 20.00 each. 
From the original sample of 82 students who agreed to participate in this study, data from 
five participants was excluded for the following reasons: One participant quit the study, two 
participants stated that their data should not be used in the analyses, and two participants came 
very close to the hypotheses, when asked for the aim of the study. The final sample included 77 
participants. It consisted of 26 (33.8%) men and 51 women (66.2%) with an age between 19 and 
33 years (M = 23.35, MdnAge = 23, SD = 3.14). Nineteen (24.7%) participants held a credit of 
€500 or higher or had held a credit of that amount in the past, while 58 (75.3%) did not. The 
median duration to complete the study was MdnDur = 13:14 minutes.  
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was construal level (high construal level or low construal level). The dependent variables were 
credit attractiveness and credit choice. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Theresa Stangl, Penghua Sun, Christian Brünger, and Michael Blens for their help in the 
survey promotion and data collection. 
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and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the two conditions in this study was random. 
At the start, participants read the instructions for the study. In the following construal 
level manipulation, they worked on a task that activates either a concrete or an abstract mindset 
by asking participants to think about maintaining and extending their social network.  
In the main part of the study, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to 
go on vacation and planned to take a credit for that reason. This scenario served as a situational 
frame for the consecutive presentation of six credit offers. Participants were asked to state their 
perceived credit attractiveness for each offer. Subsequently, they were asked to indicate which of 
the six offers they would choose.  
Thereafter participants worked on a task that measured how abstractly or concretely they 
represent given actions, serving as a manipulation check for construal level. In the last part of the 
study, participants' propensity to plan their financial matters was measured and they were asked 
for demographic information (gender, age, area of studies), disposable income and personal 
credit experience. Last, they were asked about the presumed aim of the study and whether their 
data could be used in the analyses.  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants and offered some candy to them. 
Participants could write their email address on a piece of paper and throw it in an opaque box to 
participate in a lottery and win one of five € 20.00 prizes. The winners of this lottery were 
contacted via the provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Manipulation of construal level. 
Construal level was manipulated using a mindset manipulation developed by Freitas et al. 
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(2004). The general idea is that thinking about an activity’s purpose activates an abstract 
mindset, i.e., high construal level, whereas thinking about an activity’s process activates a 
concrete mindset. i.e., low construal level. Participants in the high construal level condition were 
asked to think about why they maintain and expand their social relationships. Participants in the 
low construal level condition were asked how they maintain and expand their social 
relationships. All participants were asked to answer the respective question in a diagram that was 
supposed to reflect the thought structure in this task (Figure 1). 
In the high construal condition, participants saw five vertically aligned boxes with 
upward-facing arrows in-between that were labeled “Why?”. The undermost box contained the 
written statement “maintain and expand social relationships”. Participants were instructed to 
type an answer on why they maintained and expanded their social relationships into the second 
lowest box. After this step, they were asked to type a second answer on why they engaged in 
what they just responded in the next highest box and so on until they filled every box with an 
answer.  
In the low construal condition, participants saw five vertically aligned boxes with 
downward-facing arrows in-between that were labeled “How?”. The upmost box contained the 
written statement “maintain and expand social relationships”. Participants were instructed to 
type an answer on how they maintained and expanded their social relationships into the second 
highest box. After this step, they were asked to type a second answer on how they engaged in 
what they just responded in the next lowest box and so on until they filled every box with an 
answer. 
The original manipulation (Freitas et al., 2004) included two further steps in the 
procedure that were positioned before the part of the manipulation that is presented above:  
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High construal level condition Low construal level condition 
  
Why do you maintain and expand your social 
relationships? 
How do you maintain and expand your social 
relationships? 
  
  
 maintain and expand social relationships 
Why? How? 
  
Why?  How? 
  
Why?  How? 
  
 Why?  How? 
maintain and expand social relationships  
  
Figure 1. Construal level manipulation. Adapted from “The Influence of Abstract and 
Concrete Mindsets on Anticipating and Guiding Others' Self-Regulatory Efforts,” by A. L. 
Freitas, P. Gollwitzer, and Y. Trope, 2004, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, p. 
742. Copyright 2004 by Elsevier. 
 
Participants were asked to also name reasons (abstract condition) or means (concrete condition) 
to achieve a specific goal and rate them. However, further studies showed that these steps are not 
necessary to manipulate construal level. More specifically, the shortened manipulation displayed 
above was successfully used in related contexts, such as spending intentions (Peetz & Buehler, 
2012) and goal-setting in future saving behavior (Ülkümen & Cheema, 2011). 
Furthermore, the original manipulation by Freitas et al. (2004) used a somewhat different 
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activity, namely “improve and maintain health”. However, it was thought that the students in the 
sample for this study might not all engage in this activity. In contrast, maintaining and expanding 
social relationships represents an activity of which it can be assumed that a large majority of 
students engages in it during this phase in their lives. This slight deviation from the original 
manipulation should not weaken the main strength of holding the domain (social relationships) 
constant in both conditions while only varying the level of abstraction. 
Situational frame. 
Participants read a text on a fictitious situation that they were asked to imagine. This 
scenario served as a situational frame for the consecutive presentation of credit offers. The text 
informed participants that they were in the last semester of their studies. It specified that they 
already signed an employment contract with six months’ time in-between submitting their thesis 
and starting the new job. Participants were asked to imagine that they planned an extended 
journey in this timespan that would cost € 7,500. Their savings amounted to € 2,500, so that 
there was a financial gap of € 5,000. To fill the gap, they would be presented six credit offers that 
they would have to evaluate. For all offers, the repayment period was said to start only when 
participants would start working. They were told that from that moment on, they would have € 
750 available at their monthly disposal after paying all fixed costs. 
Credit presentation and evaluation. 
On each of the following pages, one of a total of six credit offers was presented. The 
order of these offers was random. Each credit was described as follows:  
You get a credit of € 5,000 with an annual percentage rate of xx.xx%. With a credit 
duration of xx months, the monthly redemption payments amount to € xxx.xx and the 
monthly interest fee amounts to € xx.xx. The total cost of this credit amounts to € 
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x.xxx,xx. 
While the credit amount was € 5,000 in every offer, the other credit aspects varied in 
every offer. The individual offers are printed in Table 3. The credits were designed such that 
different offers seemed attractive with regard to different aspects: Option 1 offers the lowest 
annual percentage rate (8.10%) and monthly interest fee (€ 16.26) among all offers. Option 2 
offers the lowest monthly redemption payments (€ 83.33). Option 4 offers the shortest credit 
duration (12 months) and total cost (€ 5,335.42). Option 5 offers a comparably low annual 
interest rate (10.74%), short credit duration (24 months) and low monthly redemption payments 
(€ 104.17). Finally, options 3 and 6 were structured to represent relatively balanced credit offers 
regarding all credit aspects. All credit offers were structured mathematically correct. As a 
consequence, no individual credit offer is advantageous on only one aspect and disadvantageous 
on all other aspects. For example, option 1 is very attractive regarding the annual percentage rate, 
which is hypothesized to be particularly important for credit evaluations and decisions in high 
construal level, as well as the monthly interest fee, which is hypothesized to be particularly 
important for credit evaluations and decisions in low construal level. However, participants 
paying relatively more attention to monthly costs (low construal level) should focus rather on 
option 2, which offers the lowest monthly costs, combined of monthly redemption payments and 
monthly interest fee. Thus, a test of the hypotheses is possible even though the offers cannot 
always be classified as desirable from either the point of annual percentage rate and total cost or 
the point of monthly costs. 
Below each credit offer, participants were asked to evaluate the respective offer by 
answering three questions. The questions read “How attractive do you find this credit offer?” 
(1 = not at all attractive; 7 = very attractive), “To which extent does this credit offer meet your  
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expectations?” (1 = not at all; 7 = completely), and “How advantageous is this credit offer?” 
(1 = not at all advantageous; 7 = very advantageous). Credit attractiveness was computed as the 
mean value of the three questions. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between α = .83 and α = .92 for the 6 
credit offers.  
After participants got to know and evaluated every credit offer individually, they saw a 
table that contained all credit offers in detail (Table 3). They were asked to take another look at 
the offers and pick one of them. The respective question read “Please indicate for which of the 
depicted credit offers you would decide.” 
Manipulation check. 
The Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) was used as a 
manipulation check for construal level. This instrument comprises 25 different activities. Each 
activity comes with two alternatives that describe the behavior either as a low-level construal, 
focusing on how the activity is carried out, or a high-level construal, focusing on why the activity 
is carried out. For example, tooth brushing (activity) can be described as moving a brush around 
in one’s mouth (low-level construal) or as preventing tooth decay (high-level construal). For 
each activity, participants were asked to select the alternative that best described the activity. The 
25 activities were presented in random order. For half of the activities the low-level construal 
Table 3 
Credit Offers 
Option 
Annual 
percentage rate 
(%) 
Credit duration 
(months) 
Monthly 
redemption 
payments (€) 
Monthly 
interest fee (€) Total cost (€) 
1 8.10 36 138.89 16.26 5,585.42 
2 14.90 60 83.33 28.75 6,725.00 
3 12.89 24 208.33 25.69 5,616.67 
4 13.53 12 416.67 27.95 5,335.42 
5 10.74 48 104.17 21.18 6,016.67 
6 17.58 24 208.33 34.38 5,825.00 
Note. 
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was listed first, followed by the high-level construal and for the other half the scheme was 
reversed. A participant’s score results as the number of high-level construals selected (α=.80), 
such that a low score on the Behavior Identification Score indicates a low construal level and a 
high score indicates a high construal level.  
Originally, the Behavior Identification Form was designed to assess stable individual 
differences in action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). However, recent research 
extensively showed that this instrument is well-suited for measuring context-induced construal 
level (Fujita, Trope et al. 2006; Irmak, Wakslak, & Trope, 2013; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 
2009; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006), making it an appropriate manipulation check 
for construal level (Krüger, Fiedler, Koch, & Alves, 2014). 
Because there was no established translation of the Behavior Identification Form into 
German language at the time of this study, the author translated the instrument himself. 
Control variables. 
Participants’ propensity to plan for money was measured using a scale adapted from 
Lynch, Netemeyer, Spiller, and Zammit (2010). It consists of six items (e.g., “I like to look to my 
budget for the next 1-2 years in order to get a better view of my spending in the future.”) that are 
assessed on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). Propensity to plan was 
computed as the mean value of the six questions (α = .89) with higher values indicating a 
stronger propensity to plan. 
In addition, participants were asked to state the amount of money that they had available 
at their monthly disposal after paying all fixed costs (free input). Furthermore, they were asked 
to state whether they currently had outstanding credits with a total amount of at least € 500 or 
whether this was the case at some point in the past. Answers to both questions were voluntary. 
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In the last part of the study, participants stated their beliefs about the purpose of the 
study. Furthermore, they read the following question from Meade and Craig (2012) and 
answered with either “Yes” or “No”: “Lastly, it is vital to our study that we only include 
responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise a lot of effort (the 
researchers’ and other participants’) could be wasted. In your opinion, can we use your data in 
our analyses?” 
Results. 
Preliminary analysis. 
Manipulation check. 
To begin with, the success of the manipulation of construal level was analyzed.  
In a first step, a judge unaware of condition coded each participant’s level of construal 
based on the abstractness of their responses to the reasons versus means manipulation (see Fujita, 
Trope et al., 2006). If a response was a subordinate means to the original statement “maintain 
and expand social relationships”, it was coded with a score of −1. If a response was a 
superordinate end served by maintaining and expanding social relationships, it was coded with a 
score of +1. If a response fit neither criterion, it was coded as 0. For each participant, the 
individual values were then summed to create an index of construal level ranging from −4 to + 4, 
where higher scores indicate higher levels of construal. As expected, an independent-samples t-
test indicated that participants exposed to questions for reasons (M = 2.65) generated responses 
that reflected higher construal levels compared with those exposed to questions for means 
(M = −3.05), t(74) = 16.87, p < .001, one tailed. 
In a second step, answers on the Behavior Identification Form were analyzed. Another 
independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the high construal level condition 
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(M = 15.47, SD = 4.99) did not show a higher score on the Behavior Identification Form than 
participants in the low load condition (M = 15.26, SD = 4.39), t(75) = .20, p = .420, one tailed). 
Taken together, these results seem contradictory: While the first supports the claim of a 
successful manipulation of construal level, the latter contradicts this conclusion. One possible 
explanation might stem from the location of the Behavior Identification Form in the study. As 
this measure was located close to the end of the study, quite some time elapsed between 
participants entered their thoughts on their social network and classified the activities in the 
Behavior Identification Form (the median duration was MdnDur = 4:25 minutes). It could be the 
case that the manipulation of construal level worked, as indicated by the judgements of 
participants’ answers, but that the effect did not last long enough, to affect the answers in the 
Behavior Identification Form. This would also cast doubt on whether the manipulation of 
construal level was effective throughout the whole measurement of the dependent variables, 
situated directly before the Behavior Identification Form. 
Descriptives. 
Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 4.  
On average, credit attractiveness was rated between MOffer 2 = 2.05 (SDOffer 2 = 1.08) and 
MOffer 1 = 3.89 (SDOffer 1 = 1.48). The average score on the Behavior Identification Form was 
M = 15.36 (SD = 4.67). Participants’ propensity to plan was M = 3.58 (SD = 1.17). For most 
credit offers, ratings of attractiveness were significantly correlated with each other (r = .37 to 
r = .81 to, N = 88, p < .001) No significant correlations were observed between the Behavior 
Identification Form score and the attractiveness rating of any credit offer.  
Construal level theory states that people think differently about events taking place in the  
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlation Coefficients and Reliabilities for the Variables in the 
Analyses 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Attractiveness offer #1a 3.89 1.48 .96        
2. Attractiveness offer #2a 2.05 1.08 .45* .85       
3. Attractiveness offer #3a 3.14 1.34 .72* .45* .94      
4. Attractiveness offer #4a 3.03 1.47 .42* .16 .47* .93     
5. Attractiveness offer #5a 2.75 1.31 .54* .56* .49* .17 .92    
6. Attractiveness offer #6a 2.75 1.39 .67* .55* .81* .37* .55* .94   
7. Behavior Identification 
Form Scoreb 
15.36 4.67 -.08 -.01 -.03 -.19 .01 .01 .80  
8. Propensity to planc 3.58 1.17 -.22 -.12 -.12 -.16 .04 -.04 .16 .89 
Note. N = 77. The diagonal displays Cronbach’s α for the respective scale. 
aScale range: 1 to 7. bScale range: 0 to 25. cScale range: 0 to 6. 
* p < .001. 
 
immediate future than in the distant future, because of the difference in psychological distance. 
Related to this, there are also differences among people in their short-term planning and their 
long-term planning (Lynch et al., 2010). However, the results show that propensity to plan did 
not correlate with the attractiveness rating of any credit offer. 
Main analysis. 
The means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness, split up for the two conditions 
of the construal level manipulation, are shown in Table 5.  
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the hypothesis that credits 
with a low annual percentage rate and low total costs are evaluated more positively in high 
construal level than in low construal level, while credits with low monthly redemption payments 
and low monthly interest fees are evaluated more positively in low construal level than in high 
construal level. The dependent variable was credit attractiveness. The independent variables 
were construal level (between subjects) and credit offer (within subjects). Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(14) = 60.82, p < .001), therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.76). 
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There was no main effect of construal level, F(1, 75) = 0.17, p = .897. However, there was a 
significant main effect of credit offer on credit attractiveness, F(3.80, 285.25) = 29.61, p < .001. 
The interaction between the two factors was not significant F(3.80, 285.25) = .33, p = .847.  
Regarding the descriptive results, participants in the low construal level condition 
(M = 2.95, SD = 0.17) rated credit attractiveness higher than participants in the high construal 
level condition (M = 2.92, SD = 0.17). Regarding the main effect of credit offer, pairwise 
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that credit offer 1 (M1 = 3.89, SD1 = 1.48) was 
evaluated to be significantly more attractive than any other offer (M2 = 2.05, SD2 = 1.08 to 
M3 = 3.14, SD3 = 1.34, all p < .001), credit offer 2 (M2 = 2.05, SD2 = 1.08) was evaluated to be 
significantly less attractive than any other offer (M5 = 2.75, SD5 = 1.31 to M1 = 3.89, SD1 = 1.48, 
all p < .001) and credit offer 3 (M3 = 3.14, SD3 = 1.34) was evaluated to be significantly more 
attractive than credit offer 6 (M6 = 2.75, SD3 = 1.39, p = .002). The results suggest that construal 
level had no effect on credit attractiveness. Moreover, there was no interaction of construal level 
and credit offers. Regarding the offers, participants saw offer 1 as particularly attractive. This 
offer was characterized with the lowest annual percentage rate and the lowest monthly interest 
fee among the six offers. Also, participants saw offer 2 as the least attractive one. This offer was 
characterized with the highest credit duration and the highest total cost among the six offers. Last 
Table 5 
Sample Sizes, Means and Standard Deviations of Credit Attractiveness 
 Low construal level (n = 39)  High construal level (n = 38) 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Offer #1 3.94 1.49  3.84 1.49 
Offer #2 2.00 0.96  2.11 1.19 
Offer #3 3.25 1.48  3.03 1.19 
Offer #4 3.07 1.32  2.99 1.62 
Offer #5 2.69 1.24  2.80 1.39 
Offer #6 2.75 1.52  2.75 1.26 
Note. N = 77. 
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but not least, participants saw offer 3 as more attractive compared to offer 6. The two offers are 
identical with respect to credit duration and monthly redemption payments. However, regarding 
annual percentage rate, monthly interest fee and total cost, offer 3 has financial advantages over 
offer 6. Taken together, this suggests that participants focused most on the annual percentage 
rate, the monthly interest fee and the total cost, when judging credit attractiveness. Credit 
duration and monthly redemption payments seem to have played a minor role. 
Next, credit choice was analyzed. Credit choice, split up for the two conditions of the 
construal level manipulation, is shown in Table 6. As can be seen, offer 1 was most often chosen 
in both, the low construal condition (n = 19) and in the high construal level condition (n = 23). 
As already said, this offer was characterized by the lowest annual percentage rate and the lowest 
monthly interest fee among the six offers. Offer 4 ranked second-highest in participants’ choice, 
both in the low construal level condition (n = 9) and in the high construal level condition 
(n = 11). This offer was characterized by the shortest credit duration and the lowest total cost. So 
far, this supports the idea that annual percentage rate, monthly interest fee and total cost are not 
just relevant for judgements of credit attractiveness but also for credit choice. Furthermore, a 
minority of participants decided for offer 3, with more participants in the low construal level 
condition (n = 7) opting for this alternative than in the high construal level condition (n = 2). 
This offer was characterized to balance the individual credit aspects. Neither is any of the credit 
aspects particularly advantageous, nor is any of them particularly disadvantageous. Participants 
rarely decided for the offers 5 (combined n = 4) and 6 (combined n = 2) and never for offer 2. 
Pearsons’s chi-square test was conducted to test the hypothesis that credits with a low 
annual percentage rate and low total costs are chosen more often in high construal level than in 
low construal level, while credits with low monthly redemption payments and low monthly 
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interest fees are chosen more often in low construal level than in high construal level. The 
dependent variable is credit choice. The independent variable is construal level. Participants who 
decided for credit offers 2, 5 and 6 were excluded from the analysis because the expected 
frequencies for the respective cells were too low to meet the assumptions of the chi-square test 
(Field, 2009)2. There was no significant association between construal level and the credit offers 
chosen by participants χ2(2, N = 71) = 3.35, p = .199.  
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on credit choice by examining 
credit attractiveness and credit choice under different construal levels. To this end, a laboratory 
experiment was conducted in which construal level was manipulated to be either low or high. 
Credit attractiveness was measured for six credit offers that varied in advantageousness 
depending on which credit aspect (annual percentage rate, credit duration, monthly redemption 
repayments, monthly interest fee and total cost) one focuses on. Participants then decided for one 
of the six offers. No significant difference in credit attractiveness was found between the low 
                                                 
2 A total of nine participants decided for offer 3. Split up into low and high construal level conditions, this yields 
expected frequencies slightly below the critical threshold of five. However, slight deviations are acceptable in 
contingency tables with more than four cells (Field, 2009), leading to the decision to include participants who 
decided for offer 3 in the test. Another test with only participants who decided for either offer 1 or offer 4 did not 
yield different results. 
Table 6 
Sample Sizes and Offer Specific Credit Choice 
 Low construal level (n = 39)  High construal level (n = 38) 
Measure n %  n % 
Offer #1 19 48.7  23 60.5 
Offer #2 0 0.0  0 0.0 
Offer #3 7 17.9  2 5.3 
Offer #4 9 23.1  11 28.9 
Offer #5 2 5.1  2 5.3 
Offer #6 2 5.1  0 0.0 
Note. N = 77. 
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construal level condition and the high construal level condition. This finding rejects the 
hypothesis that credits with a low annual percentage rate and low total costs are evaluated more 
positively in high construal level than in low construal level, while credits with low monthly 
redemption payments and low monthly interest fees are evaluated more positively in low 
construal level than in high construal level. Instead, participants in both conditions seemed to 
base their credit attractiveness judgements mostly on the annual percentage rate, the monthly 
interest fee and the total cost. Especially focusing on the latter can be seen as rational in the 
sense of traditional economic theory. But looking at the annual percentage rate is similarly smart, 
because the figure makes even differently structured credits easily comparable and in many cases 
a lower annual percentage rate also comes with reduced total costs.  
Regarding credit choice, the results are similar. Participants in the low construal level 
condition and participants in the high construal level condition did not choose different credits. 
This finding rejects the hypothesis that credits with a low annual percentage rate and low total 
costs are chosen more often in high construal level than in low construal level, while credits with 
low monthly redemption payments and low monthly interest fees are chosen more often in low 
construal level than in high construal level. Regardless of their experimental condition, 
participants mostly relied on the same criteria that guided their credit attractiveness judgements: 
They mostly chose offers that had a low annual percentage rate, low monthly interest fees, and 
low total costs. However, only about one quarter of participants decided in a rational way in the 
sense of traditional economic theory, by picking the credit with the lowest total cost. While this 
credit aspect seems to be of particular interest to them, they also take other aspects into account 
and often decide for a balanced credit offer.   
These findings are in line with prior results on how people compare different credit 
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offers. Ranyard, et al. (2006) found that people focus on the annual percentage rate and total 
costs when comparing several offers. When people asked questions about the credit aspects, 
most of them also targeted the annual percentage rate. However, the concept of annual 
percentage rate is somewhat more complex than for example credit duration. Therefore, a larger 
number of questions on the annual percentage rate does not necessarily hint at the highlighted 
relevance of this aspect for the credit decision but could also be driven by low understanding of 
the term (Lee & Hogarth, 1999) and the need to clarify its meaning. Ranyard et al. (2006) further 
found, that in their decision process, people often use simple heuristics based on the annual 
percentage rate. Nevertheless, as in the present study, participants in their study did not 
completely neglect other credit aspects. Instead, they frequently decided for credit options that 
balanced monthly repayment amounts, total costs and credit duration. The importance of credit 
duration is also highlighted by Wonder et al. (2008) who found the aspect to be a key 
determinant of credit choice, next to annual percentage rate and in contrast to rebates and down 
payments. This contrasts the finding that credit duration seems to have played a minor role for 
participants’ credit decision in the present study. This could be explained by the fact that Wonder 
et al. (2008) used different credit aspects than the present study. For example, they did not 
include information on the total cost but informed participants on various rebates. Thus, the 
different setup of credits might account for the contrary results regarding the importance of credit 
duration for participants’ credit choice. 
Problems with the manipulation. 
One possible explanation for the shortcoming of the present study to find the 
hypothesized effects might be that the manipulation used was not strong enough to show the 
hypothesized effect. While some results indicate a successful manipulation of construal level, the 
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overall pattern is not very convincing. On the one hand, participants’ responses to the reasons 
versus means manipulation were analyzed. In line with the argument for a successful 
manipulation, participants in the high construal level condition – who were exposed to questions 
for reasons – generated responses that reflected higher construal levels compared with those 
participants in the low construal level condition – who were exposed to questions for means. On 
the other hand, participants’ responses to the Behavior Identification Form were analyzed. 
Contrary to the result for a successful manipulation, participants in the high construal level 
condition did not differ in their score on the measure from participants in the low construal level 
condition.  
Taken together, the two results indicate, that the manipulation did indeed lead to either a 
high or a low construal level. Nevertheless, the effect did not last long enough to show up in the 
Behavior Identification Form, which was situated rather at the end of the study. Because the 
measurement of the dependent variables was situated between the manipulation of construal 
level and the Behavior Identification Form, it remains unclear, to which extent the differences in 
construal level persisted throughout the measurement. In the present study, participants were 
presented with a scenario, had to evaluate six different credit offers and form judgements on each 
of them, before they made a decision for one of the six offers, requiring them to also compare the 
offers against each other. This is a rather lengthy procedure as compared to many studies that 
relied on the same manipulation of construal level that was used in the present study. For 
example, Wan and Agrawal (2011) manipulated construal level, using the reasons-means task 
and immediately asked participants to choose one of two exhibitions that they would want to 
visit, with this choice being the dependent variable. Similarly, Tsai and McGill (2011) asked 
participants directly after the manipulation of construal level to make a decision between two 
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alternative products and rate their confidence in their choice, which was the dependent variable. 
Such designs with only little time needed to measure the dependent variable(s) directly after the 
manipulation make the majority of research using the reasons-means task. Therefore, it is 
tempting to argue, that the shortcoming of finding no difference in the credit aspects that 
participants focus on under low construal levels and high construal levels and consequently no 
effect of construal level on credit choice can be attributed to the rather long time it took 
participants to complete the credit evaluation and credit choice task. The manipulated differences 
in construal level simply grew weaker and vanished somewhere during the task, resulting in the 
null-results. 
Although this explanation cannot be ruled out, it could nevertheless also be a premature 
false conclusion. As already stated, the manipulation of construal level used in the present study 
is very widespread and successful in research. Among the bulk of studies making use of the 
manipulation, there are also some rather rare instances where the manipulation lasted over an 
extended period of time. For example, Sanna, Chang, Parks, and Kennedy (2009) had their 
participants play a social dilemma game after the manipulation of construal level. Their 
participants had to read the instructions for a rather complex game, in comparison to the scenario 
information in the present study, and play five rounds of it, in comparison to the six credit 
evaluations and the following credit choice in the present study. It can be assumed, that the 
procedure used in the Sanna et al. (2009) study was quite time consuming and in particular took 
probably more time than the credit evaluation and credit choice task in the present study. 
Nevertheless, they were able to find an effect from the manipulation of construal level. Similarly, 
Chiou, Wu, and Chang (2013) reported an effect of the reasons-means construal level 
manipulation on smoking behavior over a 40 minutes period. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
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manipulation used in the present study is capable of evoking differences in construal level that 
last over extended time periods. Therefore, it remains an open question why at least the Behavior 
Identification Form did not indicate a difference in construal level.  
Problems with the scenario. 
Another aspect that might have attenuated the induced difference in construal level 
between the two conditions might have been the scenario description that was presented prior to 
the credit evaluation and credit choice. While the reason to take a credit was described in a rather 
general way (an extended journey), the figures provided were rather detailed. Participants were 
informed about the exact costs of the journey, the amount of their current savings and the 
resulting gap as well as the amount of money available each month after paying all fixed costs, 
once they would have started working. Previous research identified detail as a low construal 
level feature (Lee, Deng, Unnava, & Fujita, 2014). In some cases, detail and concreteness were 
even used as synonyms (Woltin, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Förster, 2011). Thus, the detailed 
financial background described in the scenario might have counteracted the high construal level 
priming in the high construal level condition, reducing the difference in construal level between 
the two experimental conditions. In this situation, the scenario that was intended to provide 
context for the credit evaluation and credit decision and eventually increase the likelihood of 
realistic results might have led to the exact opposite: No differences in the dependent variables 
due to neutralization of the induced differences in construal level in the manipulation. 
An objection against this critique comes from the aforementioned social dilemma game 
study (Sanna et al., 2009). Participants in that study did not just read about four specific figures. 
Instead they were introduced to a complex payout-scheme that involved also the relations 
between these elements, to ensure that they understood the mechanics of the game. These 
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instructions covered equations and mathematical examples that were much more detailed than 
the financial information used in the present study. Nevertheless, Sanna et al. (2009), using the 
same manipulation as the present study, were able to find an effect of construal level on 
participants behavior in the social dilemma game. This speaks against the assumption that the 
financial information provided in the scenario neutralized any difference in construal level, by 
eliminating high-level construals in the respective condition, because of a high degree of detail. 
Problems with the credit presentation. 
Another possible explanation for the shortcoming of the present study to find the 
hypothesized effects relates to the way the credit alternatives were presented. It could be that 
construal level affects rather the search behavior of individuals such that low construal levels 
lead to a search for information on the monthly redemption payments, while high construal 
levels lead to a search for information on total costs. Looking only for specific aspects of a credit 
and making a decision on this basis could then lead to different credit decisions for different 
construal levels. In the present study however, participants were presented with information on 
every single aspect of the credits. That is, they had the same information base in both conditions. 
It could be that the presentation of comprehensive information led to a reevaluation of which 
aspects of a credit are most important to form a judgement on the respective credit and make a 
decision among several credit alternatives. Such a reevaluation could have attenuated differences 
in participants’ focus between the two conditions. A reevaluation with the same result regarding 
the most important aspect/s for a decision would also explain why two of the alternatives were so 
dominant (chosen by more than two thirds of participants).  
Unfortunately, no studies could be found that investigate a potential relationship between 
construal level and information search behavior in buying decisions. Apart from this specific 
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setting, research indicates that low construal levels lead to more intense post-choice information 
search as compared to high construal levels (Shani, Igou, & Zeelenberg, 2009). Given this 
finding and the fact that people value aspects of a product differently under high and low 
construal levels (Grant & Tybout, 2008), it seems legitimate to assume that construal level would 
also influence which credit aspects people see as important in the first place and thus on which 
aspects they would search information.  
Regarding the construal level dependent influence of product aspects on product choice, 
the picture is clearer. For example, Fukukura, Ferguson, and Fujita (2013) asked their 
participants to choose a phone among several alternatives, after introducing them to the reasons-
means construal level manipulation. With full information on a range of product aspects such as 
compactness, camera quality and memory for every alternative, participants in the low construal 
level condition focused on different product aspects than participants in the high construal level 
condition and subsequently chose different products. Similarly, Trope and Liberman (2000) 
asked their participants to choose one of two radio sets that they wanted to buy. Participants in 
the low construal level condition did not show a difference in their preferences for a radio set 
with good sound but a useless clock and one with bad sound but a useful clock. In contrast, 
participants in the high construal level condition showed a clear preference for the radio set with 
the better sound and the useless clock. The results were interpreted as an indication for a 
preference for primary aspects (sound) over secondary aspects (clock) in high construal level that 
is not present in low construal level. Together these results support the idea that construal level 
influences which product aspects people focus on when deciding among product alternatives 
with full information on their aspects.  
Regarding the present study, these results cannot finally clarify whether the presentation 
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of comprehensive information on all credit aspects led to a reevaluation of which aspects of a 
credit are most important to form a judgement on the respective credit and make a decision 
among the credit alternatives. However, the above findings on the influence of construal level on 
information search behavior and product choice reveal another noteworthy point: The large 
majority of studies in this area focuses on product attributes that are on the same level instead of 
being superior or inferior to one another. For example, a compact phone is not necessarily better 
than a phone with a good camera or one with a lot of memory. The importance of a single 
attribute exclusively depends on the desires of the customer. Therefore, there is no superior 
product among the alternatives presented in these studies. In case of the credits in the present 
study, the situation is different: From an economically rational point of view, the credit with the 
lowest total cost is clearly the best alternative. Therefore, the total cost aspect is superior to all 
other credit aspects. If people realize the superiority of total costs over other credit aspects, when 
presented with information on all aspects, they are more likely to base their credit judgement 
strongly on this aspect even if they would have focused on other aspects if no information was 
provided in the first place. Consequently, research on the influence of construal level on credit 
attractiveness should focus on what aspects people pay attention to when they search for 
information on credit alternatives. This would also strengthen external validity, because it can be 
assumed that people looking for a credit rather find themselves in the situation of having to 
decide on the importance of several credit aspects and search for information on these aspects 
instead of being presented with several credit options and full information on every aspect in an 
easily comparable fashion.  
Study 2 – Construal Level and Relative Importance of Credit Aspects 
Study 2 examines how different construal levels influence the importance of different 
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credit aspects. Drawing on the previously presented literature on construal level theory and 
consumer credit offers, as well as the discussion of study 1, the present study investigates 
whether differences in construal level lead to different priorities of which aspects are most 
important when selecting a credit alternative. In contrast to study 1, the focus of the present study 
lies on the relative importance of credit aspects in general rather than on specific credit 
alternatives that are advantageous with respect to one or the other aspect. The respective 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: In a high construal level, people prefer credits that are advantageous with respect to 
high construal features (e.g. having a bill that states the amount of the monthly installment very 
clear), while in a low construal level, people prefer credits that are advantageous with respect to 
low construal features (e.g., having a bill that breaks down the composition of the monthly 
installment in a very detailed way). 
Furthermore, study 2 explores how different construal levels influence the preference for 
specific sequences of installments. Although research on sequences in general is well established 
(e.g., Langer, Sarin, & Weber, 2005; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993; Ross & Simonson, 
1991), consumer’s preferences for specific repayment profiles represent a relatively new issue in 
credit research (Hassenzahl, 2005; Hoelzl, Kamleitner, & Kirchler, 2011) and might be subject to 
differences in construal level. In particular, Malkoc et al. (2010) found that a high construal level 
leads to reduced temporal discounting (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). That is, 
when products were framed more abstract, consumers were more willing to wait for them, to 
save a delivery fee. Similarly, Rogers and Bazerman (2008) demonstrated that high construal 
level is related to decisions that are advantageous in the distant future, while low construal level 
is related to decisions that are advantageous in the near future. Thus, it is assumed that people in 
67 
 
 
a high construal level focus more on the more distant installments in a longer sequence, whereas 
people in a low construal level focus more on the less distant installments in a longer sequence. 
Together with a general preference of low installments over high installments, the respective 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
H2: In a high construal level, people prefer credits with falling installments over time, 
while in a low construal level, people prefer credits with rising installments over time. 
The hypotheses were tested using a laboratory experiment on hypothetical purchase 
situations. 
Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from April 22nd to 24th, 20143. Participants were approached 
on the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part in a study 
on “verbal associations and credit evaluations”. They were informed that they would get some 
candy as a token of appreciation. Furthermore, they could take part in a lottery where five 
winners would receive € 20.00 each. 
From the original sample of 90 students who agreed to participate in this study, data from 
three participants was excluded for the following reasons: One participant stated that her data 
should not be used in the analyses and two participants did not follow the instructions for the 
manipulation4. During the manipulation, two computers crashed. The affected participants 
restarted the study in their condition. The final sample included 87 participants. It consisted of 35 
                                                 
3 I would like to thank Theresa Stangl, Penghua Sun, Christian Brünger, and Michael Blens for their help in the 
survey promotion and data collection. 
4 As described in the respective section of the text, participants were asked to write down either categories or 
exemplars for a list of given words. Instead of doing so, the two participants generated synonyms for every single 
word on the list. 
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(40.2%) men and 52 women (59.8%) with an age between 18 and 40 years (M = 23.02, 
MdnAge = 22, SD = 3.79). Twenty-two (25.3%) participants held a credit of €500 or higher or had 
held a credit of that amount in the past, while 60 (69.0%) did not and five (5.7%) refused to 
answer. On average, their monthly disposable income after rental costs amounted to €290.76 
(Mdn = €250.00). The median duration to complete the study was MdnDur = 16:18 minutes.  
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was construal level (high construal level or low construal level). The dependent variable was 
relative importance of credit aspects. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the two conditions in this study was random. 
At the start, participants read the instructions for the study. In the following construal 
level manipulation, they worked on a task that activates either a concrete or an abstract mindset 
by asking participants to generate subordinate or superordinate examples for a number of given 
terms. 
In the main part of the study, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to 
make a larger acquisition and planned to take a credit for that reason. This scenario served as a 
situational frame for the consecutive task to rate the personal importance of various aspects of a 
credit.  
Next, participants were presented with another scenario focusing on acquiring an 
apartment and taking a credit for that reason. They were then presented with three credits that 
varied in their repayment profile: One with rising installments, one with falling installments, and 
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one with constant installments over time. Participants had to indicate credit attractiveness and 
likelihood to decide for the credit for each of the three offers.  
In the last part of the study, participants' propensity to plan their financial matters was 
measured and they were asked for demographic information (gender, age, area of studies), 
disposable income and personal credit experience. Last, they were asked about the presumed aim 
of the study and whether their data could be used in the analyses.  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants and offered some candy to them. 
Participants could write their email address on a piece of paper and throw it in an opaque box to 
participate in a lottery and win one of five € 20.00 prizes. The winners of this lottery were 
contacted via the provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Manipulation of construal level. 
Construal level was manipulated using the Categories-Exemplars Task by Fujita, Trope et 
al. (2006). Participants were presented with a list of 40 terms (e.g., city, beer or planet). In the 
low construal level condition, they were asked to generate a subordinate exemplar for every term 
by completing the sentence "____ is an example for TERM" (e.g., “Earth is an example for a 
planet.”). In the high construal level condition, they were asked to generate a superordinate 
category for every term by completing the sentence, "TERM is an example of ____?" (e.g., “A 
planet is an example for celestial bodies.”). Focusing on the category to which an item belongs 
leads to a somewhat higher level of abstraction and thus primes an abstract mindset; likewise, 
focusing on a specific exemplar of an item leads to a somewhat lower level of abstraction and 
thus primes a concrete mindset.  
The Categories-Exemplars Task was successfully used to manipulate construal level in at 
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least 20 different studies (Gilead et al., 2014), dealing with various topics including consumer 
behavior (Pham, Hung, & Gorn, 2011). 
Situational frame. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they were about to make a larger, not further 
specified acquisition and planned to take a credit for that reason. Before they were starting to 
look for competing credit offers, they thought about which aspects of a credit were especially 
important to them and which aspects of a credit were less important to them. This scenario 
served as a situational frame for the consecutive rating of the importance of credit aspects. 
Importance of credit aspects. 
On each of the following eight pages that were presented in random order, participants 
were introduced to two specific forms of a credit aspect (Table 7). For each of these pairs, they 
were asked which form was more important to them personally (e.g., “What is more important to 
you: Knowing all the exact terms and conditions of your credit or having a good overview on the 
key figures?”). One form always corresponds to a rather low construal level, while the other 
corresponds to a rather high construal level. All specialized terms came with an explanation to 
support participants’ understanding (e.g., “Total cost refers to the sum of all costs related to the 
credit. This includes the specified amount of credit, interest charges, commission fees, and any 
other fees related to the credit such as for example account management fees.”). 
All questions were answered on a 7-point scale where 1 corresponds to a clear preference  
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for the low construal form of the respective credit aspect (e.g., "It is more important to me to 
know all the exact terms and conditions of my credit.") and 7 corresponds to a clear preference 
for the high construal form of the respective credit aspect (e.g., "It is more important to me to 
have a good overview on the key figures."). 
Situational frame for the evaluation of credit repayment plans. 
The scenario used was adapted from Hoelzl et al. (2011). Participants were asked to 
imagine that they were planning to buy an apartment. They had a safe job, working for a large 
company and earned € 1.440 after taxes. To buy the apartment, they needed € 30.000 in addition 
to their savings. Their bank advisor offered them a credit with a credit amount of € 30.000, a 
credit duration of 10 years, a varying interest rate and total costs of € 39.600 for which there 
were three repayment plans available. All figures were taken from Hoelzl et al. (2011) except for 
Table 7 
Relative Importance of Credit Characteristics 
 What is more important to you: 
Item Low construal level form  High construal level form 
1. Knowing the exact amount of the 
monthly installment 
or knowing the exact total cost of the credit? 
2. Not needing to excessively cut down 
spending in a given month 
or not needing to excessively cut down 
spending over the whole repayment 
period? 
3. Being able to adapt the credit 
conditions to your latest needs on short 
notice 
or being able to plan in the long run with 
fixed conditions? 
4. Keeping the monthly installments as 
low as possible 
or keeping the duration of the credit as short 
as possible? 
5. Being able to discuss your credit 
request in a personal consultation 
or being able to sign a suitable credit offer 
online? 
6. Paying higher installments in the 
beginning of the repayment period to 
pay less afterwards 
or paying higher installments in the end of 
the repayment period to pay less before? 
7. Knowing all the exact terms and 
conditions of your credit 
or having a good overview on the key 
figures? 
8. Having a bill that states the amount of 
the monthly installment very clear  
or having a bill that breaks down the 
composition of the monthly installment in 
a very detailed way? 
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the income information, which was replaced to mirror the monthly disposable income in 
Germany. This scenario served as a situational frame for the consecutive rating of the credit 
repayment plans.  
Evaluation of credit repayment plans. 
On each of the following three pages that were presented in random order, participants 
were introduced to one credit repayment plan. In the upper area of the page, the credit details 
from the scenario were printed once again, as a reminder. Below, in the left part of the page, a 
table displayed the amount of monthly and yearly repayments for each of the 10 years of the 
credit duration. In the right part of the page, a graph depicted the development of the monthly 
repayments throughout the 10 years, to visualize the difference between the three credit 
repayment plans. The bottom half of the page contained four questions to evaluate the respective 
credit repayment plan. The questions read “How attractive do you find the credit offer with the 
depicted credit repayment plan?” (1 = not at all attractive; 7 = very attractive), “To which extent 
does the credit offer with the depicted credit repayment plan meet your expectations?” (1 = not at 
all; 7 = completely), “How advantageous is the credit offer with the depicted credit repayment 
plan?” (1 = not at all advantageous; 7 = very advantageous), and “How likely is it that you take 
the credit offer with the depicted credit repayment plan?” (1 = not at all likely; 7 = very likely). 
Credit attractiveness was computed as the mean value of the four questions. Cronbach’s alpha 
ranged between α = .92 and α = .96 for the three credit repayment plans.  
After participants evaluated each credit repayment plan separately, they were asked how 
easy they found it to immerse into the given scenario (1 = not at all easy; 7 = very easy). 
Control variables. 
Participants’ propensity to plan for money was measured as described in study 1 (Lynch 
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et al., 2010). Higher values on the scale (α=.90) indicate a stronger propensity to plan. 
As in study 1, participants were asked to state the amount of money that they had 
available at their monthly disposal after paying all fixed costs (free input). Furthermore, they 
were asked to state whether they currently had outstanding credits with a total amount of at least 
€ 500 or whether this was the case at some point in the past. Answers on both questions were 
voluntary. 
In the last part of the study, participants stated their beliefs about the purpose of the 
study. Furthermore, the question for data usability from Meade and Craig (2012) that was 
described in study 1 was used again to exclude participants who preferred their data not to be 
analyzed. 
Results. 
Preliminary analysis. 
Manipulation check. 
To begin with, the success of the manipulation of construal level was analyzed. 
A judge unaware of condition measured each participant’s level of construal based on the 
abstractness of their responses to the Categories-Exemplars Task (see Fujita, Trope et al., 2006). 
If a response was an example that fell into the category of the presented original term, it was 
coded with a score of -1. If a response was a category, that included the presented original term, 
it was coded with a score of +1. If a response fit neither criterion, it was coded as 0. For each 
participant, the individual values were then summed to create an index of construal level ranging 
from -40 to +40, where higher scores indicate higher levels of construal.  
As expected, an independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the categories-
condition (M = 38.85) generated responses that reflected higher construal levels compared with 
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participants in the exemplars-condition (M = -36.55), t(55.33) = -86.44, p < .001, one tailed. 
Thus, it can be assumed that the manipulation of construal level was successful.  
Main analysis. 
In order to check for the hypothesized effect of construal level on the importance of 
respective credit aspects a MANOVA was conducted with participants’ ratings of the relative 
importance of the several credit aspects serving as dependent variables. Construal level served as 
the independent factor. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant effect of construal level on 
participants’ ratings of the relative importance of the several credit aspects, V = 0.10, F(8, 
78) = 1.15, p = .344. Similarly, in the individual follow-up ANOVAs participants in the low 
construal level condition and the high construal level condition did not differ in their ratings of 
the relative importance of the several credit aspects for any given pair of aspects.  
Next, the model was extended to a MANCOVA by adding propensity to plan as a 
covariate. As in the MANOVA, there was no significant effect of construal level on participants’ 
ratings of the relative importance of the several credit aspects, F(8, 77) = 1.48, p = .177. 
However, participants’ propensity to plan was significantly related to credit attractiveness (F(8, 
77) = 2.52, p = .017). 
The overall and offer specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness, split 
up for the two conditions of the construal level manipulation, are shown in Table 8.  
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the hypothesis that there 
would be a mean difference in the evaluation of the three different credit repayment plans 
between construal levels (low and high). The dependent variable is credit attractiveness. The 
independent variables are construal level (between subjects) and credit repayment plan (within 
subjects). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated  
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(χ2(2) = 10.80, p = .005), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.89).There was no main effect of construal level, F(1, 85) = 1.00, 
p = .321. However, there was a significant main effect of credit repayment plan on credit 
attractiveness, F(1.79, 151.70) = 81.38, p < .001. The interaction between the two factors was 
not significant F(1.79, 151.70) = .01, p = .980. Regarding the descriptive results, participants in 
the low construal level condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.05) rated credit attractiveness higher than 
participants in the high construal level condition (M = 3.48, SD = 0.96). Regarding the main 
effect of credit repayment plan, pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that the 
credit repayment plan with rising installments over time (M = 2.09, SD = 1.06) was evaluated to 
be significantly less attractive than both, the credit repayment plan with falling installments over 
time (M = 4.04, SD = 1.51, p < .001) and the credit repayment plan with constant installments 
over time (M = 4.51, SD = 1.25, p < .001). There was no significant difference between the 
credit repayment plan with falling installments over time and the credit repayment plan with 
constant installments over time (p = .116).  
Table 8 
Sample Sizes, Overall and Repayment Plan Specific Means and Standard Deviations of Credit 
Attractiveness 
 Low construal level (n = 40)  High construal level (n = 47) 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Overall credit 
attractiveness 
3.63 0.73 
 
3.48 0.69 
Attractiveness 
rising 
installments 
2.19 1.01 
 
2.00 1.10 
Attractiveness 
constant 
installments 
4.59 1.28 
 
4.44 1.24 
Attractiveness 
falling 
installments 
4.11 1.34 
 
3.98 1.65 
Note. N = 87. 
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Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on credit choice by examining 
the influence of construal level on relative importance of credit aspects and on credit repayment 
plans. To this end, a laboratory experiment was conducted in which construal level was 
manipulated to be either low or high. The relative importance of credit aspects was measured for 
eight pairs of credit aspects. Preference for credit repayment plans was measured for three plans 
with either rising, constant or falling installment rates over time. No significant difference in 
relative importance of credit aspects was found between the low construal level condition and the 
high construal level condition. This finding rejects the hypothesis that in a high construal level, 
people prefer credits that are advantageous with respect to high construal features (e.g. having a 
bill that states the amount of the monthly installment very clear), while in a low construal level, 
people prefer credits that are advantageous with respect to low construal features (e.g., having a 
bill that breaks down the composition of the monthly installment in a very detailed way). 
Furthermore, no significant difference in credit attractiveness for the three credit 
repayment plans was found between the low construal level condition and the high construal 
level condition. This finding rejects the hypothesis that in a high construal level, people prefer 
credits with falling installments over time, while in a low construal level, people prefer credits 
with rising installments over time. Instead, regardless of construal level, participants showed a 
significant preference for credit repayment plans with constant or falling installments over time 
compared to the credit repayment plan with rising installments over time.   
The latter finding is in line with prior results on how people compare different credit 
repayment plans (Hoelzl et al., 2011). Even when the total cost of credit is identical, people 
relatively dislike repayment plans with rising installments over time. From a purely economic 
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point of view, this is puzzling because people do not seem to take opportunity costs into account: 
Money that is not spent on credit repayment can be invested with compound interest leading to 
earlier investments being superior to later investments. Contrary to this argument, it might be 
that people are in fact very rational in their decision from another angle. It could be the case that 
they are aware that the more distant future comes with larger uncertainties as compared to the 
nearer future. That implies that it is much harder to say whether one will be able to pay a certain 
amount in the distant future than it is to say whether one will be able to pay it in the nearer 
future. Being aware of this, it makes sense to reject a repayment plan that is characterized with 
larger repayments in the distant future, where one is relatively uncertain to be able to pay the 
installments. Unfortunately, the data does not allow to test whether participants were unaware of 
opportunity costs or whether their choice on the repayment plans was motivated by a decreasing 
degree of certainty about their future financial situation.  
Similarly, it remains an open question why there is no difference in participants’ 
preferences for repayment plans characterized by constant and falling installments over time. If 
they were aware of the decreasing degree of certainty about their future financial situation, the 
repayment plan with falling installments should be preferred over the one with constant 
installments, which is not the case. The preference for a repayment plan with falling installments 
over time over a repayment plan with rising installments is in line with previous research on 
preferences in sequences of events. Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) found a general preference 
for improvement when a number of events is framed as a sequence. Hassenzahl (2005) further 
confirmed this preference for improvement in a credit repayment context. Both studies compared 
sequences with improving and worsening events but neglected stable sequences like the 
repayment plan with constant installments over time that was used in the present study. 
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According to the preference for improvement, participants should have preferred the falling 
installments over the constant installments, which was not the case. Read and Powell (2002) 
asked participants to choose among several sequences and to explain their choice. They found 
that, when it comes to money management, people often make choices according to convenience. 
For the current study, this means that participants may have liked the simplicity of the repayment 
plan with constant installments over time. Not having to change the monthly repayment amount 
and in turn the monthly consumption seems quite convenient in comparison with the rising and 
falling installments. Taken together, the preference for improvement and the preference for 
convenience in sequences of events may have been responsible for the pattern of results in the 
current study. 
As in study 1, no effect of construal level was found. This holds true for the importance 
of credit aspects as well as for the preference of repayment plans. The following sections will 
discuss potential reasons for this outcome. 
Problems with the manipulation. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be said with certainty that the manipulation of construal level 
was strong enough to show a potential effect of construal level on importance of credit aspects 
and preference for repayment plans. As already noted, participants in the categories-condition 
generated responses that reflected higher construal levels compared with participants in the 
exemplars-condition. Although this comparison is often used as a manipulation check (e.g., 
Fujita, Trope et al., 2006), it rather resembles the nature of an attention check in the sense of 
testing whether participants read the instructions carefully and followed them (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that the manipulation of 
construal level was successful or how long the effect lasted. However, some inferences can be 
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drawn from previous research, as more than 20 studies successfully used this manipulation 
(Gilead et al., 2014). Among them, Rim, Ulemann, and Trope (2009) used this manipulation to 
show an effect of construal level on the formation of spontaneous trait inferences from other 
peoples’ behavior. The measurement of the dependent variable was comparable to the present 
study but extended over a much longer time period. The fact that an effect of construal level was 
found then speaks against the assumption that the difference in construal level that was induced 
by the manipulation does not last over a longer time period. Supporting this view and in closer 
relation to the context of the present study, Pham et al. (2011) found an effect of construal level, 
as manipulated in the present study, on monetary valuation of objects, using a rather complex 
experimental design with a time lag between the manipulation and the measurement of the 
dependent variable. 
Taken together, it can be assumed that the manipulation used in the present study is 
capable of evoking differences in construal level that last over extended time periods. However, 
it is unclear whether this difference lasted long enough to influence participants’ answers on the 
dependent variables in this particular case. Therefore, it remains an open question whether the 
null-effect of construal level on the importance of the respective credit aspects can be attributed 
to problems with the manipulation. 
Problems with the scenario. 
As already noted in the discussion on study 1, the scenario descriptions that were 
presented prior to the measurement of the dependent variables might have attenuated the induced 
difference in construal levels between the two conditions. For the scenario described before 
participants rated the relative importance of the credit aspects, this seems rather unlikely. The 
text consisted of only two sentences that can be considered unrelated to construal level. 
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However, the scenario described before participants rated the credit repayment plans included 
some more information. This was considered necessary, in order to provide meaning to the 
subsequent task and thus increase the chance for realistic answers. Unfortunately, as in study 1, 
the scenario required some detailed information. Because detail is a low construal level feature 
(Lee et al., 2014) or even understood synonymously with concreteness (Woltin et al., 2011), the 
scenario might have counteracted the high construal level priming in the high construal level 
condition, reducing the difference in construal level between the two experimental conditions.  
As stated in study 1, there are empirical objections against this explanation (e.g., Sanna et 
al., 2009). More importantly, this explanation might illustrate why there was no effect of 
construal level on credit repayment plan ratings. However, it would not explain why there was 
no effect of construal level on the relative importance of credit aspects. Overall, it is only 
speculative whether the scenario descriptions could have addressed construal level and it seems 
unlikely that they did so to a degree that neutralized the previously induced difference in 
construal levels.  
General Discussion on Part I 
To recapitulate, both studies aimed to extend research on construal level in the consumer 
credit context. Study 1 examined how different construal levels influence the importance of 
different credit aspects for evaluations of credit attractiveness and credit choice. It was 
hypothesized that credits with a low annual percentage rate and low total costs are evaluated 
more positively and chosen more often in high construal level than in low construal level, while 
credits with low monthly redemption payments and low monthly interest fees are evaluated more 
positively and chosen more often in low construal level than in high construal level. Study 2 
extended this line of research to the relative importance of credit aspects in general. More 
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precisely, the study investigated whether differences in construal level lead to different priorities 
regarding the aspects that are most important when deciding for a credit alternative. It was 
hypothesized that high construal level leads people to prefer credits that are advantageous with 
respect to high construal features (e.g. having a bill that states the amount of the monthly 
installment very clearly), while low construal level leads people to prefer credits that are 
advantageous with respect to low construal features (e.g., having a bill that breaks down the 
composition of the monthly installment in a very detailed way). In addition, further analyses 
explored the influence of construal level on preferences for specific sequences of installments, 
assuming that a high construal level leads to preferences for credits with falling installments over 
time, while a low construal level leads to preferences for credits with rising installments over 
time. 
Based on the empirical results, all hypotheses had to be rejected. The results in study 1 
were in line with previous findings on the importance of annual percentage rate and total cost for 
credit decisions (Ranyard et al., 2006). However, there was no indication of an effect of 
construal level on participants’ preferences. The same was true for study 2. Surprisingly, there 
was no unambiguous evidence for the proper induction of different construal levels via the 
manipulations in the two studies, even though both manipulations were well-established 
measures (Gilead et al., 2014). As described in detail in the respective discussion sections of the 
two studies, both manipulations were also successfully applied in contexts comparable to those 
in the present studies. Thus, it remains unclear whether the absence of significant differences 
between the experimental conditions must be attributed to construal level not being related to the 
credit evaluations and decisions in the two studies or whether this is due to the manipulations not 
being successful. 
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Part II – Construal Level and 0%-Credits 
The main purpose of this second part of the thesis is to extend research on construal level 
theory in the consumer credit context by focusing on a more recently introduced form of credit 
offers: 0%-interest credits. To this end, two laboratory experiments investigated the relationship 
between the number 0 and construal level with regard to implications for consumer credit 
decisions. 
0%-Interest Credits 
As a reaction to the global financial crisis that started in 2007, many central banks tried to 
recapitalize the world's banking system by offering loans with very low interest rates. Some, like 
the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan even adopted a 
0% interest rate policy – essentially an elimination of interest payments – to increase gross 
expenditure and thus kick-start growth. As a consequence of being able to borrow without 
having to pay interest, some banks soon after started to offer similar credits to their customers. 
Thus, over the last couple of years, consumers have witnessed the rise of a new form of credit. 
0%-interest credits are regular consumer credit offers with the distinctive feature of an annual 
percentage rate of 0%, turning an otherwise costly financial product into a free one (regarding 
the annual percentage rate). While such offers are especially prominent for car purchases, in 
some countries (e.g., Germany) 0%-interest credits are available without being bound to a 
specific purchase (Smava, 2015). Furthermore, this new form of credit is not limited to 
installment credits. For example, several banks in the US offer credit cards with an initial period 
of 15 to 21 months during which the annual percentage rate is set to 0% (McGuire, 2017). The 
fact that the interest rate after this period rises to 11.5% to 24% gives a first impression that these 
seemingly free offers are not necessarily as advantageous as they seem. While these examples 
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demonstrate the widespread availability of 0%-interest credits, a representative study for German 
households up to the age of 75 years (GfK Finanzmarktforschung, 2014) shows the popularity. In 
this study, 19% of participants who were extremely satisfied with their credit stated that the 
annual percentage rate of 0% was a primary reason for their satisfaction. This result is 
particularly surprising because it requires a large share of 0%-interest credits among all credits 
held in the sample. At least for Germany, two further findings imply an increase in 0%-interest 
credit offers. First, relatively small credits (up to € 3,000) made up 39.8% of all new credit 
contracts in 2015 (SCHUFA Holding AG, 2016). Because 0%-interest credits are usually found 
in this area, the figure demonstrates the large potential of such offers. Second, contracts signed at 
the point of sale became more and more important over the last years. In 2015, they made up 
59% of the financial volume of all new contracts (Bankenfachverband, 2015). Thus, consumers 
increasingly decide for credit take-up directly when they are buying a new car or shopping for 
furniture, consumer electronics or household appliances. This is important, because many 0%-
interest credits are advertised as means to finance the purchase at the point of sale. Therefore, the 
preference for smaller credits and the trend to make credit decisions directly at the point of sale 
highlight the high potential for a further increase of 0%-interest credit offers.  
Overall, this sounds like a great deal for consumers: A broad availability of seemingly 
free credits with low complexity and a highly convenient way to purchase long desired products. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. Often, these credit offers come with high dunning fees 
for late payments and default costs, that seem disproportionately high compared to the amount of 
credit. In other cases the credit is offered with a mandatory residual debt insurance that is also 
expensive in relation to the credit sum. Some offers also include a credit card for the consumer. 
While the annual percentage rate for the credit is 0%, the rate for payments with the related card 
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is much higher than the usual market rates. Consumer advisors point out, that this is often not 
clear to customers, as it is only mentioned in the fine print (Verbraucherzentrale, 2016). 
Furthermore, some 0%-interest credit offers come with a repayment plan with rather small 
installments and one large installment at the end of the credit period. This increases the 
probability that consumers either default on the scheduled payment and face the high dunning 
costs or that they must take another credit to repay the first one in time.  
Beyond these financial aspects of 0%-interest credit offers, there is also a psychological 
danger related to such offers that can overshadow the seemingly advantageous financing 
possibility: Not having to pay interest could lead to careless consumption. Overoptimistic views 
of the personal financial future might lead consumers to acquire more products than they can 
afford to pay for (Yang, Markoczy, & Qi, 2007). The strong focus on the number 0 in 0%-
interest credit advertisement could mislead consumers to the interpretation that they can in fact 
afford an expensive product (Verbraucherzentrale Niedersachsen, 2014). Furthermore, the rather 
small credit amounts could lead consumers to sign multiple 0%-interest credit offers. This could 
result in reduced financial overview and ultimately non-optimal repayment decisions and 
therefore additional costs (Amar et al., 2011). 
Taken together, the low hurdles and the mentioned drawbacks render 0%-interest credit a 
potentially dangerous product that consumer protection offices already started to warn about. 
Moreover, because these financial products are relatively new, they represent a blind spot in 
research on consumer credit. In an attempt to close this gap, the following section describes an 
approach to utilize construal level theory to explain why 0%-interest credit offers are so popular, 
despite the many disadvantages related to such offers. 
The Abstract Nature of 0 
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Figure 3 displays a typical example of an advertisement for a 0%-interest credit bound to 
a car purchase. As can be seen, the annual percentage rate of 0% is the most outstanding element 
in the composition. In a large font size it is prominently placed in the center top. Potential 
customers can read it from afar and most likely form their first impression about the offer based 
on the 0% rate. Without doubt, it is the central feature of the credit. Thus, the question arises how 
people process the number 0. In contrast to positive numbers like 1, 2, or 872, 0 is not an 
intuitive number and cannot be used in counting, because it implies that there is nothing to count. 
The special case of 0 is not limited to things existing in the real world, but extends to mental 
concepts: It is easy to imagine a positive amount of any kind of objects (e.g., apples). However, 
it is not possible to imagine 0 apples. Either one does not imagine apples but  
 
Figure 3. A typical example of an advertisement for a 0%-interest credit bound to a car 
purchase. Adapted from Town East Ford 
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something else (e.g., bananas) or one does imagine at least one apple. The concept of 0 cannot be 
aligned with the mental conception of things. Thus, 0 is rather abstract in nature, compared to 
positive numbers. This allows the conclusion that the perception and cognitive processing of the 
number 0 is different from that of positive numbers.  
Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely (2007) asked their participants to make a hypothetical 
choice between buying a piece of high quality chocolate for a relatively high price or a piece of 
low quality chocolate for a relatively low price or for free. Over three conditions, the price-
scheme was set to 27¢ and 2¢, 26¢ and 1¢ as well as 25¢ and 0¢. A reduction by 1¢ from 27¢ to 
26¢ and from 2¢ to 1¢ did not change participants’ preferences. However, when the prices 
decreased such that the low quality chocolate was free (0¢), 90% of participants chose the low 
quality chocolate over the high quality chocolate, up from 40% in the 26¢ / 1¢ condition. The 
result was further replicated in an experiment with real purchases. Shampanier et al. (2007) 
termed the overly strong increase for a certain product when it is offered for free the zero-prize 
effect and explained their findings with an added benefit of free products. According to them, 
getting something without having to pay a price for it, triggers positive emotions that enter the 
cost-benefit analysis underlying the decision. Several recent studies have replicated the zero-
price effect for individual and bundled purchases as well as hedonic and utilitarian products and 
identified several boundary conditions, turning it into an established phenomenon (e.g., 
Baumbach, 2016; Hossain & Saini, 2015; Murata, 2017; Nicolau, 2012). It shows that 0 – in the 
context of prices or cost – is indeed different from positive numbers. However, the affective 
explanation is not the only attempt to understand this phenomenon. Another explanation is 
offered by Palmeira (2011). He demonstrated that consumers do not evaluate attributes of 
products in absolute terms, when comparing two products. Instead, they evaluate them in relation 
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to each other. Participants in his experiment preferred yoghurt with 1% fat over yoghurt with 5% 
fat. The author argues that this is because fat is an unwanted aspect for most customers and 
yoghurt with 5% fat is five times as bad on this aspect as the other one. However, such 
comparisons do no longer work when one of the products takes the value 0 on the compared 
aspect. Mathematically, yoghurt with 5% fat contains infinitely more fat than yoghurt with 0% 
fat. The number is too abstract to serve in a comparison with a positive number. The results of 
Palmeira (2011) support this explanation, as in the case with 0% and 5% more consumers chose 
the 5% yoghurt as in the case with 1% and 5%. Surprisingly, the demand for the seemingly 
worse offer increased, instead of the demand for yoghurt with 0% fat going up steeply. It could 
be that this was just due to the specific product used in the study. It can be assumed that most 
people are aware of the fact that fat serves as a flavor carrier. Yoghurt with 0% fat could have 
triggered the idea of either tasteless yoghurt or one with a high share of sugar, which is often 
used as a substitute for fat (Nines, 1999) and represents another unwanted characteristic related 
to the yoghurt with 0% fat. However, Palmeira (2011) also demonstrated in another experiment, 
that a credit card with an annual percentage rate of 1% is evaluated more positively than a credit 
card with an annual percentage rate of 0%, when both are compared to a credit card with an 
annual percentage rate of 20%. While the author explained the difference again with participants’ 
inability to compare 0% and 20%, he does not attempt to deliver any potential reasons for the 
surprising direction of the effect, i.e. the finding that the 0%-card is evaluated less positively than 
the 20%-card. In contrast to this, other authors replicated the so-called zero-comparison effect 
(Graham & Mohr, 2014) in a way that 0 is evaluated overly positive in comparison with positive 
numbers. For the present studies, it is argued that the number 0 is perceived and processed more 
abstractly, because it cannot be conceptualized on equal terms with positive numbers, due to the 
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lacking possibility of a relative comparison. Study 3 investigates whether being exposed to the 
number 0, as it is the case in ads for 0%-interest credits (Figure 3) induces a higher construal 
level, while being exposed to a positive number induces a lower construal level, leading to 
different product preferences, when making a credit-financed purchase. Research on construal 
level consistently found aspects of desirability to be related to high construal level and aspects of 
feasibility to be related to low construal level. Thus, aspects of desirability and feasibility were 
used in study 3, to investigate the role of construal level in differences in product preferences for 
0%-interest credits and non-0%-interest credits. The following section describes the relationship 
of construal level and desirability / feasibility. 
Construal Level and Aspects of Desirability / Feasibility 
As already mentioned in the theory section of part I, desirability is a characteristic of 
high-level construals and feasibility is a characteristic of low-level construals (Table 1). This is 
because desirability refers to the goal of attaining an object or end-state, while feasibility refers 
to the process of attaining an object or end-state (Liberman & Trope, 1998). With the idea of 
psychological distance defining construal level, construal level theory predicts that as 
psychological distance increases, consumers focus shift from aspects of feasibility to aspects of 
desirability (Trope et al., 2007). This explains for example why product preferences are strongly 
influenced by what a product is capable of before buying it and by how usable it is after buying 
and using it (Thompson, Hamilton, & Rust, 2005): Forecasts of the usage situation are 
temporally and therefore psychologically distant, thus highlighting what the product can be used 
for (Hamilton & Thompson, 2007). Regarding purchase decisions, Lu, Xie, and Xu (2013) 
showed that consumers under high construal level prefer products that are advertised with high 
desirability (operationalized as quality), whereas consumers under low construal level prefer 
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products that are advertised with high feasibility (operationalized as convenience). Furthermore, 
not only the choice was more strongly influenced by either desirability aspects or feasibility 
aspects. The authors also demonstrated that consumers under high construal level are more likely 
to search for information on aspects of desirability, while consumers under low construal level 
are more likely to search for information on aspects of feasibility, before the decision stage. 
What constitutes an aspect of desirability or feasibility depends strongly on the product at hand. 
However, Pizzi et al. (2014) identified design as an aspect of desirability that most likely holds 
true for all products. Similarly, Pfannenstiel and Chaparro (2015) identified ease of usage as a 
general aspect of feasibility. 
Construal Level and the Fit Effect 
From another perspective, one could argue that the previously explained preference for 
desirability in high construal level and for feasibility in low construal level is just one specific 
form of the more general idea that people favor a fit between the level of abstraction of their own 
mental construals and the level of abstraction of new information presented to them. 
Various experiments in the domain of judgement and decision making have shown that 
people favor information that matches their construal level over information that does not match 
(e.g., Kim & John, 2008; Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2000). This 
goes so far that people are more willing to believe and trust information that matches their 
construal level. For example, Hansen and Wänke (2010) assumed that when people read 
information that is written in either abstract or concrete language, matching their abstract or 
concrete mental construals, they have a good feeling about the harmony of processing these 
statements and, as a consequence, would judge them as more likely to be true as compared to a 
situation in which there is a mismatch between the level of abstraction of the language and their 
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mental construals. While the results supported the effect of the construal level fit on truth ratings, 
the authors unfortunately missed to test their explanation that a match leads to an increase in ease 
of processing of the information thereby influencing truth ratings. Although in slightly different 
contexts, other studies already demonstrated that an alignment of cognitive processing style and 
perceived cues does indeed lead to a metacognitive flow that then affects the outcome of the 
cognitive processing (e.g., Förster & Higgins, 2005; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 
2003).  
Lee, Keller, and Sternthal (2010) extended the findings of Hansen and Wänke (2010) to 
the realm of hypothetical buying decisions and product attitudes. They found that participants’ 
attitude towards a cross-trainer increased, when their construal level matched the description of 
the sporting equipment, written either with a focus on high construal level aspects or low 
construal level aspects of the product. In another experiment, Lee et al. (2010) found support for 
a different explanation of this fit effect: According to the results, the match between participants’ 
construal level and the abstract or concrete description of the target product increased 
engagement, resulting in a more positive attitude towards the product.   
Regarding the present work, these findings have an interesting implication. If 0 is indeed 
more abstract than positive numbers, for the reasons explained in the section on the nature of the 
number 0, people in a high construal level should experience a fit of their construal level and the 
number 0. Parallel to the previously presented findings, this should lead to an increase in 
perceived attractiveness of 0%- interest credits as compared to people in a low construal level, 
who do not experience this fit effect. Together with a replication of the more general zero-price 
effect in the domain of 0%-interest credits, study 4 aims to test this assumption.  
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Study 3 – 0%-Credit and Product Choice 
Advertisements for 0%-interest credits often include the prominent display of the number 
0. Study 3 investigates whether focusing on 0 induces a higher construal level than focusing on 
positive numbers and whether the resulting difference in construal level leads to different 
product preferences when making a credit financed purchase. Building on the described literature 
on the relatively more abstract nature of 0, the first hypothesis in this study reads as follows: 
H1: Concentrating on an advertisement with the prominent display of the number 0 leads 
to a relatively higher construal level as compared to concentrating on an advertisement with the 
prominent display of a positive number. 
Furthermore, building on the described literature on construal level and aspects of 
desirability and feasibility, it is assumed that the induced difference in construal level is strong 
enough to influence participants’ product preferences in a hypothetical buying decision such that 
participants in the high construal level condition, being offered a 0%-interest credit with an 
interest fee of € 0, decide for a laptop which is favorable in terms of desirability, whereas 
participants in the low construal level condition, being offered a 1%-interest credit with an 
interest fee of € 5, decide for a laptop which is favorable in terms of feasibility. The respective 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
H2: Participants in a high construal level prefer to buy products on credit that are 
favorable in terms of desirability, while participants in a low construal level prefer to buy 
products on credit that are favorable in terms of feasibility. 
The hypotheses were tested using a laboratory experiment on a hypothetical purchase 
situation. 
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Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from June 23rd to 24th, 20145. Participants were approached on 
the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part in a study on 
“buying decisions and financing”. They were informed that they would get some candy as a 
token of appreciation. Furthermore, they could take part in a lottery where 10 winners would 
receive € 20.00 each. 
From the original sample of 91 students who agreed to participate in this study, data from 
three participants was excluded for the following reasons: One participant quit the study, one 
participant stated that her data should not be used in the analyses and one was excluded because 
her data on the measurement of the dependent variables was corrupted due to a glitch in the 
software that was used to conduct the study. The final sample included 88 participants. It 
consisted of 24 (27.3%) men and 64 women (72.7%) with an age between 16 and 37 years 
(M = 22.41, MdnAge = 22, SD = 3.66). The median duration to complete the study was 
MdnDur = 8:14 minutes. 
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was construal level (high construal level or low construal level). The dependent variable was 
product choice. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the two conditions in this study was random. 
                                                 
5 I would like to thank Julia Herzog, Omid Kamali Novin, Jan Guldner, Clemens Lotz, and Timo Buss for their help 
in the survey promotion and data collection. 
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At the start, participants read the instructions for the study. In the following construal 
level manipulation, they worked on a task that activates either a concrete or an abstract mindset 
by asking participants to focus either on a concrete number (5) or on an abstract number (0). The 
effectiveness of this manipulation was checked using the Behavior Identification Form 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). 
In the main part of the study, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to 
buy a new laptop and planned to take a credit for that reason. This scenario served as a 
situational frame for the consecutive task to choose a specific laptop among several alternatives 
that differed in terms of desirability and feasibility. 
Next, participants answered some questions on their satisfaction with their choice and the 
importance of the product characteristics for their choice.  
In the last part of the study, participants were asked for demographic information 
(gender, age, area of studies, duration of studies). Last, they were asked about the presumed aim 
of the study and whether their data could be used in the analyses.  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants and offered some candy to them. 
Participants could write their email address on a piece of paper and put it in an opaque box to 
participate in a lottery and win one of 10 € 20.00 prizes. The winners of this lottery were 
contacted via the provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Manipulation of construal level. 
Construal level was manipulated via the presentation of a picture, prominently displaying the 
number 0 or the number 5. All participants were presented with the picture of an opened laptop. 
In the high construal level condition, a large 0 was displayed on its screen, while in the low 
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construal level condition, a large 5 was displayed on the screen. No further information on the 
nature of the digit or it’s relation to other tasks in the study was provided. Participants were 
instructed to concentrate on the picture for 20 seconds. Only after that time, they were able to 
proceed with the study. 
Manipulation check.  
As a manipulation check, the behavior manipulation form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989) was used. The order in which participants were presented with the questions in this form 
was identical with the order in the original presentation of the measure. As in study 1, the 
answers to the questions in the form – with concrete ones coded as 0 and abstract ones coded as 
1 – were summed up to form an index (α = .79), with higher values indicating a higher construal 
level. 
Situational frame. 
Participants read a scenario concerning a specific buying decision situation and were 
asked to imagine themselves in the described situation. Specifically, they were told that their 
laptop was no longer working and they intended to buy a new one, because they were dependent 
upon such a device. They were told that they had to choose one laptop from a range of six 
different ones. Furthermore, participants were informed that all laptops would cost € 500 and that 
they differed only among the four dimensions that participants were about to see in the product 
presentation. In the high construal level condition, participants were told that a 0%-interest credit 
was available for the purchase and that this meant annual interest costs of € 0. In the low 
construal level condition, participants were told that a 1%-interest credit was available for the 
purchase and that this meant annual interest costs of € 5. The combined information served as a 
situational frame for the consecutive presentation of the six products and the choice among these 
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alternatives. 
Product presentation and product choice. 
The page on which participants compared the product alternatives and made a decision 
was split up into four vertically aligned sections. The two topmost sections served as a reminder 
of the manipulation of construal level. The third section in the middle of the screen contained the 
product alternatives in a format suited to compare them. Finally, the bottom section asked 
participants to choose one of the product alternatives. 
In the top section of the page, the following sentence was written: "Finance your desired 
product comfortably and inexpensively with our installment financing with an interest rate of 
X%!". In the high construal level condition, X was 0 and in the low construal level condition X 
was 1. Underneath, in the second section of the screen, participants saw the same picture as in 
the construal level manipulation. Only this time, the display of the laptop read "For a price of € 
500, your annual interest cost amounts to € Y.” In the high construal level condition, Y was 0 and 
in the low construal level condition Y was 5. As in the manipulation, the digit was the most 
prominent element on the display to reinforce the manipulation of construal level. 
In the third section of the screen, six different laptops, labeled alternative 1 to alternative 
6, were presented (see Figure 4). For each alternative, information on battery life, user-
friendliness, design and warranty period was provided. Battery life and user-friendliness 
represent feasibility attributes that are connected to thoughts on a specific usage situation of a 
laptop. A long battery life is needed when one wants to work outside or on the way to the office. 
Similarly, user-friendliness is important when one wants to get to work quickly without losing 
much time (e.g., via preinstalled programs and short boot-up times). Contrary, design and 
warranty period represent desirability attributes that are connected to thoughts on a laptop in 
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general without a specific usage situation. An appealing design and a long warranty period 
should be important when one thinks about the product as such without contextual aspects. 
For each of the four attributes, a rating was provided for every alternative, using a scale 
of five stars. The more stars were filled, the better was the alternative on the respective 
dimension. Such a rating format is widely used in online shops. For the present study, it further 
offers the advantage of making the rating of different attributes intuitively comparable. 
Otherwise, participants would have faced the complex task to evaluate first whether for example 
an increase from 6 to 8 hours of battery life is comparable to an increase from 2 to 3 years of 
warranty. To further simplify the comparison, every alternative was rated on each attribute with 
either two or with four out of the five possible stars. For every alternative, two attributes signaled 
a negative rating (two stars) and two attributes signaled a positive rating (four stars). This was 
done in such a way that alternative 2 stood out on feasibility (both, battery life and user-
friendliness rated positive) and alternative 3 stood out on desirability (both, design and warranty 
period rated positive). The other four alternatives were mixed forms with both, one feasibility 
and one desirability attribute positive as well as one feasibility and one desirability attribute 
negative. 
Finally, in the fourth section of the screen, participants were asked to make a decision for 
one of the alternatives. The respective question read “For which of the six alternatives do you 
decide?” 
Choice satisfaction and rating of product attributes. 
Next, participants’ satisfaction with their choice was measured as well as the relative 
importance of the four product attributes for their choice. 
Choice satisfaction was understood as a general concept consisting of choice satisfaction, 
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choice difficulty and choice uncertainty, covering aspects of the process as well as the outcome 
(Goedertier, Geskens, Geuens, & Weijters, 2012). The respective three questions read “How 
satisfied are you with your choice?” (1 = not satisfied at all; 7 = very satisfied), “How difficult 
was it for you to make a choice?” (1 = not difficult at all; 7 = very difficult), and “How certain 
are you that you made the right choice?” (1 = not certain at all; 7 = very certain). Choice 
satisfaction was computed as the mean value of the three questions. Cronbach’s alpha was 
α = .72.  
Each of the four product attributes was rated with regard to attractiveness, general 
importance and relevance for the buying decision. The respective three questions read “How 
attractive do you find the following product attributes?” (1 = not at all attractive; 7 = very 
attractive), “How important are the following product attributes to you?” (1 = not at all 
important; 7 = very important), and “How relevant are the following product attributes for your 
buying decision?” (1 = not at all relevant; 7 = very relevant). For each product attribute, an index 
of impact on the buying decision was computed as the mean value of the three questions. 
Cronbach’s alpha ranged between α = .83 and α = .88 for the four product attributes.  
Control variables. 
In the final section, participants were asked how well they could imagine themselves in 
the described scenario that served as a situational frame in this study. Also, they were asked to 
remember the annual percentage rate of the credit offer for the laptop (don’t remember; 0%; 1%) 
to check whether participants paid attention to this crucial aspect of the manipulation. In 
addition, they stated their beliefs about the purpose of the study. Furthermore, the question for 
data usability from Meade and Craig (2012) that was described in study 1 was used again to 
identify participants who preferred their data not to be analyzed.  
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Results. 
Preliminary analysis. 
Manipulation check. 
In a first step, participants’ score on the Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989) was analyzed to see whether the manipulation of construal level was successful. 
An independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the high construal level condition 
(M = 14.48, SD = 4.66) did not score significantly higher on the Behavior Identification Form 
than participants in the low construal level condition (M = 13.24, SD = 4.58), t(86) = 1.26, 
p = .107 (one-tailed). Therefore, it must be assumed that the manipulation of construal level was 
not successful. To check whether participants followed the instructions in the manipulation and 
focused on the respective digit on the screen of the laptop, answers on the recall-question for that 
digit were analyzed. Eighty-five (96.6%) participants remembered the presented digit correctly 
and three (3.4%) participants stated that they did not remember the digit. Thus, the large majority 
of participants did follow the instruction in the manipulation but it did not lead to a difference in 
construal level between the two conditions, according to the Behavior Identification Form. This 
finding rejects the hypothesis that concentrating on 0 leads to a relatively higher construal level 
as compared to concentrating on a positive number. 
Descriptives. 
Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 9. 
On average, participants were rather satisfied with their individual choice among the 
laptops (M = 4.69, SD = 1.22). Battery life (M = 6.17, SD = 1.02) was rated as the most 
important product attribute for the decision. The second most important product attribute was 
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user-friendliness (M = 5.73, SD = 1.05). Despite somewhat lower levels of importance, warranty 
period (M = 5.02, SD = 1.44) and design (M = 4.03, SD = 1.46) also represent product attributes 
that were important for participants’ product choice. 
The positive correlation of the importance of battery life and user-friendliness (r = .24, 
N = 88, p = .024) can be interpreted in favor of the underlying aspect of feasibility. In contrast, 
the correlation between the importance of design and warranty period was not significant (r = -
.06, N = 88, p = .607), speaking against an underlying aspect of desirability. Out of the four 
dimensions, only importance of battery life was significantly correlated with choice satisfaction 
(r = .26, N = 88, p = .015).  
Furthermore, the results show that on average, participants did not seem to have problems 
imagining themselves in the scenario that was described in the study (M = 5.42, SD = 1.56). The 
easier it was for them, the more satisfied were they with their product choice (r = .43, N = 88, p < 
Table 9 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlation Coefficients and Reliabilities for the Variables in the 
Analyses 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Behavior 
Identification Form 
scorea 
13.83 4.63 .79       
2. Choice satisfactionb 4.69 1.22 .12 -      
3. Importance of  
battery lifeb 
6.17 1.02 -.03 .26* .85     
4. Importance of user-
friendlinessb 
5.73 1.05 .09 .05 .24* .83    
5. Importance of  
designb 
4.03 1.46 -.20 -.12 -.16 .06 .86   
6. Importance of 
warranty periodb 
5.02 1.44 -.07 -.07 .04 -.07 -.06 .88  
7. Ease of 
imaginationb 
5.42 1.56 .16 .43** .06 -.03 .12 -.05 - 
Note. N = 88. The diagonal displays Cronbach’s α for the respective scale. 
aScale range: 0 to 25. bScale range: 1 to 7. 
* p < .05. ** p < .001. 
 
101 
 
 
.001). 
Main analysis.  
Participants’ product choices, split up for the two conditions of the construal level 
manipulation, are shown in Table 10. 
To account for the small cell size for some alternatives, Fisher’s exact test was used to 
analyze the differences in participants’ choices between the two construal levels. As the test 
showed, there was no difference in product choice between the two conditions, N = 88, p = 919, 
two-tailed. Next, the test was used for the direct comparison of the choice of alternatives 2 and 3. 
Alternative 2 was particularly favorable when considering aspects of feasibility, while alternative 
3 was particularly favorable when considering aspects of desirability. Again, there was no 
significant difference in participants’ product choice between the high construal level condition 
and the low construal level condition, N = 43, p = .488, two-tailed. Therefore, the hypothesis that 
participants in a low construal level prefer to buy products on credit that are favorable in terms of 
feasibility, while participants in a high construal level prefer to buy products on credit that are 
favorable in terms of desirability, was rejected. 
In the next step, the importance of the product attributes for the product choice was 
analyzed. Participants’ ratings of the importance of the four product attributes, split up for the 
Table 10 
Sample Sizes, Absolute and Relative Share of Participants Choosing the Product Alternatives 
 Low construal level (n = 46)  High construal level (n = 42) 
Product n %  n % 
#1 1 2.2  1 2.4 
#2 20 43.5  21 50.0 
#3 2 4.3  0 0.0 
#4 5 10.9  4 9.5 
#5 7 15.2  6 14.3 
#6 11 23.9  10 23.8 
Note. N = 88. 
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two conditions of the construal level manipulation, are shown in Table 11.  
In order to check for the hypothesized effect of construal level on the importance of the 
product attributes a MANOVA was conducted with participants’ ratings of the importance of the 
four product attributes for the product choice serving as dependent variables. Construal level 
served as the independent factor. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no significant effect of construal 
level on participants’ ratings of the importance of the four product attributes, V = 0.03, F(4, 
83) = 0.69, p = .599. Similarly, in the individual follow-up ANOVAs participants in the low 
construal level condition and the high construal level condition did not differ in their ratings of 
the relative importance of the individual product attributes.  
Next, the model was extended to a MANCOVA by adding choice satisfaction as a 
covariate. As in the MANOVA, there was no significant effect of construal level on participants’ 
ratings of the importance of the product attributes, V = 0.03, F(4, 82) = 0.57, p = .684. Neither 
was participants’ choice satisfaction significantly related to the importance of the four product 
attributes, V = 0.08, F(4, 82) = 1.66, p = .168. Therefore, the hypothesis that participants in a low 
construal level see product attributes that refer to feasibility as more important for their product 
choice than product attributes that refer to desirability, while participants in a high construal 
level put more importance on product attributes that refer to desirability than to feasibility, was 
rejected. 
Table 11 
Importance of the Product Attributes for the Product Choice 
 Low construal level (n = 46)  High construal level (n = 42) 
Product attribute M SD  M SD 
Battery life 6.03 1.24  6.33 0.68 
User-friendliness 5.70 1.04  5.75 1.08 
Design 3.95 1.68  4.12 1.18 
Warranty period 5.09 1.41  4.93 1.48 
Note. N = 88. 
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Exploratory analyses. 
Potential problems with the manipulation. 
As already noted, there was no significant difference in the score on the Behavior 
Identification Form between the low construal level condition and the high construal level 
condition. In contrast to study 1, participants in the present study completed the Behavior 
Identification Form directly after the manipulation. Therefore, the possibility that the 
manipulation of construal level was successful but did only last for a very limited time, can be 
discarded. Because the Behavior Identification Form was frequently used as a manipulation 
check for construal level (e.g., Krüger et al., 2014),as it is able to show significant differences, it 
must be assumed that the manipulation of construal level was not successful. This might explain 
why the analyses in the previous section did not show any significant effects of construal level 
on the dependent variables. However, in order to explore the hypotheses in a different way, the 
analyses were run again with a focus on differences between participants who scored either high 
or low on the Behavior Identification Form. To this end, participants were allocated to two 
groups via a median split on the score on the Behavior Identification Form. In the low score 
group, participants score averaged M = 10.25 (SD = 2.98) compared to M = 17.41 (SD = 2.88) in 
the high score group.  
As in the main analysis, Fisher’s exact test was used to analyze the differences in 
participants’ choices between the two groups. As the test showed, there was no difference in 
product choice between the two groups, N = 88, p = .919, two-tailed. The same was true for the 
direct comparison of the choice of alternatives 2 (particularly favorable when considering aspects 
of feasibility) and 3 (particularly favorable when considering aspects of desirability), N = 88, 
p = 233, two-tailed. In line with the results from the main analysis, these two findings reject the 
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hypothesis that participants in a low construal level prefer to buy products on credit that are 
favorable in terms of feasibility, while participants in a high construal level prefer to buy 
products on credit that are favorable in terms of desirability. 
Furthermore, as in the main analysis, a MANCOVA was calculated to analyze the 
differences in the importance of product attributes for participants’ product choice between the 
two groups created from the Behavior Identification Form score. As in the main analysis, no 
significant effect of construal level group on the importance of product attributes was obtained, 
V = 0.32, F(4, 82) = 0.68, p = .607. Neither was participants’ choice satisfaction significantly 
related to the importance of the four product attributes, V = 0.08, F(4, 82) = 1.80, p = .137. In 
line with the results from the main analysis, this finding rejects the hypothesis that participants in 
a low construal level see product attributes that refer to feasibility as more important for their 
product choice than product attributes that refer to desirability, while participants in a high 
construal level put more importance on product attributes that refer to desirability than to 
feasibility. 
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on consumer credit decisions in 
a 0%-interest credit context choice by examining whether the prominent display of the number 0, 
as it is frequently the case in ads for 0%-interest credits, induces a higher construal level than 
positive numbers and whether the resulting difference in construal level leads to different 
product preferences, when making a credit financed purchase. To this end, a laboratory 
experiment was conducted in which participants had to concentrate on either the number 0 or the 
number 5, to induce different construal levels. Participants’ construal level was then measured 
and they were asked to make a hypothetical purchase decision by selecting one out of six product 
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alternatives to be financed either by 0%-interest credit with € 0 interest costs or a 1%-interest 
credit with € 5 interest cost. The product alternatives varied with regard to two attributes 
mirroring desirability and two attributes mirroring of feasibility. Furthermore, the importance of 
each product attribute for the purchase decision was measured.  
No significant difference in construal level was found between the participants primed 
with the number 0 and those primed with the number 5. This finding rejects the hypothesis that 
concentrating on the number 0 leads to a relatively higher construal level as compared to 
concentrating on a positive number. This speaks against the idea that 0 represents a special 
number (Graham & Mohr, 2014; Palmeira, 2011; Shampanier et al., 2007) to the extent that it 
activates a higher construal level than positive numbers. A criticism of the manipulation could be 
that the mere presentation of a number on a screen is a rather weak approach to change an aspect 
of participants’ cognition. However, previous research used similar techniques to successfully 
induce low and high construal levels (Liberman & Förster, 2009). Also, participants had to 
concentrate on the presented number for a rather long period of 20 seconds. With the study only 
continuing after this interval and no other distractions in the individual cubicles in the lab, it can 
be assumed that participants did indeed spend a major amount of time focusing on the numbers. 
Thus, minimal exposure can be excluded as an explanation why the manipulation did not lead to 
different construal levels. Participants completed the Behavior Identification Form directly after 
the manipulation. Therefore, is can also be ruled out that a potential effect of the manipulation 
did not last long enough to be detected. In sum, it remains an open question why the number 0 
despite of its abstract nature does not lead to a higher construal level than positive numbers.  
Furthermore, participants’ product decision did not differ between neither the two groups 
created by the manipulation nor between two groups created via a median split on the score of 
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the Behavior Identification Form as a substitute for construal level. These findings reject the 
hypothesis that participants in a high construal level prefer to buy products on credit that are 
favorable in terms of desirability, while participants in a low construal level prefer to buy 
products on credit that are favorable in terms of feasibility. Instead, participants showed a strong 
preference for a product that was rated high on both attributes of feasibility and low on both 
attributes of desirability regardless of construal level. The following section discusses this issue 
in detail. 
Problems with the attributes. 
Previous research consistently demonstrated that before an actual purchase or usage 
situation, product preferences are more strongly influenced by aspects of desirability than by 
aspects of feasibility (Hamilton & Thompson, 2007; Lee & Koubek, 2010, 2012; Thompson, et 
al., 2005). In the present study, the pattern was reversed: 46.6% of participants indicated to 
prefer buying a laptop with both attributes of feasibility (battery life and user-friendliness) being 
rated with four stars and both attributes of desirability (design and warranty period) being rated 
with two stars. This leaves two possible conclusions. First, it is possible that the product 
attributes used in the present study do not reflect desirability and feasibility in the way that it was 
assumed. Second, it might be that one or two of the attributes were very dominant for the 
purchase decision and thus stood out, regardless of construal level.  
Regarding the first point, it cannot be said with certainty, that design and warranty period 
appeal to desirability whereas battery life and user-friendliness appeal to feasibility. As 
mentioned in the section on construal level and aspects of desirability as well as feasibility, Pizzi 
et al. (2014) identified design as an aspect of desirability while Pfannenstiel and Chaparro (2015) 
identified ease of usage as an aspect of feasibility. User-friendliness comes close to the idea of 
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ease of usage and at least in cordless operation, a long battery life of a laptop should also add to 
the concept of feasibility, as it targets the mean used to reach an end state, i.e., being able to 
work for long hours, in order to finish a large piece of work. In contrast, it is not that easy to 
clearly identify the warranty period with desirability. For people high on anxiousness, this might 
be true but for the average person, the warranty period could also be an aspect of feasibility. 
After all, it targets the mean to reach an end goal, i.e., being able to comfortably get a 
replacement device to continue working without having to bother with buying a replacement 
oneself. Results from Lessard-Bonaventure and Chebat (2015) speak against this argument. 
Researching the willingness to pay for an extended warranty, they found that consumers are 
willing to pay more for a warranty if they do not touch the product. According to construal level 
theory, touching a product decreases psychological distance from the self to a minimum. Thus, 
construals of products should be on a relatively low level for touched products and on a 
relatively higher level for products not touched. Taking willingness to pay as an indicator for the 
personal importance of a warranty, these results can be interpreted such that higher construal 
level leads to a stronger preference for warranties, which is in line with the assumptions in the 
present study. However, this argumentation is speculative. Without a measure of perceived 
desirability and feasibility of the four product attributes, it is hard to draw firm conclusions. The 
lack of such a measure is a limitation of the present study. 
Regarding the second point, the results suggest that battery life and user-friendliness were 
indeed very dominant over design and warranty period. With together 38.6% of participants 
indicating to prefer buying either product alternative 5 or 6, warranty period also seems to be a 
product attribute that is of importance to some participants, as this attribute was rated with four 
stars in both these product alternatives. At the same time, the two product alternatives also had 
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either battery life or user-friendliness rated with four stars. Taken together, it seems that battery 
life and user-friendliness were very dominant attributes. Maybe these two attributes are so 
important when purchasing a laptop, that even in high construal levels, they clearly outweigh 
warranty period and especially design. This is in line with the pattern emerging from 
participants’ answers on the question how important each of the product attributes was for their 
decision. However, from the mean values of importance (Table 11) the large difference in impact 
on the purchase decision between the attributes does not become clear. The fact that the 
attributes used in the present study were not equally important represents another limitation of 
the study that might have contributed to the failure to obtain an effect of construal level on 
product choice, depending on desirability and feasibility concerns. 
Problems with the product presentation. 
There is a further possible explanation for the surprising result that participants in the two 
groups in this study didn’t show a difference in product choice and also deviated from 
established choice patterns in the literature (Pfannenstiel & Chaparro, 2015). It could be that an 
aspect of the study unintentionally induced low-level construals in all participants. Such a factor 
must have been situated after the Behavior Identification Form, measuring differences in 
construal level, and before the measurement product choice. A possible candidate might be the 
way the product alternatives were presented. Pizzi et al. (2014) found that when choosing among 
several alternatives, the provision of attribute-based information leads to choices driven by 
desirability, while the provision of alternative-based information leads to choices driven by 
feasibility. This is because information on attributes is perceived to be rather abstract, leading 
people to envision consumption in the distant future, whereas information on alternatives is 
perceived to be rather concrete, leading people to envision consumption in the near future. For 
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the presentation of the product alternatives and the ratings of their attributes in the present study, 
it could be argued, that the design used resembled rather a comparison of alternatives than of 
attributes. Each individual product alternative was presented in a separate box, containing 
information on the product-specific rating of all four product attributes. In contrast, a 
presentation form focusing on a comparison of information on attributes would for example 
consist of a separate box for each product attribute, containing information on the rating of the 
respective attribute for all product alternatives. Thus, the format of the presentation of the 
product alternatives and the ratings of the product attributes could have induced a low construal 
level in all participants. Furthermore, Lamberton and Diehl (2013) found empirical support for 
their hypothesis that attribute-based assortments lead to lower construal levels as compared to 
benefit-based assortments. Similar to the previously reported findings of Pizzi et al. (2014), the 
argument behind this is that benefits refer to questions for reasons associated with high-level 
construals, while attributes refer to questions for means associated with low-level construals. 
Because the present study exclusively relied on ratings of product attributes as differences 
between the product alternatives, this also speaks for an activation of low construal levels in all 
participants due to the format of the product presentation. Future studies could avoid this 
problem by choosing another presentation format. For example, a grid with product alternatives 
in rows, attributes in columns (or vice versa) and the individual ratings in the resulting cells 
would avoid comparisons that focus on either product alternatives or product attributes. 
Furthermore, desirability attributes could be formulated as benefits, e.g., being able to start 
working immediately after booting and carry on for long hours in cordless operation instead of 
user-friendliness and battery life. In the present study, these shortcomings could have contributed 
to the failure to obtain an effect of construal level on product choice, depending on desirability 
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and feasibility concerns. 
Study 4 – Construal Level and 0%-Credit Attractiveness 
Study 4 investigates the influence of construal level on participants’ preferences for credit 
offers with interest rates 0%, 1% and 2%. Building on the described literature on the zero-price 
effect (Shampanier et al., 2007), in a first step, the study aims to demonstrate an overly strong 
positive reaction towards 0% interest credits. The respective hypothesis reads as follows:  
H1: The positive increase in credit evaluation between a 1%-interest credit and a 0%-
interest credit is larger than the increase in credit evaluation between a 2%-interest credit and a 
1%-interest credit.  
Drawing on the described literature on the fit effect, people in a high construal level 
should experience a fit of their construal level and the number 0 in the 0%-interest credit offer. 
This should intensify their positive evaluation of the offer and thus lead to an increase in 
perceived attractiveness of 0%-interest credits as compared to people in a low construal level, 
who do not experience this fit effect. Thus, the respective hypothesis reads as follows: 
H2: Participants in the high construal level condition evaluate a 0%-interest credit offer 
more positively than participants in the low construal condition. 
The hypotheses were tested using a laboratory experiment on a hypothetical purchase 
situation. 
Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from June 23rd to 24th, 20146. Participants were approached on 
the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part in a study on 
                                                 
6 I would like to thank Julia Herzog, Omid Kamali Novin, Jan Guldner, Clemens Lotz, and Timo Buss for their help 
in the survey promotion and data collection. 
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“buying decisions and financing”. They were informed that they would get some candy as a 
token of appreciation. Furthermore, they could take part in a lottery where 10 winners would 
receive € 20.00 each. 
From the original sample of 91 students who agreed to participate in this study, data from 
three participants was excluded for the following reasons: Two participants quit the study and 
one participant stated that her data should not be used in the analyses. The final sample included 
88 participants. It consisted of 32 (36.4%) men and 56 women (63.6%) with an age between 18 
and 36 years (M = 23.19, MdnAge = 22, SD = 3.96). Twenty-four (27.3%) participants stated that 
they already took a credit in the past. The median duration to complete the study was 
MdnDur = 11:25 minutes. 
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was construal level (high construal level or low construal level). The dependent variable was 
credit attractiveness. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the two conditions in this study was random. 
At the start, participants read the instructions for the study. The following construal level 
manipulation was an extended version of the manipulation used in study 1: Participants thought 
and wrote about why or how they would perform a given activity. 
After the manipulation, participants were asked to imagine that they were about to buy a 
new laptop and planned to take a credit for that reason. This scenario served as a situational 
frame for the consecutive task in which they were asked to rate the attractiveness of three credit 
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offers that differed only with regard to their annual percentage rate. 
Next, participants answered some questions on their financial knowledge as well as credit 
experience and stated whether and how many hours they worked during the week, before they 
completed the Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) as a manipulation 
check for construal level.  
In the last part of the study, participants were asked for demographic information 
(gender, age, area of studies, duration of studies). Further, they were asked about the presumed 
aim of the study and whether their data could be used in the analyses.  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants and offered some candy to them. 
Participants could write their email address on a piece of paper and put it in an opaque box to 
participate in a lottery and win one of 10 € 20.00 prizes. The winners of this lottery were 
contacted via the provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Manipulation of construal level. 
Construal level was manipulated building on the same mindset manipulation (Freitas et 
al., 2004) that was already used in study 1. As already noted in the respective method section, 
study 1 just used one of three parts of the original manipulation, because previous studies in 
related contexts (Peetz & Buehler, 2012; Ülkümen & Cheema, 2011) demonstrated the success 
of this more efficient version of the manipulation. However, the shortened version did show 
mixed results of a successful manipulation of construal level in study 1. To make up for this 
shortcoming, the original manipulation by Freitas et al. (2004) was used in the present study. As 
such, the manipulation was threefold: In a fist part, participants read a text on why or how a 
person might pursue a goal and what research found on the process. In the second part, 
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participants named three different ways how to reach a goal or three reasons why reaching this 
goal is important. In the last part, which was equivalent to the manipulation used in study 1, 
participants again named means or reasons, this time increasing or decreasing in the level of 
abstraction.  
Regarding the first part, slight adaptions to the original text were made. In the original 
manipulation, satisfying course requirements was suggested as a reason to participate in a 
psychology experiment in the high construal level condition, and participating in an experiment 
was suggested as a mean to satisfy course requirements in the low construal level condition. 
Because the participants in the present study did not receive course credit for participation, the 
two chains of reasons and means were modified to fit participants’ circumstances. In the high 
construal level condition, studying at the University of Cologne was used as a reason to 
ultimately find happiness in life, whereas in the low construal level condition, giving a 
presentation or passing an exam was used as a mean to ultimately find happiness in life. The 
modified texts that participants read are shown in Table 12. In the study, a German translation 
was presented. After participants read the text, they were referred to the next page of the study,  
containing the second part of the manipulation.   
In this part, participants in the high construal level condition were asked to write down 
three goals in their life that were of personal relevance. Below each goal, they were asked to rate 
how much maintaining and improving their physical health would help them to reach this goal 
(1 = a little; 5 = a lot). In contrast, participants in the low construal level condition were asked to 
write down three means how they could maintain and improve their physical health. Below each 
mean, they were asked to rate how much their response would help them to maintain and 
improve their physical health (1 = a little; 5 = a lot).  
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Making participants think about abstract goals (high construal level condition) or 
concrete means (low construal level condition) was also the idea behind the third part of the 
manipulation. As in study 1, participants in both conditions completed a diagram similar to the 
one shown in Figure 1. However, the present study used ‘maintaining and improving one’s 
physical health’ as a starting point for the diagram. The data from study 1 showed that many 
Table 12 
Information on Information Processing Mindsets 
High construal level condition Low construal level condition 
For everything we do, there always is a reason 
why we do it. Moreover, we often can trace 
the causes of our behavior back to broad life-
goals that we have. For example, you 
currently studying at the University of 
Cologne. Why are you doing this? Perhaps to 
learn something in an area that you want to 
know better. Why do you want to know more 
on this area? Perhaps you want to work in this 
area after graduating from the university. 
Why do you want to work in this area? 
Perhaps because you think that working in 
this area will be fun. Why is it important to 
you to have a job that is fun to do? Maybe 
because you are better at tasks if they are fun 
to do. And perhaps you wish to educate 
yourself and find a good job because you feel 
that doing so can bring you happiness in life. 
  
Research suggests that engaging in thought 
exercises like that above, in which one thinks 
about how one’s actions relate to one’s 
ultimate life goals, can improve people’s life 
satisfaction. In this experiment, we are testing 
such a technique. This thought exercise is 
intended to focus your attention on why you 
do the things you do. For this thought 
exercise, please consider the following 
activity: ‘improving and maintaining one’s 
physical health.’ 
For everything we do, there always is a 
process of how we do it. Moreover, we often 
can follow our broad life-goals down to our 
very specific behaviors. For example, like 
most people, you probably hope to find 
happiness in life. How can you do this? 
Perhaps finding a good job, or being 
educated, can help. How can you do these 
things? Perhaps by earning a college degree. 
How do you earn a college degree? By 
satisfying course requirements. How do you 
satisfy course requirements? In some cases, 
you have to give a presentation or pass an 
exam.  
 
Research suggests that engaging in thought 
exercise like that above, in which one thinks 
about how one’s ultimate life goals can be 
expressed through specific actions, can 
improve people’s life satisfaction. In this 
experiment, we are testing such a technique. 
This thought exercise is intended to focus 
your attention on how you do the things you 
do. For this thought exercise, please consider 
the following activity: ‘improving and 
maintaining one’s physical health.’ 
Note. Text adapted from “The Influence of Abstract and Concrete Mindsets on Anticipating 
and Guiding Others’ Self-Regulatory Efforts” by A. L. Freitas, P. Gollwitzer & Y. Trope, 
2004, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, p. 743. 
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participants did not follow the instructions to enter their answers in the boxes in the prescribed 
order in the high construal level condition (bottom to top). Furthermore, many participants gave 
answers that were not related to the preceding answer (i.e. not being more abstract or concrete 
but suggesting alternatives to the previous answer instead). In order to ensure that participants 
understood the instructions on how to complete the diagram properly, the present study used an 
example of an already complete diagram next to the one that the participants had to complete.  
Situational frame. 
Participants read a scenario concerning a specific buying decision situation and were 
asked to imagine themselves in the described situation. Specifically, they were told that their 
laptop was no longer working and they intended to buy a new one. They were told that they went 
to an electronics market to replace the broken laptop. To finance the new laptop, they could take 
up a credit with a duration of 24 months. This information served as a situational frame for the 
consecutive three credit offers for the new laptop. 
Credit presentation and credit attractiveness. 
On each of the following pages, one of a total of three credit offers was presented. To 
control for potential order effects, half of the participants saw the offers in ascending order with 
regard to the annual interest rate and half of the participants saw the products in descending 
order. At the top of each page, the scenario was presented again. Directly below, each credit was 
described as follows: “The annual percentage rate for this credit offer is x% per year. For every 
100€ of credit, x€ of interest payment would accrue per year.” The credit offers varied with 
respect to the annual interest rate and the yearly interest payments respectively, taking the 
numbers 2, 1 and 0. 
Below each credit offer, participants were asked to evaluate the respective offer by 
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answering three questions. The questions read “How attractive do you find this credit offer?” 
(1 = not at all attractive; 7 = very attractive), “How likely is it that you take this credit offer?” 
(1 = not at all likely; 7 = very likely), and “How would it feel to take this credit offer?” (1 = not 
at all good; 7 = very good). Credit attractiveness was computed as the mean value of the three 
questions. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between α = .79 and α = .83 for the three credit offers.  
Financial situation and working hours. 
Next, participants rated the level of their financial education (1 = very low; 7 = very 
high), stated whether they already took a credit in the past and if / how many hours they worked 
per week next to their studies. 
Manipulation check. 
As a manipulation check the behavior manipulation form (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) 
was used. The order in which participants were presented with the questions in this form was 
identical with the order in the original presentation of the measure. As in studies 1 and 3, the 
answers to the questions in the form – with concrete ones coded as 0 and abstract ones coded as 
1 – were summed up to form an index (α = .77), with higher values indicating a higher construal 
level. 
Control variables. 
In the final section, participants were asked how easy they found it to immerse into the 
given scenario (1 = not at all easy; 7 = very easy) that served as a situational frame in this study. 
Also, they were asked to remember the annual percentage rates of the credit offers to check 
whether participants paid attention to this crucial aspect of the study. Furthermore, the question 
for data usability from Meade and Craig (2012) that was described in study 1 was used again to 
identify participants who preferred their data not to be analyzed. Lastly, they were asked about 
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the presumed aim of the study.  
Results. 
Preliminary analysis. 
Manipulation check. 
In a first step, participants’ score on the Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989) was analyzed to see whether the manipulation of construal level was successful. 
An independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the high construal level condition 
(M = 15.96, SD = 4.23) did not score significantly higher on the Behavior Identification Form 
than participants in the low construal level condition (M = 17.14, SD = 4.30), t(86) = 1.30, 
p = .197. Therefore, it must be assumed that the manipulation of construal level was not 
successful.  
Descriptives. 
Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlation Coefficients and Reliabilities for the Variables in the 
Analyses 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Attractiveness  
2%-credit offera 
3.43 1.51 .82      
2. Attractiveness  
1%-credit offera 
4.06 1.51 .91** .79     
3. Attractiveness  
0%-credit offera 
4.92 1.71 .73** .82** .83    
4. Behavior 
Identification Form 
scoreb 
16.55 4.18 -.07 -.09 .01 .77   
5. Financial educationa 4.19 1.28 -.10 -.09 -.07 .09 -  
6. Ease of imaginationa 5.18 1.47 .05 .01 .08 -.06 .23* - 
Note. N = 88. The diagonal displays Cronbach’s α for the respective scale. 
aScale range: 1 to 7. bScale range: 0 to 25. 
* p < .05. ** p < .001. 
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On average, participants rated the 0%-interest credit (M = 4.92, SD = 1.71) most 
attractive and the 2%-interest credit least attractive out of the three offers (M = 3.43, SD = 1.51), 
showing a preference for lower interest rates. All credit offers’ ratings were strongly correlated 
(r = .73, N = 88, p < .001 to r = .91, N = 88, p < .001). Participants rated their financial education 
on average with M = 4.19 (SD = 1.28) and did not seem to have problems imagining themselves 
in the scenario that was described in the study (M = 5.18, SD = 1.47). These two variables were 
correlated, such that participants with higher financial education could imagine themselves in the 
situation more easily, r = .23, N = 88, p = .034. 
Main analysis.  
Participants’ ratings of credit attractiveness, split up for the two conditions of the 
construal level manipulation are shown in Table 14. 
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the hypotheses that the 
positive increase in credit evaluation between the 1%-interest credit and the 0%-interest credit is 
larger than the increase in credit evaluation between the 2%-interest credit and the 1%-interest 
credit as well as that participants in the high construal level condition would rate credit 
attractiveness for the 0%-interest credit higher as compared to participants in the low construal 
level condition. The dependent variable was credit attractiveness. The independent variables 
were construal level (between subjects) and credit offer (within subjects). Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated (χ2(2) = 43.21, p < .001), therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.72). 
There was no main effect of construal level, F(1, 86) = 1.60, p = .210. However, there was a 
significant main effect of credit offer on credit attractiveness, V = 0.63, F(1.43, 
122.99) = 106.23, p < .001. The interaction between the two factors was not significant, F(1.43, 
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122.99) = 2.96, p = .073. Regarding the descriptive results, participants in the high construal 
level condition (M = 4.33, SD = 1.64) rated credit attractiveness similar to participants in the low 
construal level condition (M = 3.94, SD = 1.28). Regarding the main effect of credit offer, 
within-subjects contrasts revealed a linear trend, F(1, 86) = 138.36, p < .001. The quadratic term 
was not significant, F(1, 86) = 3.65, p = .060. Thus, both hypotheses have to be rejected.   
Exploratory analyses. 
Potential problems with the manipulation. 
As already noted, there was no significant difference in the score on the Behavior 
Identification Form between the low construal level condition and the high construal level 
condition. In contrast to study 3, participants in the present study completed the Behavior 
Identification Form after the measurement of the dependent variables. Therefore, it is possible 
that the manipulation of construal level was successful but did only last for a limited time. 
However, given the effect duration of the manipulation in previous research (e.g., Chiou et al., 
2013; Sanna et al., 2009) it seems unlikely, that there was an effect of the manipulation but that it 
did not last long enough to influence answers on the Behavior Identification Form. Therefore, it 
must be assumed that the manipulation of construal level was not successful. This might explain 
why the analyses in the previous section did not show any significant effects of construal level 
Table 14 
Sample Sizes and Offer Specific Means and Standard Deviations of Credit Attractiveness 
 Low construal level (n = 44)  High construal level (n = 44) 
Product M SD  M SD 
2%-interest 
credit offer 
3.11 1.23 
 
3.75 3.43 
1%-interest 
credit offer 
3.86 1.36 
 
4.26 4.06 
0%-interest 
credit offer 
4.85 1.61 
 
4.99 4.92 
Note. N = 88. 
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on the dependent variables. However, in order to explore the hypotheses in a different way, the 
analyses were run again with a focus on differences between participants who scored either high 
or low on the Behavior Identification Form. As in study 3, participants were allocated into two 
groups via a median split on the score on the Behavior Identification Form. In the low score 
group, participants score averaged M = 12.95 (SD = 2.73) compared to M = 19.98 (SD = 2.12) in 
the high score group.  
As in the main analysis, a mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses. The only 
change to the above described model consisted in the newly generated condition variable that 
was generated from the score on the Behavior Identification Form, which served as the between 
subjects factor. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated 
(χ2(2) = 44.42, p < .001), therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.71). There was no main effect of this new indicator of construal 
level, F(1, 86) = 0.14, p = .706. As in the main analysis, there was a significant main effect of 
credit offer on credit attractiveness, F(1.42, 122.25) = 102.74, p < .001. The interaction between 
the two factors was not significant, F(1.42, 122.25) = 0.25, p = .700. Regarding the descriptive 
results, participants in the high construal level condition (M = 4.08, SD = 1.32) rated credit 
attractiveness similar to participants in the low construal level condition (M = 4.20, SD = 1.59). 
Regarding the main effect of credit offer, within-subjects contrasts revealed a linear trend, F(1, 
86) = 132.44, p < .001. The quadratic term was not significant, F(1, 86) = 3.61, p = .061.  
In line with the results from the main analysis, these findings reject the hypotheses that 
the positive increase in credit evaluation between the 1%-interest credit and the 0%-interest 
credit is larger than the increase in credit evaluation between the 2%-interest credit and the 1%-
interest credit as well as that participants in the high construal level condition would rate credit 
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attractiveness for the 0%-interest credit higher as compared to participants in the low construal 
level condition. 
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on consumer credit decisions by 
replicating the zero-price effect (Shampanier et al., 2007) in the domain of 0%-interest credits. 
Furthermore, it focused on the question whether this effect is even stronger in a high construal 
level, when there is a fit between the abstract nature of 0 and consumers’ abstract mental 
processing style. To this end, a laboratory experiment was conducted in which participants’ 
construal level was manipulated to be either high or low. They then had to evaluate credit offers 
with 2%, 1%, and 0% interest for a hypothetical purchase decision. 
In contrast to the respective hypothesis, the positive increase in credit evaluation between 
the 1%-interest credit and the 0%-interest credit was similar to the increase in credit evaluation 
between the 2%-interest credit and the 1%-interest credit. Thus, the zero-price effect could not be 
replicated in the domain of 0%-interest credits. Furthermore, the hypothesis that participants in 
the high construal level condition evaluate the 0%-interest credit offer more positively than 
participants in the low construal condition had to be rejected as well, based on the empirical 
results. 
Regarding the results of the manipulation check, the manipulation of construal level used 
in the present study was not successful. This is surprising because previous studies in related 
contexts (Peetz & Buehler, 2012; Ülkümen & Cheema, 2011) demonstrated the success even of a 
leaner version of the manipulation. Thus, the present use of the original version (Freitas et al., 
2004) should have ensured the presence of a significant difference in construal levels between 
the two conditions. The fact that this did not show in the manipulation check can be explained in 
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two ways. First, it is possible that the manipulation of construal level didn’t induce significantly 
different construal levels. As stated above, this is rather unlikely, as it is a commonly used 
manipulation with many studies confirming its impact (Gilead et al., 2014). Second, it is possible 
that the manipulation was in fact successful but that the manipulation check did not react to the 
difference in construal level. This is also rather unlikely, because the Behavior Identification 
Form was frequently used as a manipulation check for construal level, demonstrating a good 
responsiveness (e.g., Krüger et al., 2014). Also, the measurement of the dependent variables took 
rather little time and was directly followed by the manipulation check. Thus, a too long time 
period in between the manipulation of construal level and the manipulation check can be 
excluded as a potential reason for the present results. In sum, it remains unclear, whether the 
manipulation of construal level didn’t induce significantly different construal levels or whether 
the manipulation check did not react to the difference in construal level. 
The present study analyzed the influence of construal level on credit attractiveness in two 
ways: First, focusing on the two experimental conditions from the construal level manipulation 
and second, focusing on the stable difference as measured by the Behavior Identification Form. 
Both analyses found no effect of construal level on credit attractiveness. This suggests that 
beyond rather technical aspects the underlying theoretical assumptions might be wrong. This 
possibility is further discussed in the following section. 
General Discussion on Part II 
To recapitulate, both studies aimed to extend research on construal level theory in the 
consumer credit context by focusing on 0%-interest credits as a new form of credit offers. Study 
3 investigated whether the prominent display of the number 0 induces a higher construal level 
than positive numbers, and whether the resulting difference in construal level leads to different 
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product preferences, when making a credit financed purchase. Study 4 investigated the influence 
of construal level on participants’ preferences for credit offers with interest rates of 0%, 1% and 
2%. The study focused on a replication of the zero-price effect in the credit domain – an overly 
strong positive reaction towards 0% interest credits – and a fit effect between high construal 
level and the abstract nature of 0 that would increase the attractiveness of 0%-interest credit 
offers. The manipulations in both studies did not work as expected. A measure of construal level 
constructed from the score of the Behavior Identification Form was used to run additional 
analyses, despite the fact that the manipulations did not induce the desired effects. All 
hypotheses around the abstract nature of 0 and its effect on credit-related decisions had to be 
rejected based on the empirical results. 
What does this mean for the guiding idea of this section that 0 is more abstract than 
positive numbers and that this difference in abstraction influences credit decisions? As noted in 
the discussion section of study 3, there is still room for interpretations in favor of this idea and 
despite the discouraging results. The reported problems with mainly the presentation of credit 
and product alternatives offer explanations for the missing empirical support of the hypotheses 
that are different from a non-existent difference in abstraction between 0 and positive numbers. 
However, with competing explanations, it remains unclear what exactly led to the results in the 
present form. Study 4 also suffered from problems around the manipulation of construal level. 
However, the analyses indicated that it is rather unlikely that the insignificance of the results can 
be traced back solely to these flaws. Instead, the results suggest that there is no connection 
between construal level and credit attractiveness regarding the special case of 0%-interest credit 
offers. Overall the two studies presented here failed to deliver convincing evidence for the 
abstract nature of 0 and its implications for credit decisions. While the theoretical arguments for 
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the relative abstractness of 0 are persuasive, empirical support is lacking. Thus, the possibility 
that 0%-interest credits are perceived and processed like any other credit offer with a positive 
annual percentage rate cannot be excluded. Maybe the special context of annual percentage rates 
renders 0 rather practical and clear instead of abstract. Generally, research found that people 
underestimate the time it takes to repay a credit (Overton & MacFadyen, 1998; Ranyard & Craig, 
1993) and argues that one reason is peoples’ low understanding of compound interest (Lusardi & 
Mitchelli, 2007). Against this background, an annual percentage rate of 0 is a very clear 
information because unlike a positive figure it implies that no costs incur from interest. By 
abandoning the need to make calculations regarding compound effects it could be that this 
context counteracts a potentially abstract nature of 0 when dissociated from any contextual 
information. 
Nevertheless, this would not explain the absence of an effect of 0 without contextual 
information on construal level as observed in study 3 before the measurement of the dependent 
variables. Thus, the relation of 0 as a relatively abstract number and construal level remains 
somewhat unclear, despite the fact that such a relation seems to be absent in the credit context. 
Future studies might nevertheless benefit from the points raised in the individual discussion 
sections, in order to design further experiments for more sophisticated tests on the nature of 0.  
Part III – System 1 and System 2 Processing of 0%-Credits 
The main purpose of this third part of the thesis is to extend research on 0%-interest 
credit choice by examining credit attractiveness under System 1 and System 2 processing. To 
this end, laboratory experiments were conducted in which System 1 / 2 processing was 
manipulated using either cognitive load manipulations (studies 5 and 6) or an information 
processing mindset manipulation (study 7). 
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Throughout the last decades, dual process theories have greatly influenced social 
cognition research (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011; Sherman, 
Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). The term describes a variety of theories that postulate different 
modes of information processing used to make decisions or form judgements. As a central 
assumption, information processing is said to be either intuitive or deliberate (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). While earlier theories aimed mainly to explain specific phenomena like 
attitude-behavior relations (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000) or stereotyping (Blair & Banaji, 1996), 
more recent models are characterized by rather broad applicability (Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 
2006). The following subsections will first outline the core ideas behind dual process theories, 
followed by an in-depth presentation of System 1 / 2 information processing as the specific 
theoretical framework used in the present studies. A final subsection will concentrate on different 
ways to manipulate System 1 / 2 information processing, before the actual studies are presented. 
Hypotheses are derived from the theoretical background and introduced individually with each 
study. 
Dual Process Theories 
The central idea to all dual process theories is that there are two kinds of cognitive 
information processing: Intuitive processing and deliberate processing (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013).  
Intuitive in this context means that information is processed automatically as opposed to 
controlled. As such, intuitive processing can be triggered without the intention to do so and often 
happens without the person being aware of the process. Furthermore, cognitive resources are 
preserved in this kind of information processing (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). While it is 
possible that all these features are present in a given instance of intuitive processing, this does 
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not necessarily have to be the case. For example, in some situations the person may be aware that 
she is using a fast and frugal heuristic (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) such that only the low amount 
of cognitive resources associated with such a heuristic characterizes the intuitive processing. 
This can be clarified using an example of a person who wants to find out how long it will take to 
pay off her overdraft credit of € 5,000 with an annual interest rate of 12%7. Wanting to repay € 
100 per month and relying on a heuristic, the person could divide the outstanding credit by the 
monthly payment and adjust the result by some month to adjust for the interest charges. This is 
likely to yield a result of about 56 months. In such a situation, the person is well aware of the fact 
the she is using a rule of thumb to come up with an estimation for the question at hand. However, 
it is also possible to think of other situations in which the person is not aware of her intuitive 
processing, e.g., in case of stereotype-congruent evaluations of ambiguous behavior (Devine, 
1989).  
In contrast, deliberate processing means that information is processed in a controlled and 
reflective way. As such, deliberate processing is intentional and therefore requires the person to 
be aware of the process. Furthermore, such processing relies on the availability of cognitive 
resources because the reasoning is cognitively effortful (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). In 
contrast to intuitive processing, all these features are present in a given instance of deliberate 
processing: It is not possible to actively process information in a controlled way without being 
aware of this or without using cognitive resources. As an example for deliberate processing, the 
credit repayment situation described above can be used again. However, this time the person 
thinks about a formula to calculate the time needed to repay the overdraft, uses all information in 
a structured way and calculates the result of 69 months. While this is the correct result, deliberate 
                                                 
7 According to Stiftung Warentest (2013), an independent organization investigating and comparing goods and 
services, this represents a common interest rate for overdraft credits in Germany. 
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processing can also lead to wrong outcomes (e.g., if the person uses the wrong formula).  
System 1 / 2 Information Processing 
In an attempt to integrate previous research on dual-process theories (e.g., Klein, 1998; 
Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Epstein, 1994; Pollock, 1989), Stanovich (1999) introduced the 
labels System 1 for intuitive processing and System 2 for deliberate processing. Instead of a 
distinct definition, these labels each encompass a set of properties, describing the underlying 
cognitive processes. While System 1 processing is characterized to be associative, holistic, 
automatic, undemanding of cognitive capacity and fast, System 2 processing is characterized to 
be rule-based, analytic, controlled, demanding of cognitive capacity and slow (Stanovich, 1999). 
More recently, additional attributes associated with System 1 / 2 have been identified regarding 
consciousness (e.g., default process vs. inhibitory), evolution (e.g., shared with animals vs. 
uniquely human), functional characteristics (e.g., stereotypical vs. egalitarian) and individual 
differences (e.g., independent of general intelligence vs. linked to general intelligence) (Evans, 
2008).  
While discovering more and more characteristics for either System 1 or System 2 
processing helps to understand the two underlying concepts, this is also a subject to criticism. 
Keren and Schul (2009), for example, raised the question whether the large amount of binary 
attributes could really be combined in such a way that they support the notion of exactly two 
modes of processing. Put differently, they assumed that some System 1 characteristics could also 
be seen together with some System 2 processing characteristics, leading to modes of processing 
that are neither System 1 nor System 2. While Evans and Stanovich (2013) do not respond to the 
point of mixed modes, they clarify that the terms System 1 and System 2 refer in fact to multiple 
forms of intuitive or deliberate processing that are grouped under the respective heading (e.g., 
128 
 
 
Stanovich, 2011). The fact that both System 1 and System 2 processing are associated with a 
clear and distinct pattern of neural activation (Liberman, 2007) supports this interpretation. 
Some older as well as more recent theories under the umbrella of dual processes assume 
that intuitive and deliberate processing proceed in parallel (e.g., cognitive-experiential self-
theory (Epstein, 1994); reflective-impulsive model of social behavior (Deutsch & Strack, 2006)). 
In this view, two simultaneously operating information processing systems compete for control 
over a judgement, decision or behavior, with the possibility to interact at several processing 
steps. In contrast to this view, System 1 / 2 information processing proposes a default-
interventionist structure (Evans, 2007). System 1 processing automatically leads to an intuitive 
default response in any given situation. While this represents the final response in some 
situations, others trigger the use of System 2 processing that may lead to another response, 
altering or overriding the System 1 processing response.  
Research on System 1 / 2 Information Processing in Economic Contexts 
While initial applications of dual-process theories focused on classical themes of social 
psychology, more recent studies also utilized the theories in the area of individual economic 
judgement and decision making. For example, in an online shopping context, Roghanizad and 
Neufeld (2015) found that consumers assessing website trustworthiness tend to rely more on 
System 1 processing as opposed to System 2 processing when the purchase situation involves 
ambiguity and risk. Related to this area of application, Zhang, Zhao, Cheung, and Lee (2014) 
identified source credibility and quantity of online consumer reviews as System 1 processing 
cues whereas they identified argument quality in online consumer reviews as a System 2 
processing cue, influencing purchase decisions. Independent from other people’s opinions, 
features of the product itself are related to processing modes as well. For example, Bradu, 
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Orquin, and Thøgersen (2014) investigated the impact of traceability labels printed on chocolate 
bars on willingness to buy the product and found that this product feature is processed relying on 
System 1 instead of System 2 processing. On a general level, involvement with the product is 
highly correlated with System 2 processing (Arens & Rust, 2012). According to Hochman, Ayal, 
and Ariely (2015), System 2 processing should lead to less self-centered behavior. Using an 
ultimatum game framework, they were able to show that System 1 processing led to higher 
priority of information on the personal utility and stronger personal utility driven behavior than 
System 2 processing. 
System 1 / 2 Information Processing in Credit Research 
To the best knowledge of the author of the present thesis, there is no study that introduces 
System 1 / 2 information processing (or any other dual process theory) to the area of consumer 
credit research. Given the huge impact of the theory on other fields, this is quite surprising. 
Nevertheless, there is some research on the use of heuristics in credit decision-making that will 
be presented here.  
Kidwell and Jewell (2008) investigated the influence of past credit experience on credit 
card acquisition. They found that participants who were less experienced were more likely to 
mobilize cognitive resources and deliberate about acquiring the credit as compared to 
participants who were more experienced and hence rather just followed their attitude towards 
acquiring the credit card. Ranyard et al. (2006) asked participants to imagine wanting to buy a 
relatively inexpensive (a washing machine for ₤400) or a relatively expensive (a used car for 
₤2700) good on credit. Several credit alternatives were presented about which the participants 
could ask questions before having to make a decision for one of the alternatives. The study 
showed that most participants did not ask for all pieces of information to make an informed 
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decision. Instead, many just asked for the annual interest rate (APR) or based their decision for a 
specific credit alternative just on this feature of the credit, even if they asked for other pieces of 
information as well. This was especially true for the scenario with the relatively cheap product, 
implying that smaller financial consequences might promote the use of this single-attribute 
choice heuristic that Ranyard et al. (2006) termed ‘take the best APR’-heuristic.  
After taking up a credit, the repayment period starts either directly or with a time-delay. 
In any case, consumers should know how long it is going to take them to pay back the credit 
including interest fees and other costs. Despite the importance of this knowledge, Overton and 
MacFadyen (1998) found that about one third of the participants in a study on underestimations 
of loan burdens did not calculate the repayment period but relied on guessing it. This led to 
relatively large underestimations of the repayment period. One possible explanation that is also 
backed by the results of Soll et al. (2013) would be that the participants who refrained from 
precise calculating relied on a heuristic similar to the one described above (dividing the 
outstanding credit by the monthly payment and adjusting the result by some months to account 
for the interest charges). 
Taken together, the results suggest that heuristic processing of credit aspects focuses 
strongly on the interest rate. Consumers seem to interpret this credit detail as an indicator of the 
credit quality (Ranyard et al., 2006) when deciding about credit take-up. Afterwards, heuristic 
processing puts a strong emphasis on the interest rate when it comes to basic repayment 
considerations (Soll et al., 2013). Other aspects are rather neglected or considered to a smaller 
extent. This prominent role of interest rates is especially interesting for 0%-interest credit offers. 
In such cases, heuristic processing (i.e. System 1 processing) emphasizes a particularly favorable 
aspect of the credit offer that does not necessarily reflect other aspects of the credit. For example, 
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many 0%-interest credit offers come with additional early repayment fees or a mandatory 
expensive default insurance. Focusing one’s attention on only one aspect can lead to a biased 
picture of the offer. On the contrary, System 2 processing should lead to a more comprehensive 
analysis of credit offers. Relying on System 2 information processing, people should take more 
aspects of the credit into account and integrate them according to weighting rules into a more 
holistic evaluation of the offer. Because an interest rate of 0% is already the best form of this 
credit aspect, other credit aspects can only take a worse form. For example, the monthly 
installment rate cannot be € 0,00 and the repayment duration cannot be 0 months, because it 
would not be possible to repay the credit in such a case. Therefore, integrating several credit 
aspects into an overall picture of a 0%-interest credit can never lead to a more favorable 
evaluation than the isolated consideration of the 0%-interest rate. Given this, System 1 
information processing is assumed to lead to better evaluations of 0%-interest credit offers as 
compared to System 2 information processing. 
Manipulating System 1 / 2 Information Processing 
Studies on System 1 / 2 information processing can be grouped in three categories. 
The first category comprises studies that assess individual differences in System 1 /2 
information processing using performance measures. The most widely used tool in this domain is 
the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005; see Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 
2016 and Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014 for newer versions). It tests whether participants 
follow an intuitive but incorrect response or whether they reflect deliberately to arrive at the 
correct response. The cognitive reflection test is seen as a good performance predictor for classic 
heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011) and was widely used as an 
indicator for System 1 / 2 information processing in the area of economic decision making (e.g., 
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Alós-Ferrer & Hügelschäfer, 2016; Calvillo & Burgeno, 2015; Corgnet, Espín, & Hernán-
González, 2015).  
The second category comprises studies that assess individual or situational differences in 
System 1 / 2 information processing using neural imaging methodology. Using mostly functional 
magnetic resonance imaging to observe brain activity via the blood flow and repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to temporarily deactivate brain areas, studies in this category 
tend to map System 1 and System 2 processing to different neural systems. Results from this area 
consistently show that decisions are the outcome of an interplay of different neuronal systems 
instead of being the result of a consistent data processing entity (Brocas, & Carrillo, 2014; 
Liberman, 2007). However, some brain areas are more strongly associated with either System 1 
or with System 2 information processing. For example, it was shown that the left inferior frontal 
gyrus is more strongly linked to System 1 processing, while the bilateral superior parietal lobules 
is more strongly linked to System 2 processing (Tsujii & Sakatani, 2012; Tsujii, Sakatani, 
Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011). Nevertheless, a direct one-to-one translation of System 
1 / 2 information processing to neural systems might be too simplistic (Klein, 2011). 
The third category comprises studies that experimentally manipulate System 1 / 2 
information processing. Usually, this is done either by instructing participants to use System 1 
processing or System 2 processing or by inhibiting the use of System 2 processing trough the 
tasks or the setting of the study.  
One way to inhibit the use of System 2 processing is to use time pressure in a given task 
(Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Furlan, Agnoli, & Reyna, 2016). Processing information in a 
deliberate and effortful way requires the availability of working memory resources but also the 
time needed to make use of these resources. Time pressure therefore limits a person’s ability to 
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rely on System 2 processing. Thus, decisions under time pressure are more strongly driven by 
System 1 processing which is often automatic and therefore requires less time. 
Another way to inhibit the use of System 2 processing is to limit available working 
memory capacity in a given task (De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005; Whitney, Rinehart, 
& Hinson, 2008). One approach is to have participants store information in their short term 
memory so that less of this resource is available for the primary task in an experiment. For 
example, some studies asked participants to remember a list of letters or digits. In the System 1 
information processing condition, the list consisted just of one or very few different letters or 
digits (e.g., FFFFFF) while in the System 2 information processing condition, the list consisted 
of many or entirely different letters or digits (e.g., FLPHRT). The primary task of interest in a 
given study is then situated between the presentation of the list of letters or digits and a recall 
question. The idea is that memorizing a list of one or few different letters or digits leaves more 
working memory capacity for the primary task as compared to memorizing a list of many or 
entirely different letters or digits. The recall question can take various forms. Mostly, participants 
are asked to recall one specific element (e.g., the number to the right of 5 in a sequence 25341; 
Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002), recall whether a given letter or digit was part of the list 
(Dittrich & Stahl, 2012), or recall the whole list (Kessler & Meier, 2014). Asides from 
memorizing a list of letters or digits, some studies also used variants of tasks where participants 
had to memorize a sequence of symbols (Van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006), 
specific dot patterns (De Neys, 2006; Nagel et al., 2009), a series of art slides (Ward & Mann, 
2000) or other elements (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). 
Inhibiting the use of System 2 processing by limiting available working memory capacity 
is also the idea behind the n-back task (Gevins & Cutillo, 1993). Here, participants have to 
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monitor a sequence of individually presented stimuli and press a key whenever the current 
stimulus is identical to the stimulus presented n trials back. Because this requires monitoring, 
updating and manipulation of information, the n-back task is suited to impose higher cognitive 
load than memory tasks like the one described above. In a 0-back variant, a participant would 
just have to respond to a current stimulus that equals a preset target, thus leaving enough 
working memory to engage in System 2 processing in a simultaneous task. In a 2-back variant, 
the task requires much more working memory, because the participant has to memorize the 
previous two stimuli, compare the current stimuli with the one presented two trials before and 
then update her information on the previous two stimuli, as the next trial starts. Thus, much less 
working memory can be used in a simultaneous task, therefore making use of System 1 
processing more likely. The stimuli can consist of numbers (Callicott et al., 1999), letters 
(Ragland et al., 2002), words (Kim et al., 2002), shapes (Hautzel et al., 2002), or other entities 
(Druzgal & D’Esposito, 2001) and be presented in a spatial (Carlson et al., 1998) or verbal 
fashion (Rämä et al., 2001), contributing to the broad applicability of the n-back task (Owen, 
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005).  
Another way to experimentally manipulate System 1 / 2 information processing relies 
rather on mindset manipulations instead of limiting working memory. Hsee and Rottenstreich 
(2004) found that asking participants to solve math problems (e.g. “If an object travels at five 
feet per minute, then by your calculations how many feet will it travel in 360 seconds?” p.24) led 
them to System 2 processing in a subsequent task, while asking them to describe their feelings 
(e.g., When you hear the name ‘George W. Bush’, what do you feel? Please use one word to 
describe your predominant feeling.” p.24) led them to System 1 processing in a subsequent task. 
Other studies successfully replicated this method (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) or 
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similar variations like including either System 1-related words or System 2-related words in the 
instructions for a given task (Zhong, 2011). While such priming-based mindset manipulations are 
rather subtle, Skarlicki and Rupp (2010) openly asked their participants to either use a System 1 
processing frame or a System 2 processing frame, emphasizing either rational evaluations and 
objective analysis or intuition and gut feelings. Van den Bos and Maas (2009) developed a 
mindset manipulation that combines these two elements. In essence, they asked their participants 
to answer questions on a described situation but also to either use a System 1 processing frame or 
a System 2 processing frame in doing so. 
The following studies will concentrate on the last category of experimental manipulations 
of System 1 / 2 information processing, in order to benefit from the advantages of experimental 
designs (Wampold, 2006). Studies 5 and 6 will use cognitive load as a mean of manipulating 
System 1 / 2 information processing via the availability of working memory. Study 7 will use a 
mindset manipulation targeting information processing style directly.  
Hedonic and Utilitarian Qualities in Credit Financed Purchases 
Next to information processing, the product that is to be financed should be important in 
credit decisions. After all, it represents the reason why people even start to think about spending 
money and in particular using credit in a given instance. 
One way to characterize products is by focusing on their utilitarian and hedonic qualities. 
Utilitarian products fulfil at least one specific function. In many cases, that renders the product’s 
usefulness stable over time. For example, a lawnmower fulfils its function equally well when 
using it for the first or 97th time. In contrast, hedonic products provide pleasure and fun. Because 
people adapt quickly to these positive experiences (Wang, Novemsky, & Dhar, 2009), the 
provided pleasure decreases over time. For example, the first hour of playing on a new video 
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game console provides more pleasure than the 97th hour of playing. When consumers think about 
using a product in the future, they are aware of this difference between utilitarian and hedonic 
products (Mishra & Mishra, 2011). Thus, it could influence their choice, such that they rather 
buy utilitarian products on credit than hedonic products, because the thought of repaying a credit 
for a good that does not constantly fulfil the expectations that one has in the first place seems 
rather discouraging. 
Similarly, Kivetz, and Simonson (2002) found that pain of payment – that is the 
perceived disutility of payment (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998) – looms larger for hedonic goods 
than for utilitarian goods. They argue that this is because hedonic consumption is seen as not 
absolutely needed and is therefore harder to justify as compared to utilitarian consumption. This 
impeded justifiability might also be the reason why consumers are more reluctant of downstream 
payments for hedonic products than for utilitarian products (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998).  
When consumers nevertheless purchase both, hedonic and utilitarian products on credit, 
they show a preference for repaying hedonic debt faster than utilitarian debt (Besharat et al., 
2015). The fact that this is even the case when a prioritization of non-hedonic debt repayment 
would be financially advantageous emphasizes the aversive character of hedonic debt. Thus, it 
can be assumed that people are less likely to purchase hedonic products on credit as compared to 
purchasing utilitarian products on credit. 
However, adding System 1 / 2 information processing to the picture can lead to a more 
fine-grained view. There is no general preference for utilitarian over hedonic products. Instead, it 
is easier to justify utilitarian purchases as compared to hedonic purchases. This is why 
Diefenbach and Hassenzahl (2011) found that consumers in a buying scenario preferred a 
primarily utilitarian mobile phone over a primarily hedonic mobile phone. In contrast, when 
137 
 
 
information was provided that made hedonic attributes appear more legitimate, thereby 
enhancing justifiability, participants preferred the primarily hedonic mobile phone. So when the 
potential conflict of justifiability of hedonic purchases is resolved, people are in fact choosing 
hedonic over utilitarian alternatives. While all previously mentioned studies focus on deliberate 
decision making, that is System 2 processing, System 1 processing might offer another route to 
hedonic consumption. In System 1 processing, people do neither analyze costs and potential 
benefits nor do they consider long-term adaptation to positive experiences evoked by hedonic 
goods. Instead their response to a given stimulus is rather automatic, driven by affect and 
associations. In this light, it is very reasonable to assume that hedonic products evoke a stronger 
desire than utilitarian products. Seeing a video game console, the fun of playing a good game 
comes to mind. This is more appealing than seeing a lawn mower that might help to prevent the 
garden from evolving into a jungle but is rather associated with effort and loss of leisure time. 
While this argument focuses on product preferences, it is easy to transfer the idea to 
credit attractiveness. To illustrate this, one can imagine a product that is advertised in 
combination with a 0%-interest credit offer. Relying on System 2 processing, consumers should 
be aware of the fact that the product to be financed is a different thing than the credit supposed to 
finance the product. Thus, consumers should be able to evaluate the product in isolation. If it 
appeals to them, they should evaluate the credit offer as a second thing that is not connected with 
the product. It follows that the question whether the product is a rather hedonic one or a rather 
utilitarian one does not influence the credit evaluation. Therefore, credit attractiveness is 
independent of the product type in case of System 2 processing. For System 1 processing, the 
procedure might differ substantially. The lack of working memory or the lack of motivation to 
engage in analytic processing should lead to consumers making a joint evaluation of the product 
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and the respective credit. Instead of separating both entities and analyzing them separately, it can 
be assumed that consumers perceive the bundle of product and credit as one entity. In such a 
case, credit attractiveness may also depend on the product type. As explained before, a video 
game console as a hedonic product evokes a stronger positive affective reaction than a lawn 
mower as a utilitarian product. This affective reaction could then manifest in a more positive 
rating of credit attractiveness. This way, System 1 processing should lead to higher credit 
attractiveness for hedonic products as compared to utilitarian products. 
Study 5 – Evaluation of Credit Offers Under Number-Based Cognitive Load 
Study 5 examines how different levels of cognitive load influence the evaluation of 0%-
interest credit offers for everyday products. Drawing on the previously presented literature on 
System 1 / 2 information processing in economic decision-making and the theoretical 
considerations on the salience of the number 0, the hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: Evaluating 0%-interest credit offers for specific products under high cognitive load 
leads to higher credit attractiveness as compared to evaluating them under low cognitive load. 
The hypothesis was tested using a laboratory experiment on hypothetical purchase 
opportunities. 
Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from November 10th to 13th, 20148. Participants were 
approached on the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part 
in a study on “information processing in the context of consumption decisions and 0%-
financing”. They were informed that they could earn up to € 5.00, depending on their 
                                                 
8 I would like to thank Penghua Sun, Atar Herziger, Rufina Gafeeva, Jenny Maurer, Christian Brünger, and Michael 
Blens for their help in the survey promotion and data collection. 
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performance and that they could take part in a lottery where five winners would receive € 20.00 
each.  
From the original sample of 184 students who agreed to participate in this study, data 
from 6 participants was excluded for the following reasons: One participant failed to provide any 
data on the dependent variables and five participants stated that their data should not be used in 
the analyses. The final sample included 178 participants. It consisted of 63 (35.4%) men and 115 
women (64.6%) with an age between 18 and 44 years (M = 23.0, MdnAge = 22, SD = 4.3). The 
median duration to complete the study was MdnDur = 29:47 minutes and the median payout was 
MdnPay = € 3.25, leading to an hourly earning equivalent of around € 6.50. 
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was level of cognitive load (low load or high load). The dependent variable was credit 
attractiveness. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the conditions in this study was random. 
At the start, participants read the instructions for the study, learned about the payoffs 
from the tasks and completed an example. The example was included to familiarize participants 
with the somewhat complex design of the tasks in the study and to promote their understanding 
of the incentive scheme. Although they were not paid for their answers in the example, 
participants learned about their score from it and the money that they would have earned, 
immediately after completing it. They were then free to look at the instructions again to clarify 
any unclear points or to go on directly.  
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The main part of the study then consisted of two parallel tasks. While performing an 
evaluation task, participants were engaged in a cognitive load task at the same time. In the 
evaluation task, participants were presented with a product offer and a corresponding credit offer 
for this product. They were asked to evaluate the product offer and the credit offer. In the 
cognitive load task, participants were asked to pay attention to a sequence of digits that was read 
to them via headphones and to state afterwards whether a certain digit was included in the 
sequence. Correct answers on this task were incentivized. 
The two tasks were combined in the following way: On a first page, participants saw the 
product and credit details and evaluated the product offer. Simultaneously, they were listening to 
the sequence of digits. A second page then asked whether a certain digit was included in the 
previous sequence. On a third page, participants again saw the product and credit details, only 
this time were asked to evaluate the credit offer. Again, they simultaneously listened to another 
sequence of digits. On a fourth page, they were then asked whether a certain digit was included 
in this second sequence. This scheme was repeated for 10 different products. To control for 
potential order effects, half of the participants saw the products in ascending price order and half 
of the participants saw the products in descending price order. 
After this part of the study, participants worked on a recall task. A total of 10 incentivized 
questions were asking for the correct recall of details of the previously seen offers. 
In the last part of the study, participants answered questions on the complexity of the 
offers, the relevance of the offered products and the understandability of the credit details. 
Furthermore, they provided information on the quality of their answers (Meade & Craig, 2012) 
and demographic information (gender, age, field of studies). 
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants, calculated their payout, and paid the 
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participants. Overall, they could get a maximum of 400 points. As 1 point translated into 1.25 
euro cents, this equaled a maximum payout of € 5.00. After receiving their money, participants 
could write their email address on a piece of paper and put it in an opaque box to participate in a 
lottery and win one of five € 20.00 prizes. The winners of this lottery were contacted via the 
provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Cognitive load. 
Cognitive load was manipulated using a verbal-auditory task adapted from Dittrich and 
Stahl (2012). Participants listened to a sequence of nine digits ranging from 1 to 9 that was 
recorded by a male speaker. In the high load condition, this sequence consisted of six different 
digits, (e.g., 7 – 3 – 4 – 7 – 6 – 7 – 9 – 3 – 1) whereas in the low load condition, it consisted of 
three different digits (e.g., 9 – 3 – 4 – 3 – 9 – 4 – 9 – 3 – 9). The sequence was constructed such 
that every low load sequence consisted of a subset of the digits used in the high load sequence. 
Those digits that appeared in both sequences were always in the same position in both sequences 
(e.g., positions two, three, seven and eight in the above example). Furthermore, within every 
sequence, a maximum of two digits could appear in a directly ascending or descending order 
(e.g., 3 – 4, but not 2 – 3 – 4).  
Participants heard one digit at the beginning of a 5-second interval, followed by silence 
for the remaining part of the interval. With the beginning of the next 5-second interval, they 
heard the next digit. Due to this, every sequence had a length of 45 seconds. Centered at the 
bottom of the screen, participants saw a countdown displaying the remaining time on the page in 
seconds.  
At the end of this interval, the study automatically continued to the next page, where 
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participants were asked “Did the sequence that you just listened to contain the digit X?” For half 
of the sequences, the digit referred to in the question was part of the sequence and for the other 
half of the sequences the digit referred to in the question was not part of the sequence. Every 
correct answer earned participants 10 points, whereas an incorrect answer led to a deduction of 5 
points. Over a total of 10 sequences parallel to the evaluation of product offers and another 10 
sequences parallel to the evaluation of credit offers, they could earn a maximum of 200 points in 
this task. 
Product and credit offer. 
Participants were presented with a total of 10 products and credit offers. Each offer was 
presented on an individual page. To control for potential order effects, half of the participants 
saw the products in ascending price order, starting with a tablet PC for € 379, and half of the 
participants saw the products in descending price order, starting with a car for € 9,975. In any 
case, participants saw the same 10 products for the exact same prices in both conditions. The 
products used in this study were a tablet PC, a gaming console, a season ticket for the local 
soccer team, a couch, a holiday package, a surround sound system, a mountain bike, a skydiving 
license, a kitchen and a car. Each page with a product and a credit offer was set up in the same 
way: In the upper left corner of the screen, participants saw a picture of the respective product. In 
the upper right corner of the picture, they saw a red price tag that informed about the name of the 
product and its price. Below the picture, in the lower left corner of the screen, credit details were 
provided. A table contained information on the credit amount, annual percentage rate, credit 
period, amount of monthly installment rates, a one-time additional charge and dunning fees.  
The credit amount always equaled the product price and the annual percentage rate was 0 
percent for all products. Credit period was either 12, 18 or 24 months, amount of monthly 
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installment rates was calculated as credit amount divided by credit period and the one-time 
additional charge was either 2%, 3% or 4% of the credit amount, expressed in absolute numbers. 
The dunning fees were either € 0 or € 5. The random variation in credit period, one-time 
additional charge and dunning fees was predetermined and used for all participants. It served the 
purpose to make the offers more realistic. All specific details were in line with comparable real 
credit offers.  
Product and credit evaluation. 
Next to the product and credit offer, on the right side of the screen, participants were 
asked to evaluate the product and credit offer. The respective questions for the credit offer read 
“How attractive do you find the depicted financing possibility?” (1 = not at all attractive; 
7 = very attractive), “To which extent does the depicted financing possibility meet your 
expectations?” (1 = not at all; 7 = completely), “How advantageous is the depicted financing 
possibility?” (1 = not at all advantageous; 7 = very advantageous) and “How likely is it that you 
take the depicted financing possibility?” (1 = not at all likely; 7 = very likely). The questions for 
the product had the same wording, except for the fact that they replaced “financing possibility” 
with “offer”. Asking for an evaluation of the product offer just served the purpose to disentangle 
this information from the evaluation of the credit offer. While the latter was the variable of 
interest, the former was of no further interest. Credit attractiveness was computed as the mean 
value of the four questions. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between α = .86 and α = .90 for the 10 
products.  
Recall task. 
After evaluating all offers and completing the verbal-auditory task, participants answered 
10 questions on the previously seen offers. Each question asked for the correct recall of either a 
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credit detail (e.g., “Which price range includes the one-time additional charge for the 0%-
financing of the skydiving license?”) or a detail of the product to be financed (e.g., “What was 
not shown in the picture for the all-inclusive holiday?”). The random order of the questions was 
predetermined and exactly the same for all participants, regardless of whether they saw the 
products in ascending price order or descending price order. For every question participants had 
to select the correct answer out of four answer options. Every correct answer earned them 20 
points, whereas an incorrect answer led to a deduction of 5 points. Over a total of 10 questions, 
they could earn a maximum of 200 points in this task.  
By making it possible to earn exactly the same amount of points through the cognitive 
load task and the recall task, participants should have no incentive to focus their attention either 
solely on listening to the digit sequences or solely to the visual offers. Instead, they should have 
tried to pay attention to both tasks, because of the balanced incentive structure. Due to the fact 
that the dependent variables are subjective evaluations, there was no possibility to incentivize 
them directly. Incentivizing the attention paid to the offers was done to indirectly motivate 
participants to give meaningful answers to the evaluation questions. 
Manipulation check and perceived purpose of the study. 
To check whether the amount of cognitive capacity needed to perform the cognitive load 
task differed between the two conditions, participants were asked to state how much attention 
they had left for the evaluation of the product and credit offers while engaging in the cognitive 
load task (adapted from Allen, Edwards, Snyder, Makinson, & Hamby, 2014). Answers ranged 
from 1 = not much at all to 7 = very much. Furthermore, participants stated their beliefs about 
the purpose of the study. 
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Control variables. 
Participants indicated how complex they perceived the tasks overall to be (1 = not at all 
complex to 7 = very complex). Furthermore, they stated the relevance of the offers for them 
personally (1 = not at all relevant to 7 = very relevant), to assess whether they could to some 
degree relate to the situation of evaluating products and credit offers. As a measure of quality for 
the evaluation of the credits, participants also indicated how understandable they perceived the 
details of the 0%-financing to be (1 = not at all understandable to 7 = very understandable). 
In addition, measures from Meade and Craig (2012) were included to assess how much 
effort participants devoted to the study and whether their data should be used in the analyses. 
The questions read “How much effort did you put forth towards the tasks in this study?” (1 = not 
much at all to 7 = very much) and “How thoroughly did you work on the tasks in this study?” 
(1 = not much at all to 7 = very much). After this, participants answered the following question 
with either Yes or No: “Lastly, it is vital to our study that we only include responses from people 
that devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise a lot of effort (the researchers’ and other 
participants’) could be wasted. In your opinion, can we use your data in our analyses?” 
Results. 
Preliminary analysis. 
Manipulation checks. 
In a first step, the questions on attention left for the evaluation task, and on task 
complexity were analyzed to see whether the manipulation of cognitive load was successful. An 
independent-samples t-test indicated that participants in the low load condition had significantly 
more attention left for the evaluation of the product and credit offers while engaging in the 
cognitive load task (M = 4.52, SD = 1.68) than participants in the high load condition (M = 3.97, 
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SD = 1.66), t(176) = 2.20, p = .015 (one-tailed). However, participants in the low load condition 
(M = 5.14, SD = 1.38) did not perceive the tasks to be significantly less complex as compared to 
participants in the high load condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.28), t(176) = 1.46, p = .073 (one-
tailed).  
While the first result supports the claim of a successful manipulation of cognitive load, 
the latter casts doubt. Therefore, the scores from the two incentivized tasks were analyzed as 
well. If the manipulation was successful, participants in the low load condition should have 
scored higher on the verbal auditory task as compared to participants in the high load condition, 
because the task was easier for them. Furthermore, the task required less attention in the low load 
condition, leading to a higher score on the recall task, because more cognitive resources could be 
invested in the latter. Due to non-normality of the score from the verbal auditory task, a Mann-
Whitney test was conducted, indicating that participants in the low load condition scored 
significantly higher (Mdn = 19) as compared to participants in the high load condition 
(Mdn = 18), U = 2137.50, z = -5.44 p < .001 (one-tailed). Regarding the score on the recall task, 
participants in the low load condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.57) did not significantly differ from 
participants in the high load condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.61), t(176) = 1.47, p = .074 (one-
tailed). 
Overall, the evidence for a successful manipulation of cognitive load is not clear. With 
the question about attention left for the evaluation task being the closest indicator for cognitive 
load and being significant it is argued for a successful manipulation. This is supported by the 
tendency in the other variables examined, although not always significant. 
Descriptives. 
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Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 15.  
On average, credit attractiveness was rated with M = 3.71 (SD = 0.84). The average 
rating for product attractiveness was M = 3.89 (SD = 0.75). The two values being so close to 
each other and the strong positive correlation of r = .86, N = 178, p < .001 can be interpreted as 
an indicator that participants had difficulties to differentiate between product and credit offer.  
Participants’ score from the verbal-auditory task was very close to the maximum of 20 
points (M = 18.23, SD = 1.85). No significant correlation was found between this score and 
credit attractiveness. The score from the recall task was M = 5.50 (SD = 1.60) without anyone 
who answered all 10 questions either correctly or incorrectly.  
On average, participants had some attention left for the credit evaluation while listening 
to the sequences of digits (M = 4.24, SD = 1.69). Overall, the tasks in this study were perceived 
to be rather complex, as the answers to the respective question indicate (M = 5.29, SD = 1.33).  
The relevance of the products presented in this study was rather low (M = 2.70, 
SD = 1.41). It is interesting to note that product relevance correlates with credit attractiveness 
such that credit offers for more relevant products were perceived to be more attractive.  
The average rating of credit understanding of M = 4.85 (SD = 1.73) suggests that 
participants understood the credit offers and the specific aspects of the offers. A better credit 
understanding was also related to a higher score in the recall task (r = .17, N = 178, p = .026), 
more attention left for the credit evaluation while working on the verbal-auditory task (r = .23, 
N = 178, p = .002) and higher product relevance (r = .15, N = 178, p = .047). 
Main analysis. 
The overall and product specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness, 
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split up for the two conditions of the cognitive load manipulation, are shown in Table 16.  
A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the hypothesis that 
there would be a mean difference in credit attractiveness between cognitive load levels (low and 
high). Product order and the interaction of cognitive load and product order were added as 
control variables. There was no main effect of cognitive load, F(1, 174) = 0.40, p = .528. 
However, there was a significant main effect of product order on credit attractiveness, F(1, 
174) = 10.26, p = .002. The interaction between the two factors was not significant F(1, 
174) = .60, p = .439. Regarding the descriptive results, participants in the low load condition 
(M = 3.74, SD = 0.77) rated credit attractiveness similar as participants in the high load condition 
(M = 3.68, SD = 0.90). Participants who saw the products in a descending price order perceived 
the credits to be more attractive (M = 3.90, SD = 0.80) as compared to participants who saw the 
products in an ascending price order (M = 3.51, SD = 0.84). 
The similar level in credit attractiveness between the two conditions of cognitive load 
speaks against the hypothesis that participants with high cognitive load perceive credits to be 
more attractive. 
Exploratory analyses. 
Potential problems with effort invested by the participants. 
Data quality was analyzed in more detail, to ensure that this aspect is not related to the 
absence of the hypothesized effect.  
As Groves and Lyberg (2010) pointed out in their total survey error framework, 
describing statistical error properties of survey sample statistics, measurement error is a crucial 
point for data quality. Among other things, it can be caused by participants who do not pay 
enough attention to reading and answering the questions (Greszki, Meyer, & Schoen, 2015). This 
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can happen, for example, when they are not interested in the topic of the study but also when 
they are fatigued, become impatient or distracted (Krosnick, 1991). Such careless responses can 
have negative consequences for data quality. This is especially true for measures that include 
positively worded as well as negatively worded items (Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, & 
DeShon, 2012), as is the case with the dependent measure in this study. While some argue that 
careless responses can lead to an attenuation of the observed relationships between variables 
(McGrath, Mitchell, Kim, & Hough, 2010), others argue that an inclusion of such responses in 
the analyses can lead to inflated relationships among the variables (Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 
2015).  
In order to cancel out such problems and increase data quality (Aust, Diedenhofen, 
Ullrich, & Musch, 2013), it was decided to reanalyze the data for those participants who invested 
at least a crucial amount of effort into completing the study. In doing so, it has to be said that this 
might have negative consequences for the generalizability of potential results (Oppenheimer et 
al., 2009). For this analysis, the answers on the two questions for invested effort and the 
thoroughness of participants’ work were averaged. Only those participants who scored above the 
median were selected. This was equivalent to a score of 6 or higher on this generated data quality 
index, resulting in a subsample of n = 84. A chi-square test of independence was performed to 
examine the relation between cognitive load and passing this data quality threshold. The relation 
between these variables was insignificant, χ2(1, N = 178) = 0.10, p = .766. Passing the threshold 
was therefore not affected by participants’ condition. A one-way between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate the effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness in this subsample. 
As in the main analysis, credit attractiveness did not significantly differ between participants in 
the low load condition (M = 3.62, SD = 0.85) and participants in the high load condition 
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(M = 3.81, SD = 0.95), F(1, 82) = 0.91, p = .342. 
Potential problems with the understandability of the credit offers. 
Next, understandability of the credit offers was analyzed. A low understanding of the 
credit offers could lead to more or less random answers concerning credit attractiveness and thus 
decrease data quality. Again, only those participants who scored above the median on the 
question for credit understandability were selected. This was equivalent to a score of 5 or higher 
on this question, resulting in a subsample of n = 112. A chi-square test of independence was 
performed to examine the relation between cognitive load and passing this understandability 
threshold. Participants in the low load condition stated a better understandability of the credit 
offers as compared to participants in the high load condition, χ2(1, N = 178) = 5.08, p = .030. 
This is in line with the argument that having less cognitive resources to spend on the credit offers 
leads to a more superficial processing of the information and thus to lower understandability. 
However, rerunning the previous analysis for this subsample of participants reproduced the 
earlier pattern of results: Credit attractiveness did not significantly differ between participants in 
the low load condition (M = 3.69, SD = 0.77) and participants in the high load condition 
(M = 3.77, SD = 0.78), F(1, 110) = 0.32, p = .573.  
Potential problems with the relevance of the products. 
The very same approach was used with respect to the perceived relevance of the 
products. It could be possible that the participants perceived the products to be different from 
their everyday purchases. If that was the case, they could have problems to relate to a situation 
where the purchase of such products is the central element, thus giving more or less random 
answers, leading to decreased data quality. For this analysis, only those participants who scored 
above the median on the question for relevance of the products were selected. This was 
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equivalent to a score of 3 or higher on this question, resulting in a subsample of n = 90. A chi-
square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between cognitive load and 
passing this relevance threshold. The relation between these variables was insignificant, χ2(1, 
N = 178) = 2.24, p = .177. Rerunning the previous analysis for this subsample of participants 
reproduced the pattern of results: Credit attractiveness did not significantly differ between 
participants in the low load condition (M = 3.98, SD = 0.62) and participants in the high load 
condition (M = 4.10, SD = 0.67), F(1, 88) = 0.80, p = .372. 
Product-specific analysis. 
In a last step, the relationship between cognitive load and credit attractiveness was 
analyzed in detail for each offer, to see whether the hypothesized effect exists for some products 
but vanishes in the aggregation. To this end, the model from the main analysis was extended to a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the individual ratings of credit attractiveness 
serving as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no effect of cognitive load on 
credit attractiveness, V = 0.07, F(10, 166) = 1.33, p = .218. Furthermore, none of the individual 
follow-up ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness. 
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on credit choice by examining 
credit attractiveness under different levels of cognitive load. To this end, a laboratory experiment 
was conducted in which cognitive load was manipulated to be either low or high. Credit 
attractiveness was measured for several 0%-interest credit offers that were presented with 
products thought to be relevant to students. No significant difference in credit attractiveness was 
found between the low cognitive load and high cognitive load conditions. This finding was 
consistent throughout the analyses and rejects the hypothesis that participants with high cognitive 
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load perceive 0%-interest credits to be more attractive as compared to participants with low 
cognitive load. 
The finding stands in contrast to the related results in the literature. Hinson, Jameson, and 
Whitney (2003) showed over several studies using hypothetical as well as real monetary rewards, 
that imposing cognitive load increased participants’ preference for immediate over delayed 
rewards. Credit can be seen as a financial instrument that allows the debtor to engage in 
immediate consumption instead of having to wait for consumption through means of saving. 
Thus, it should be seen as more attractive under high cognitive load, because the goal it serves is 
strongly desired. Furthermore, Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013) found evidence for a 
correlation between higher cognitive ability and greater short-term impatience among students. 
Arguing that cognitive ability can be interpreted as a proxy for generally available cognitive 
resources, this is in line with Hinson et al. (2003). Adding to research on the nature of the 
relationship between cognitive resources and temporal decision making, Frederick (2005) found 
that participants with a high score on the cognitive reflection test rather realized the potential 
disadvantages of immediate over delayed consumption than having a pure preference for 
consuming later.  
One possible explanation for the shortcoming of the present study to find an effect where 
previous research indicated a linkage might be that the manipulation used was not strong enough 
to show the hypothesized effect. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next section.   
Surprisingly, the current study found that participants who were presented with products 
in a descending price order perceived the credits to be more attractive as compared to 
participants who were presented with products in an ascending price order. 
The finding fits well with the literature on evaluation of sequences. Acquiring products is 
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connected to giving away money and thus to the experience of a monetary loss. The set of 
products in this study can then be seen as a sequence of potential losses with low losses in the 
beginning and high losses in the end or vice versa, depending on the prices of the products. 
Research shows that people prefer loss-sequences that become smaller instead of bigger over 
time. In an incentivized study, Langer et al. (2005) observed that participants preferred a 
sequence with a lower end loss even though the total loss in this sequence was higher than in an 
alternative with a higher end loss. In the credit context, Hassenzahl (2005) found that participants 
who imagined taking up a loan for a vacation preferred a repayment scheme with a larger 
installment at the beginning of the repayment period over a scheme with a larger installment at 
the end of the repayment period. About one third of the participants who preferred the sequence 
with decreasing installments stated concerns for the future or anxiety of rising installments the 
reason for their choice. Another study on repayment schemes (Hoelzl et al., 2011) found further 
evidence for such a preference for improvement, outweighing financial benefits.  
However, it should be noted that this interpretation of the effect of price order on credit 
attractiveness only holds under the assumption that participants interpreted the set of products 
and credit offers as a sequence of potential losses. Instead of focusing on the monetary loss it is 
also possible that they focused on the product-specific gain in value, ignoring the fact that they 
had to pay for it because it was credit-financed. In this case they would have favored a worsening 
sequence, contradicting previous research findings. 
Problems with the manipulation. 
While some results indicate a successful manipulation of cognitive load, the overall 
pattern is not very convincing. On the one hand, there was a significant difference between the 
two conditions for attention left for the evaluation of the product and credit offers while 
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engaging in the cognitive load task and with regard to the score on the cognitive load task. On 
the other hand, no difference between the two conditions was found regarding the perceived 
complexity of the tasks in the study and the score on the recall task. It seems as if the 
manipulation did indeed induce different amounts of cognitive load in the two conditions. 
Nevertheless, even in the high load condition participants had enough cognitive resources 
available to process the information on the product and credit offer, as the equal score on the 
recall task indicates. Unfortunately, it remains an open question whether they also had the 
cognitive resources needed to integrate the information on the credit aspects in a sophisticated 
process leading to a well-reasoned judgement of the credit offer available or whether they had to 
concentrate on single aspects like the 0%-interest rate and used heuristics to form their 
judgement.  
It is unlikely that the difference between the conditions regarding the attention left for the 
evaluation of the product and credit offers represents a measurement artefact. Paas and van 
Merriënboer (1994) showed that people are able to introspect on their cognitive resources and 
accurately report the expenditure of mental effort on a unidimensional numerical scale like the 
one used for left attention in the present study. Furthermore, they noted that this measurement 
technique was rather sensitive to small differences in several studies (Paas, van Merriënboer, & 
Adam, 1994). More recently, Schmeck, Opfermann, von Gog, Paas, and Leutner (2015) added 
that the sensitivity can be even greater for a delayed measurement as compared to a direct 
measurement, because participants seem to base their cognitive load rating rather on the more 
complex problems in a series that represents the task instead of the average or last problem. Such 
increased sensitivity provides a possible explanation for the question why other measures for 
cognitive load did not show a difference between the two conditions in this study. 
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If problems with the measurement can be excluded, shortcomings regarding the 
manipulation have to be located in the way the cognitive load manipulation was applied in the 
present study. In a meta-analysis on the effect of cognitive load on duration judgments, Block, 
Nancock, and Zakay (2010) reported that over 60% of studies that experimentally manipulated 
cognitive load used a manipulation relying on different levels of task difficulty to achieve 
different levels of cognitive load. The fact that the second most prominent approach to require 
participants to stay passive while presented with a stimulus (low load) or actively respond to it 
(high load) was only used in around 14% of studies, shows that the manipulation in the present 
study follows the by far most common way to manipulate cognitive load.  
A direct comparison with the results from other applications of the manipulation used in 
the present study is not possible, because it was adapted to the specific needs of this study. 
Nevertheless, other scholars used very similar manipulations and were able to show a clear 
effect. For example Rissman, Gazzaley, and D’Esposito (2009) had their participants listen to a 
sequence consisting of six unique randomly ordered digits (high load) or the sequence “1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6” (low load). As in the present study, they then presented a single digit on screen and 
participants had to indicate whether or not this digit was part of the sequence. With this 
manipulation the authors were able to show that high load led to lower performance in a visual 
information processing task as compared to low load. 
From this it becomes clear that a possible problem with a weak manipulation must be 
located in the specific design of the manipulation in the present study. The score from the verbal 
auditory task represents a first hint towards such a problematic point. With an average of 
M = 18.98 (SD = 1.25) correct answers in the low load condition and M = 17.52 (SD = 2.04) 
correct answers in the high load condition, participants in both conditions were very close to 
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answering all 20 items correctly. The sequence of digits used in the high load condition was 
more challenging than the sequence of digits in the low load condition, but only to a small 
degree. 
One possible explanation for this is that the silent interval between two digits was rather 
long. Participants heard a new digit only every 5 seconds, leaving them a considerable amount of 
time to memorize the digit before hearing the next one. Maybe the length of this interval gave 
even participants in the high load condition more time than needed to memorize the sequence of 
digits, thus leaving enough time for a sophisticated evaluation of the credit offers. A shorter 
silent interval in between the digits could result in a more difficult task for participants in the 
high load condition while still leaving enough time to memorize an easier sequence (low load 
condition). Accordingly, research indicates that free recall performance as well as recognition of 
a stimulus is impaired when participants are stressed at the time of memorizing a stimulus 
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2010). 
Contrary to the underlying assumption in the previous paragraph, it is also possible that 
participants in the low load condition actually perceived a rather high load as well because 
listening to digits (no matter of the structure of the sequence) interrupted the processing of credit 
details which were also presented in the form of digits. Ideally, the cognitive load manipulation 
should of course manipulate cognitive load but without a mechanism interfering with the credit 
evaluation task. In order to have a clear distinction between the mechanics of the two tasks, it 
would be better to change the sequences of digits in the verbal auditory task to sequences of 
letters. This way, the manipulation would create cognitive load via a letter-based dimension, 
while the credit evaluation task is based on processing numerical information, thus disentangling 
the two tasks. 
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Another possible explanation for the small difference in cognitive load between the two 
conditions is that memorizing a sequence constructed of just six different digits (high load) is 
only mildly more demanding compared to memorizing a sequence consisting of three different 
digits (low load). Although memorizing six digits should be twice as challenging, the two 
versions are close to each other and on the lower end of a scale of cognitive demands compared 
to other cognitive load tasks, e.g., higher levels of the n-back task. Widening the spread by using 
more than six different digits in the high load condition and less than three different digits in the 
low load condition could help to improve this aspect of the manipulation.  
Problems with the credit evaluation task. 
While the manipulation of cognitive load represents one possible explanation for the 
absence of the hypothesized effect of cognitive load on credit evaluation, the design of the 
evaluation task might contribute to the problem as well. Similar to the argument for shorter silent 
intervals in the verbal auditory task, participants might have had a considerable amount of time 
to evaluate the credit offers. Even though the verbal auditory tasks induced more load in the high 
load condition, it is possible that 45 seconds were sufficient for all participants to evaluate the 
credit offers in a sophisticated way, taking into account all the given details. Fortunately, the 
amount of time that participants have to evaluate the offers is connected to the length of the 
silent interval in the verbal auditory task: Keeping the amount of digits in sequence fixed, a 
decrease of the silent intervals to 3 seconds also limits the amount of time participants have to 
evaluate the credit offers to 30 seconds. Less time to reach a decision (in this case the evaluation 
of an offer) should then increase the effect of cognitive load on the process of making that 
decision. 
Another problematic aspect that is not related to the manipulation becomes evident in the 
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mean values for product attractiveness and credit attractiveness. The two values (M = 3.89, 
SD = 0.75, and M = 3.71, SD = 0.84) being nearly identical and highly correlated (r = .86, 
N = 178, p < .001) indicate that participants had difficulties differentiating between product and 
credit offer. It is likely that participants either took credit related aspects into account when 
evaluating the product or product related aspects when evaluating the credit offer. Furthermore, 
it is possible that both evaluations were affected in this way. While it is not possible to test which 
information was included in which judgement, the wording of the respective questions in the 
evaluation task could serve as a hint. For the credit evaluation, the questions referred to the 
“financing possibility”, making it rather clear what should be evaluated. However, for the 
product evaluation, the questions referred to the “offer”. This term was not chosen well, because 
it could also refer to the credit offer. Furthermore, participants could interpret the term as a 
combination of the product and the financing possibility, as it is often used in everyday 
situations. Following this line of thought, it is rather the measurement of product attractiveness 
that is affected by measurement error, while the measurement of credit attractiveness should be 
free of such concerns. Nevertheless it can only be speculated about possible explanations for the 
high similarity of product attractiveness and credit attractiveness. Regarding the explanation 
offered here, using the term “product” instead of “offer” in the evaluation of product 
attractiveness would have been favorable. 
Furthermore, the amount of information to be processed in the present study might have 
been too high in general. For each of the 10 products, participants were asked to process 
information on the product from the details on the price tag and the picture of the product to form 
a judgement on the product. Furthermore, they had to make sense of various credit aspects that 
might have been unfamiliar to them and to process them in a certain way in order to form a 
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judgement on the credit offer. This was accompanied by the verbal auditory task and had to be 
accomplished in a fixed amount of time. The high average value for overall task complexity 
(M = 5.29, SD = 1.33) mirrors the demanding character of the tasks and their repetition over the 
10 products. With each additional product, participants might have felt more and more depleted 
because of the high level of attention needed in the tasks and the information processing 
involved in evaluating the product and credit offers. As the literature suggests, a great expense of 
attention leads to impaired subsequent higher order cognitive processing (Schmeichel, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2003). Thus, for the later products, participants in the low load condition might have 
processed the given information in the same way as participants in the high load condition. 
Although the verbal auditory task was less demanding for them, the overall amount of 
information in the study to be processed decreased their cognitive resources to a minimum. 
Analyses of the influence of cognitive load on credit attractiveness for the first presented product 
(the tablet-PC in the ascending price order; Mhigh load = 4.10, SDhigh load = 1.47; Mlow load = 4.06, 
SDlos load = 1.18, t(87) = -.15, p = .885 and the car in the descending price order Mhigh load = 3.78, 
SDhigh load = 1.06; Mlow load = 3.79, SDlos load = 1.32, t(87) = .04, p = .969) revealed no significant 
effect. Even though this result does not rule out the described effect of overall information load 
on cognitive processing, it shows that such an effect was of marginal importance in the present 
study.  
Further limitations. 
The random assignment to the experimental conditions should have cancelled out the 
influence of factors that might otherwise influence credit attractiveness. Nevertheless, explicitly 
controlling for such factors would increase the precision of an effect of cognitive load on credit 
attractiveness. The fact that this was not taken into account in the present study might pose 
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another limitation. One such factor could be consumer spending self-control. Building on the 
more general concept of self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 
2007), it is defined as a person’s ability to monitor and regulate spending-related thoughts and 
actual decisions according to preset standards (Haws, Bearden, & Nenkov, 2012). As an 
example, imagine a person who sets a personal limit for the price she is willing to pay for a new 
shirt. While shopping for clothes, she sees a nice shirt that she likes very much. Unfortunately, 
the price exceeds her personal limit. If the person has low spending self-control, she would 
probably ignore her preset limit and buy the shirt. In contrast, if the person has high self-control, 
she would be more likely to stick to her preset limit and refrain from the purchase.  
Haws, et al. (2012) showed that participants low in consumer spending self-control were 
more likely to make impulsive purchases and payed more for products compared to participants 
high in consumer spending self-control. Related to the present study, they also found that 
participants low in consumer spending self-control were willing to pay a higher credit card 
premium than participants high in consumer spending self-control (Bearden & Haws, 2012). For 
the present study, these findings might be relevant in the following way: Especially participants 
in the low load condition could analyze the credit details and conclude that the offer is not that 
negative. Those among them who are low in consumer spending self-control might find the 
credit more attractive, as they see it as a facilitating means to acquire a desired product. In 
contrast, participants high in consumer spending self-control might see the credit as a negative 
temptation testing their willingness to overcome the purchase and thus find it less attractive. 
Study 6 – Evaluation of Credit Offers Under Letter-Based Cognitive Load 
As noted in the discussion of study 5, the experimental design had some limitations that 
might have been responsible for the non-significant results on the hypothesis of cognitive load 
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influencing credit attractiveness. Study 6 was conceptualized as a revised version of study 5, 
examining how different levels of cognitive load influence the evaluation of 0%-interest credit 
offers for everyday products. Based on the results of study 5, it was decided to make adjustments 
with regard to three major aspects: First, the manipulation of cognitive load was adjusted such 
that the difference between the two conditions in cognitive resources required was increased. 
Second, the overall level of cognitive resources required in the study was heightened through 
changes in the manipulation and the credit evaluation task. Third, the relevance of the credit 
evaluation was strengthened by selecting products that were closer to typical student purchases. 
The same hypothesis as in study 5 was tested: 
H1: Evaluating 0%-interest credit offers for specific products under high cognitive load 
leads to higher credit attractiveness as compared to evaluating them under low cognitive load. 
The hypothesis was tested using a laboratory experiment on hypothetical purchase 
opportunities. 
Method. 
The method of this study was similar to the previous study. Details on the specific 
differences are provided below. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from April 7th to 8th, 20159. Participants were approached on 
the campus of a large German university. All participants were asked to take part in a study on 
“information processing in the context of consumption decisions and 0%-financing”. They were 
informed that they could earn up to € 5.00, depending on their performance and that they could 
take part in a lottery where two winners would receive € 20.00 each and one winner € 10.00.  
                                                 
9 I would like to thank Penghua Sun, Atar Herziger, Rufina Gafeeva, Jenny Maurer, Paula Risius, Christian Brünger, 
Michael Blens, and Oliver Zabel for their help in the survey promotion and data collection. 
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From the original sample of 91 students who agreed to participate in this study, data from 
two participants was excluded for the following reasons: The PC of one participant crashed 
during the study and one participant stated that his data should not be used in the analyses. The 
final sample included 89 participants. It consisted of 32 (36.0%) men and 57 (64.0%) women 
with an age between 18 and 34 years (M = 22.3, MdnAge = 21, SD = 3.3). The median duration to 
complete the study was MdnDur = 25:50 minutes and the median payout was MdnPay = € 4.25, 
leading to an hourly earning equivalent of around € 9.80. 
Procedure. 
A two-group between-subjects design was used in this study. The independent variable 
was level of cognitive load (high load or low load). The dependent variable was credit 
attractiveness. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the two conditions in this study was random. 
The initial part of the study was identical to study 5: Participants read the instructions for 
the study, learned about the payoffs from the tasks and completed an example. Although they 
were not paid for their answers in the example, participants learned about their score and the 
money that they would have earned, immediately after completing it. They were then free to look 
at the instructions again to clarify any unclear points or to start directly with the main part of the 
study.  
As in study 5, the main part of the present study consisted of two parallel tasks, an 
evaluation task and a cognitive load task, this time for six rounds. In the evaluation task, 
participants were presented with a product offer and a corresponding credit offer for this product 
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and were asked to evaluate both. In the cognitive load task, they were asked to pay attention to a 
sequence of letters, instead of the digits from study 5, that was read to them via headphones and 
to state afterwards whether a certain letter was included in the sequence. The answers on this 
question were incentivized.  
The way in which these two tasks were combined was completely identical to the 
structure in study 5. The only difference was that the scheme was repeated for only six instead of 
10 different products with the products being ordered randomly.  
As a measure for a stable ability to suppress an intuitive and wrong answer in favor of a 
reflective and deliberate right answer, participants completed a cognitive reflection test. Next, 
they completed a recall task, aiming at the correct recall of details of the previously seen offers. 
For each offer, participants furthermore stated their familiarity with the respective product and its 
relevance to them personally. In addition, hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of their attitudes 
towards the product were measured. Except for the manipulation check, all measures were 
repeated for every product. Product order was again random.  
This was followed by an assessment of participants’ self-control in the domain of 
consumer spending. In a last part of the study, participants answered questions on the complexity 
of the offers and the understandability of the credit details. In addition, they stated how much 
attention they had left for the evaluation of the product and credit offers while engaging in the 
cognitive load task (adapted from Allen et al., 2014) and completed an instructional 
manipulation check as attention check. Furthermore, they provided information on the quality of 
their answers and demographic information (gender, age, field of studies).  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants, calculated their payout, and paid the 
participants. Overall, they could get a maximum of 600 points from the verbal auditory task. As 
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1 point translated into 0.5 euro cents, this equaled a maximum payout of € 3.00 from the task. By 
adding a € 2.00 flat payment part, the overall maximum payout was € 5.00. After receiving their 
money, participants could write their email address on a piece of paper and throw it in an opaque 
box to participate in a lottery and win one of two € 20.00 prizes or one € 10.00 prize. The 
winners of this lottery were contacted via the provided address after completion of the study.  
Material. 
Cognitive load. 
Cognitive load was again manipulated using a verbal-auditory task adapted from Dittrich 
and Stahl (2012). Unlike in study 5, participants did not listen to digits but to a sequence of nine 
letters ranging from A to Z that was recorded by a male speaker. The difference between the two 
conditions was more pronounced than in study 5: In the high load condition, all letters in this 
sequence were different from one another, (e.g., T – Q – G – N – X – L – R – W – A) whereas in 
the low load condition, it consisted of only two different letters (e.g., L – N – L – N – L – L – N 
– N – L). The sequence was constructed such that every low load sequence consisted of a subset 
of the letters used in the high load sequence. Those letters that appeared in both sequences were 
always in the same position in both sequences (e.g., positions four and six in the above example).  
The silent interval between two letters was reduced from 5 seconds in study 5 to 3 
seconds in the present study. Accordingly, every sequence had a length of 30 seconds instead of 
45 seconds as in study 5. Centered at the bottom of the screen, participants saw a countdown 
displaying the remaining time on the page in seconds.  
At the end of this interval, the study automatically continued to the next page, where 
participants were asked “Did the sequence that you just listened to contain the letter [?]?” For 
half of the sequences, the letter referred to in the question was part of the sequence and for the 
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other half of the sequences the letter referred to in the question was not part of the sequence. For 
every correct answer, participants earned 50 points, whereas an incorrect answer led to a 
deduction of 25 points. Over a total of six sequences parallel to the evaluation of product offers 
and another six sequences parallel to the evaluation of credit offers, they could earn a maximum 
of 600 points by performing this task. 
Product and credit offer. 
Because of the low rating of personal relevance for the products in study 5 it was decided 
to use different products in the present study. They were selected with regard to being owned by 
a majority of students (a vacuum cleaner, a desk, a washing machine, and a notebook) or thought 
to be desired by them (a longboard and a surf camp). In accordance with study 5, every page 
with a product and credit offer was set up in the same way: In the upper left corner of the screen, 
participants saw a picture of the respective product. In the upper right corner of the picture, they 
saw a red price tag that informed about the name of the product and its price. Below the picture, 
in the lower left corner of the screen, credit details were provided. A table contained information 
on the credit amount, annual percentage rate, credit period, amount of monthly installment rates, 
a one-time additional charge and dunning fees.  
The credit amount always equaled the product price and the annual percentage rate was 
0% for all products. Credit period was either 6 or 12 months, amount of monthly installment 
rates was calculated as credit amount divided by credit period and the one-time additional charge 
was either 0%, 2%, or 4% of the credit amount, expressed in absolute numbers. The dunning fees 
were either € 0 or € 5. The random variation in credit period, one-time additional charge and 
dunning fees was predetermined and used for all participants. It served the purpose to make the 
offers more realistic. All specific details were in line with comparable real credit offers.  
168 
 
 
Product and credit evaluation. 
Product and credit attractiveness were measured as in study 5. The only difference was 
that the questions for product attractiveness referred specifically to the product instead of to the 
overall offer as in study 5 (e.g., “How attractive do you find the depicted product?”, 1 = not at all 
attractive; 7 = very attractive). Credit attractiveness was computed as the mean value of the four 
respective questions. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between α = .77 and α = .88 for the six products.  
Cognitive reflection test. 
After evaluating all offers and completing the verbal-auditory task, participants 
completed a cognitive reflection test, adapted from Frederick (2005). Consisting of three 
brainteaser items in a free-response format, it assesses participants’ ability to suppress an 
intuitive and spontaneous wrong answer in favor of a reflective and deliberate right answer. An 
example item reads "If it takes five machines 5 minutes to make five pairs of shoes, how long 
would it take 100 machines to make 100 pairs of shoes?”. A score was computed as the sum of 
correct answers to the three questions (α=.72). 
Recall task. 
The structure of the recall task was identical to the one used in study 5. A recall score 
was computed as the sum of correct answers to the 12 questions over all six products.  
Control variables. 
Familiarity with the respective product was measured using the question “Have you at 
least once bought a product like this?” and personal relevance was measured using the question 
“How relevant is the product to you personally?” (1 = not at all relevant to 7 = very relevant).  
Hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of participants’ attitudes towards the product were 
measured using the HED/UT scale (Voss, Spangenberg, & Grohmann, 2003). It consists of 10 
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semantic differential response items, five of which refer to the hedonic dimension (e.g., 
1 = enjoyable to 7 = unenjoyable) and five of which refer to the utilitarian dimension (e.g., 
1 = practical to 7 = impractical) of participants’ attitudes. Hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of 
participants’ attitudes were computed as the mean value of the five respective items. For the six 
products, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from α = .59 to α = .86 for the hedonic dimension and from 
α = .83 to α = .91 for the utilitarian dimension of participant’s attitudes. 
Participants’ self-control in the domain of consumer spending was measured using the 
consumer spending self-control scale (Haws et al., 2012). It consists of 10 items (e.g., “I often 
delay taking action until I have carefully considered the consequences of my purchase 
decisions.”) that are assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). 
Consumer spending self-control was computed as the mean value of the 10 questions (α=.89). 
Manipulation check, and further control variables. 
The manipulation check and the measures regarding study purpose, task complexity, 
understandability of the credit offers and data usability were exactly the same as in study 5. In 
order to further assess whether or not participants were reading the instructions in the study 
carefully, an instructional manipulation check was adapted from Oppenheimer et al. (2009). 
Participants saw the question “Which of the following activities do you pursue regularly? Please 
select all that apply.” Underneath, they read the following text in a smaller font: “Research in 
psychology was able to show that people, when answering questions, do not pay much attention 
and minimize their effort as much as possible. Due to that, questions are often not read carefully 
enough. For this reason, we are very interested in whether you take the time to deliberately read 
all instructions. In order to show that you really read the instructions, please ignore the above 
question and just type ‘Jemand’ in the box below. Thank you!” Under this text, participants saw 
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some activities (e.g., going to the movies, reading books) and the open text box, in which they 
should write the word ‘Jemand’. 
After completing the check, participants read the following question and answered with 
either Yes or No: “Lastly, it is vital to our study that we only include responses from people that 
devoted their full attention to this study. Otherwise a lot of effort (the researchers’ and other 
participants’) could be wasted. In your opinion, can we use your data in our analyses?” (Meade 
& Craig, 2012).  
Results. 
Preliminary analyses. 
Manipulation check. 
In a first step, the questions on attention left for the evaluation task, and on task 
complexity were analyzed to see whether the manipulation of cognitive load was successful. Due 
to non-normality of the answers to the question on attention a Mann-Whitney test was 
conducted, indicating that participants in the low load condition (Mdn Rank = 5) did not have 
significantly more attention left for the evaluation task as compared to participants in the high 
load condition (Mdn Rank = 4), U = 853.00, z = -1.14 p = .128 (one-tailed). An independent-
samples t-test indicated that participants in the low load condition perceived the tasks to be 
significantly less complex (M = 4.82, SD = 1.21) as compared to participants in the high load 
condition (M = 5.58, SD = 1.16), t(87) = -3.03, p = .002 (one-tailed).  
While the latter result supports the claim of a successful manipulation of cognitive load, 
the first casts doubt. Therefore, the scores from the verbal auditory task and the recall task were 
analyzed as well. If the manipulation was successful, participants in the low load condition 
should have scored higher on the verbal auditory task as compared to participants in the high 
171 
 
 
load condition, because the task was easier for them. Furthermore, the task required less attention 
in the low load condition, leading to a higher score on the recall task, because more cognitive 
resources could be spent on the offers. Due to non-normality of the score from the verbal 
auditory task, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted, indicating that participants in the low load 
condition scored significantly higher on the verbal auditory task (Mdn Rank = 66.00) as 
compared to participants in the high load condition (Mdn Rank = 24.47), U = 66.00, z = -7.80 p 
< .001 (one-tailed). Also, participants in the low load condition scored significantly higher on the 
recall task (M = 7.14, SD = 1.79) as compared to participants in the high load condition 
(M = 6.42, SD = 2.08), t(87) = 1.72, p = .042 (one-tailed).  
Overall, the evidence for a successful manipulation of cognitive load is not completely 
clear. The two scores measure behavior that should be influenced by cognitive load and therefore 
go beyond the subjective perception of participants’ attention that was captured in the previously 
analyzed question. With this measure consistently showing a significant difference between the 
two conditions of cognitive load and the results from the analysis on perceived complexity being 
significant as well, it is argued for a successful manipulation. 
Descriptives. 
Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 17.  
As can be seen, credit offers were on average rated to be somewhat attractive (M = 4.21, 
SD = 0.83). The same is true for product attractiveness (M = 4.50, SD = 0.55). The two values 
being so close to each other and the positive correlation of r = .53, N = 89, p < .001 can be a first 
hint that participants had difficulties differentiating between product and credit offer, as seemed 
to be the case in study 5. Participants’ score from the verbal-auditory task is further away from 
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the maximum of 12 points (M = 9.15, SD = 1.93). As in study 5 no significant correlation was 
found between this score and credit attractiveness. The score from the recall task is close to the 
midpoint of the respective range (M = 6.78, SD = 1.96) without anyone who answered all 12 
questions either correctly or incorrectly. On average, participants had some attention left for the 
credit evaluation while listening to the sequences of digits (M = 4.44, SD = 1.74).  
Overall, the tasks in this study were perceived to be about as complex, as the ones in 
study 5 (M = 5.20, SD = 1.24). In contrast, the choice of products presented in this study led to a 
strong increase in relevance of the products to M = 4.42 (SD = 0.90). It is interesting to note that 
product relevance correlates positively with credit attractiveness (r = .24, N = 89, p = .024) and 
product attractiveness (r = .31, N = 89, p = .004) as well as with task complexity (r = .21, 
N = 89, p = .048), which in turn is positively related to product attractiveness (r = .23, N = 89, 
p = .033).  
The average rating of credit understanding of M = 4.63 (SD = 1.46) is a positive signal 
that participants seemed to understand the credit offer and its various aspects. The positive 
correlation between credit understanding and attention left for the credit evaluation while 
listening to the sequences of digits (r = .29, N = 89, p = .005) suggests that participants who 
could pay more attention to the credit details developed a better understanding of them. 
Hedonic attitudes of participants towards the product were on average less positive 
(M = 4.09, SD = 0.52) than utilitarian attitudes (M = 5.52, SD = 0.56). While hedonic attitudes 
showed a stronger positive relation to product attractiveness (r = .44, N = 89, p < .001) than to 
product relevance (r = .21, N = 89, p = .045), the opposite was true for utilitarian attitudes 
(r = .26, N = 89, p = .015 and r = .42, N = 89, p < .001 respectively). This pattern indicates that 
these are indeed distinct dimensions of participants’ attitudes. This notion is further supported by 
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the small positive correlation between both dimensions (r = .24, N = 89, p = .024).  
Finally, consumer spending self-control averaged at M = 5.13 (SD = 1.12) and 
participants answered on average M = 1.05 (SD = 1.14) of the three questions of the cognitive 
reflection test correctly. Interestingly, there is no correlation between the performance in this test 
and task complexity or credit understanding. 
Main analyses. 
The overall and product specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness, 
split up for the two conditions of the cognitive load manipulation, are shown in Table 18.  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be a mean 
difference in credit attractiveness between cognitive load levels (low and high). There was no 
significant effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness, F(1, 87) = 0.55, p = .462. The means 
of credit attractiveness were equal for participants in the high load condition (M = 4.28, 
SD = 0.94) and participants in the low load condition (M = 4.15, SD = 0.70). 
Next, the model was extended to a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) by 
adding hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of participants’ attitudes towards the product and 
Table 18 
Sample Sizes, Overall and Product Specific Means and Standard Deviations of Credit 
Attractiveness 
 Low load (n = 44)  High load (n = 45) 
Measure M SD  M SD 
Overall credit 
attractiveness 
4.15 0.70 
 
4.28 0.94 
Longboard 3.32 1.07  2.94 1.34 
Laptop  4.42 1.21  4.65 1.43 
Desk 4.00 1.46  4.01 1.57 
Vacuum 
cleaner 
3.81 1.30 
 
4.03 1.39 
Surf camp 4.73 1.48  5.33 1.40 
Washing 
machine 
4.79 1.12 
 
4.76 1.44 
Note. N = 89. 
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consumer spending self-control as covariates. As in the ANOVA, there was no significant effect 
of cognitive load on credit attractiveness, F(1, 84) = 0.57, p = .452. Furthermore, none of the  
covariates were significantly related to credit attractiveness (F(1, 84) = 0.35, p = .557 for 
hedonic dimension of participants’ attitudes, F(1, 84) = 1.65, p = .203 for utilitarian dimension 
and F(1, 84) = 0.41, p = .525 for consumer spending self-control). 
The equality in credit attractiveness between the two conditions of cognitive load speaks 
against the hypothesis that participants with high cognitive load perceive credits to be more 
attractive. 
Exploratory analyses. 
Potential problems with attention paid by the participants. 
As pointed out earlier in study 5, measurement error can be caused by participants who 
for various reasons do not pay enough attention to reading and answering the questions (Greszki 
et al., 2015). As a consequence, it can lead to a decrease in data quality. In order to cancel out 
such problems and increase data quality (Aust et al., 2013), it was decided to reanalyze the data 
for those participants who passed the instructional manipulation check. A chi-square test of 
independence was performed to examine the relation between cognitive load and passing the 
instructional manipulation check. The relation between these variables was insignificant, χ2(1, 
N = 89) = 0.31, p = .669. Passing the check was not affected by condition. As in the main 
analysis, no significant effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness was obtained, F(1, 
50) = 0.03, p = .874, for the participants who passed the instructional manipulation check 
(n = 52). 
Potential problems with the relevance of the products. 
Next, it was decided to take a closer look at the product relevance and prior experience 
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with the products. As argued in study 5, low product relevance could lead to random answers in 
the credit evaluation. However, product relevance ranged from M = 4.28 (SD = 2.01) for the surf 
camp to M = 5.93 (SD = 1.31) for the notebook with the exception of M = 2.00 (SD = 1.55) for 
the longboard, resulting in a mean relevance of M = 4.42 (SD = 0.90) over all six products 
(α=.45). Furthermore, 20.2% of participants indicated for at least four products that they bought 
these or similar ones in the past. While 77.5% of participants indicated this for at least two 
products, only 9.0% did not buy any of the products in the past. From these results, it was 
concluded that a low product relevance is no primary concern for participants’ ability to relate to 
the described situation. 
Potential problems with System 1 / 2 information processing as a stable disposition. 
Instead of an experimental manipulation, some researchers used the cognitive reflection 
test as a measure to assess the stable ability of individuals to suppress an intuitive and 
spontaneous wrong answer in favor of a reflective and deliberate right answer. For example, 
Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009) found participants scoring low on the test to be less 
patient for money, compared to participants scoring high. Furthermore, participants scoring low 
tend to make more forecast errors (Moritz, Siemsen, & Kremer, 2014) and focus more on salient 
pieces of information, instead of processing all available information (Hoppe & Kusterer, 2011).  
Under the assumption that the cognitive reflection task captures a stable disposition 
towards System 1 or System 2 information processing, one could argue that participants scoring 
low on the measure are more impatient for the product, underestimate the occurrence of 
unforeseen problems in the repayment period and focus on 0%-interest as the central feature of 
the credit, leading to higher credit attractiveness. Kendall’s tau was calculated in order to 
determine if there was such a relationship between the score from the cognitive reflection test 
177 
 
 
and credit attractiveness. In line with the assumption, the two variables were significantly 
correlated, rτ (89) = -.15, p = .036 (one-sided). The result suggests that a stable disposition 
towards System 1 information processing as indicated by a low score on the cognitive reflection 
task is positively related to credit attractiveness. 
Product-specific analysis. 
In a last step, the relationship between cognitive load and credit attractiveness was 
analyzed in detail for each offer, to see whether the hypothesized effect exists for some products 
but vanishes in the aggregation. To this end, the model from the main analysis was extended to a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the individual ratings of credit attractiveness 
serving as dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no effect of cognitive load on 
credit attractiveness, V = 0.10, F(6, 82) = 1.59, p = .160. Furthermore, none of the individual 
follow-up ANOVAs revealed a significant effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness. The 
overall and product specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness are shown in 
Table 18. 
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to examine a potential effect of cognitive load on 
credit attractiveness. To this end, a revised version of study 5 was conducted in which cognitive 
load was manipulated to be either low or high. Credit attractiveness was measured for several 
0%-interest credit offers that were presented with products thought to be relevant to students. No 
significant difference in credit attractiveness was found between the low cognitive load and high 
cognitive load conditions. This finding was consistent throughout the analyses and rejects the 
hypothesis that participants with high cognitive load perceive 0%-interest credits to be more 
attractive as compared to participants with low cognitive load.  
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The finding that cognitive load had no effect on credit attractiveness stands in contrast to 
the related results and suggestions in the literature (Benjamin et al., 2013; Frederick, 2005; 
Hinson et al., 2003) as already noted in the discussion section of study 5. Possible explanations 
for the repeated shortcoming to find an effect where previous research indicated a linkage will be 
derived in the next section.   
Problems with the manipulation. 
While most results indicate a successful manipulation of cognitive load, the overall 
pattern is not completely clear. On the one hand, there was a significant difference between the 
two conditions regarding the perceived complexity of the tasks in the study as well as the scores 
on the verbal auditory task and the recall task. On the other hand, no difference between the two 
conditions was found regarding the self-reported attention left for the evaluation of the product 
and credit offers while engaging in the cognitive load task. The difference in scores from the 
verbal auditory load task indicates that the two conditions did significantly differ in the amount 
of cognitive resources needed for the task. Accordingly, participants had differing amounts of 
resources left to process the product and credit information, as the score from the recall task 
indicates. This interpretation is backed by the differing degrees of perceived complexity of the 
tasks in the study in the two conditions of cognitive load. Nevertheless, participants in the two 
conditions did not differ in the amount of perceived attention left for the credit evaluation task. 
The fact that the behavioral indicators indicate a difference between the two conditions that is 
not backed by the self-reported indicators contrasts the finding that people are able to introspect 
on their cognitive resources and accurately report the expenditure of mental effort (Paas & van 
Merriënboer, 1994, Schmeck et al., 2015). 
Overall, the changes regarding the manipulation from study 5 to study 6 did improve the 
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discriminability of the two conditions of cognitive load, as the behavioral indicators show. 
However, regarding the perception of participants, the indifference in attention left still leaves 
room to doubt a completely successful manipulation.  
Maybe it is not the specific design of the cognitive load manipulation that needs 
improvement but the auditory character of it that prevents the hypothesized effect to show up in 
the results. Evidence for this idea comes from research on multimedia learning. Researchers 
found that participants acquired more knowledge from a written text with supportive pictures 
when the text was read to them while seeing it on screen as compared to just seeing the text 
without listening to it (Penney, 1989). This so called modality effect was confirmed in numerous 
studies (see Ginns (2005) for a meta-analysis). To explain this effect, it is assumed that cognitive 
processing takes place in two separate subsystems: One for visual information processing and 
one for auditory information processing, with independent cognitive resources (Brünken, Plass, 
& Leutner, 2004). For the present study, this implies that the used manipulation of cognitive load 
targets and occupies only cognitive resources in the auditory information processing subsystem. 
In contrast, the information processing in the credit evaluation task relies exclusively on 
cognitive resources in the visual information processing subsystem. If these two subsystems are 
indeed independent from each other and do not draw from the same pool of resources, the 
manipulation of cognitive load should not affect credit attractiveness. While this explanation fits 
with the results from the present study, it contradicts previous success in showing an effect of an 
auditory cognitive load task on an outcome variable that relies on the visual information 
processing subsystem (Rissman et al., 2009; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that such examples are very hard to find. The overwhelming 
majority of published work in this area relies on cognitive load tasks and outcome variables of 
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the same modality. With the modality effect speaking against a coincidence, future tests of the 
hypothesis in the present study should rely on non-auditory cognitive load tasks. 
A closer analysis of the manipulation used reveals another possible impediment. The 
general idea behind the manipulation is that occupying cognitive resources prevents people from 
processing information in an analytic and controlled way so that they tend to rely on more 
automatic information processing that is less demanding regarding the cognitive resources 
needed. That means, that the manipulation used in the present study inhibits controlled 
processing for participants in the high cognitive load condition. While this procedure was highly 
successful in previous research on economic decision making (Duffy & Smith, 2014; Schulz, 
Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014), it might not be that well suited for the present study. While 
the mentioned studies strongly incentivized the decision to be made under different levels of 
cognitive load, the present study did not do so, because the dependent variable measured 
attractiveness of the offer instead of an objective criterion that could be used for incentivization. 
Thus, it is unclear whether the participants in the low cognitive load condition were motivated to 
make use of their cognitive resources in the credit evaluation task and engaged in more rational 
and controlled information processing than participants in the low cognitive load condition. If 
they became tired of the repetitive tasks, had difficulties to relate to the products used or were 
distracted otherwise, it is likely that they processed the credit details in a rather superficial way, 
even though they had the cognitive resources for a more thorough processing. It would have been 
favorable to use a manipulation that concentrates on activating either a mindset highlighting 
controlled information processing or a mindset highlighting automatic information processing. 
By doing so, it would no longer be necessary to rely on the assumption that participants who 
have a large amount of cognitive resources available also make use of them to a certain degree, 
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without being forced to do so. 
Regarding participants’ score on the verbal auditory task, the changes made in the design 
of the manipulation were successful in both desired ways: First, the two conditions differ more 
from each other (M = 10.64, SD = 0.57 in the low load condition and M = 7.69, SD = 1.66 in the 
high load condition) than it was the case in study 5. Thus, the changes made in the design 
strengthened the discriminability of the two conditions of cognitive load. Second, the average 
score of M = 9.15, SD = 1.93 is further away from the maximum of 12 points. Thus, the 
existence of a ceiling effect of this measurement can be excluded.  
Problems with the credit evaluation task. 
The results for the product and credit evaluation in study 5 indicated that participants had 
difficulties differentiating between product and credit offer. In order to get a clean measure of 
credit attractiveness with the influence of product aspects, the wording of the questions was 
changed in the present study. However, this did not have the desired effect on the evaluations. 
Product attractiveness (M = 4.50, SD = 0.55) and credit attractiveness (M = 4.21, SD = 0.83) 
were still rated nearly identical and correlated (r = .53, N = 89, p < .001), although the link was 
weaker than in study 5. 
One reason for mixing the evaluation of the product and the evaluation of the credit 
might be difficulties in making an isolated judgement. In case of the credit attractiveness, it is 
possible that participants lacked the knowledge necessary to form a judgement on the offer or 
that they felt unsure about it because of unfamiliarity with credits. Mussweiler and Strack (2000) 
showed that anchoring – the tendency to start forming a judgement or making a decision from a 
previous piece of information, often leading to biased outcomes – depends on a persons’ 
knowledge about the object to be judged. The less knowledgeable, the more did their participants 
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assimilate a numeric estimate towards the anchor. In the present case, participants might have 
taken their previous rating of the product attractiveness as an anchor for the credit attractiveness 
decision. Nevertheless, participants’ self-reported credit understanding was not on a particularly 
low level, neither in study 5 (M = 4.85, SD = 1.73) nor in study 6 (M = 4.63, SD = 1.46). 
Therefore, a lack of credit understanding alone cannot account for the similarity of product 
attractiveness and credit attractiveness. However, these numbers also show that participants did 
not have a perfect understanding of the credit details. Because this is crucial to meaningful 
ratings of credit attractiveness, future studies should pay more attention to using simple language 
and taking time to explain the credit aspects in detail, to ensure a comparably high level of 
understanding for all participants. 
A second shortcoming lies in the quality of the credit offers and could add to the 
explanation why the hypothesized effect of cognitive load on credit attractiveness was not found. 
It is possible, that the offers were simply too advantageous. More specifically, the one-time 
additional charge and the dunning fees were the only two components that made the credit offer 
more expensive than a cash payment. On average, the one-time additional charge equaled 2.00% 
of the product price or € 3.53. The dunning fee equaled 1.32% of the product price or € 2.50. 
Because most consumers do not anticipate to lag behind with their monthly instalment rate 
(Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson, 2008), it is likely that participants interpreted this credit 
aspect as one of secondary importance, leaving the one-time additional charge as the main driver 
of the costs for the offered credit. Participants in the low cognitive load condition should have 
been able to calculate that the offered credits are indeed really cheap, compared to the average 
loan for consumption with a duration of up to 12 months in April 2015 in Germany of 5.00% 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016) but also in comparison to cash payment. As a consequence, they 
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might have concluded that the offer is very attractive. This would then resemble the conclusion 
of participants in the high cognitive load condition, who should have reached this conclusion on 
a more affective way by concentrating on the 0% interest rate, as described in the theory section. 
In order to observe different outcomes in the credit evaluation under different levels of cognitive 
load, the credits must be designed such that aspects that are relevant under low load processing 
lead to a different judgment than aspects that are relevant under high load processing. To ensure 
that this is the case, future studies should use credit offers that are worse than the ones used in 
the present study, while still being in line with statutory provisions and real consumer credit 
offers. For example, this could be done by adding an expensive mandatory residual debt 
insurance, requiring down payments or adding an early repayment fee. 
Further limitations. 
The present study used products that were selected with regard to being owned by a majority of 
students. This was done to come up with a set of products that participants can relate to because 
they are relevant in their everyday lives. Indeed, this selection of products led to a significant 
increase in product relevance from study 5 (M = 2.79, SD = 1.41) to study 6 (M = 4.42, 
SD = 0.90), t(265) = -9.94, p < .001. It can be assumed that this was also the reason for product 
attractiveness (M = 3.89, SD = 0.75 in study 5 and M = 4.50, SD = 0.55 in study 6, t(265) = -
6.81, p < .001) and credit attractiveness (M = 3.71, SD = 0.84 in study 5 and M = 4.21, SD = 0.83 
in study 6, t(265) = -4.60, p < .001) to increase significantly. Nevertheless, this is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to ensure that participants take the situation described in the study as 
something that they could also encounter outside the laboratory. Meaningful ratings of credit 
attractiveness further require participants to have a certain level of involvement with the 
products. For example, a dish washer would be relevant to most people, as it saves a lot of effort 
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and money (through lowered water consumption). Nevertheless, the involvement with such a 
product should be rather low, because even when deciding to buy one, they all accomplish the 
task of cleaning dishes without offering further benefits like improved taste for the next meal on 
the washed plate. It is possible that participants in the present study had difficulties of making 
meaningful judgements on the credit offers for products with low involvement, because they 
lacked a connection to such a situation and perceived it as artificial. Therefore, involvement with 
the products should be given special emphasis in the product selection for future studies. 
Related to this point, missing contextual information might have complicated 
participants’ efforts of relating to the described situation. They were asked to rate the 
attractiveness of a product offer and a credit offer without any further information about the 
context of these offers. They were neither instructed to imagine to be looking for such products 
or wanting to buy them. Also, no information on why the product was needed or whether 
financing a purchase via credit was necessary was provided. Having to decide about the 
attractiveness without knowing anything about the context might have made it difficult for 
participants to reach a decision that is comparable to a decision in a comparable real situation 
with additional information. In order to eliminate such difficulties, further studies should provide 
at least a situational framework for the decisions on attractiveness as well as an instruction to 
imagine being in a specific situation that renders the purchase of the displayed products relevant.  
As argued in the discussion section of study 5, a measure for spending self-control was 
included in the present study. Contrary to the assumption, it did not correlate significantly with 
either product attractiveness or credit attractiveness. This is probably a result of the dependent 
variable: The concept of credit attractiveness mainly consists of an affective and a cognitive 
component. In contrast, little importance is given to a behavioral component. In fact, only one of 
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the four questions used for credit attractiveness asked for a behavioral intention. Self-control 
however, puts great emphasis on actual behavior: The idea is that people with low self-control 
fail to behave in line with their goals, when confronted with a tempting choice (Baumeister et al., 
2007). Thus, participants high in spending self-control should have less problems to forgo a good 
offer for a wanted product compared to participants low in spending self-control but this does not 
imply that they find the good or the credit any less attractive.  
Study 7 – Evaluation of Credit Offers for Products with Different Use Under System 1 and 
System 2 Processing 
Study 7 examines how System 1 / 2 processing influences the evaluation of 0%-interest 
credit offers for everyday products. Drawing on the previously presented literature on 
System 1 / 2 information processing in economic decision-making and the theoretical 
considerations on the salience of 0, the first hypothesis is similar to the hypotheses in studies 5 
and 6: 
H1: When people evaluate 0%-interest credit offers for specific products, relying on 
System 1 information processing leads to higher credit attractiveness as compared to relying on 
System 2 information processing. 
Furthermore, study 7 examines the role of intended product use in this relationship. 
Drawing on the literature on hedonic and utilitarian products, the second hypothesis reads: 
H2: Relying on System 1 information processing while evaluating 0%-interest credit 
offers for products with intended hedonic product use leads to higher credit attractiveness as 
compared to products with intended utilitarian product use.  
The hypotheses were tested using a laboratory experiment on hypothetical purchase 
opportunities. 
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Method. 
Participants. 
Data collection took place from June 22nd to 24th, 201510. Participants were approached 
on the campus of a large German university. They were asked to take part in a study on 
“consumption decisions” in return for a flat payment of € 3.00. From the original sample of 144 
students who agreed to participate in this study, data from three participants was excluded for the 
following reasons: The PC of one participant crashed during the study and two participants stated 
that their data should not be used in the analyses. The final sample included 141 participants. It 
consisted of 41 (29.1%) men and 100 women (70.9%) with an age between 18 and 49 years 
(M = 22.6, MdnAge = 21, SD = 3.8). The median duration to complete the study was 
MdnDur = 27:48 minutes, leading to an hourly earning equivalent of around € 6.50. 
Procedure. 
A 2 (information processing mindset) x 2 (intended product use) between-subjects design 
was used in this study. The two independent variables were information processing mindset 
(System 1 mindset or System 2 mindset) and intended product use of the presented products 
(hedonic use or utilitarian use). The dependent variable was credit attractiveness. 
When entering the lab, participants were seated individually at a computerized workplace 
and asked to start working on the study. All information was provided on screen. The allocation 
of participants to the four conditions in this study was random. 
At the start, participants completed the information processing mindset manipulation. 
In the following evaluation task, participants were presented with a product offer and a 
corresponding 0%-credit offer for the product. The product was described to be of either hedonic 
                                                 
10 I would like to thank, Atar Herziger, Rufina Gafeeva, Jenny Maurer, Paula Risius, Michael Blens, and Oliver 
Zabel for their help in the survey promotion and data collection. 
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or utilitarian use. Unlike in studies 5 and 6, participants were asked to only evaluate the credit 
offer. This scheme was repeated for five different products.  
After this part of the study, participants answered a manipulation check for information 
processing mindset. The questions of this manipulation check referred to the situation when 
participants were completing the manipulation. Next, participants answered a manipulation 
check for intended product use. Furthermore, participants’ self-control in the domain of 
consumption expenditures, their attitude towards credit, need for cognition and their tendency to 
plan with money were assessed.  
Following these scales, participants’ understanding of credit-related terms that were used 
in the previously seen credit offers was measured and they completed an instructional 
manipulation check serving as an attention check. In a last part of the study, participants stated 
their involvement with each of the five products used in the previous offers, provided 
information on the quality of their answers (Meade & Craig, 2012) and demographic information 
(gender, age, field of studies).  
Finally, the experimenter thanked the participants and handed the payment of € 3.00 to 
them.  
Material. 
Information processing mindset. 
Information processing mindset was manipulated using a mindset manipulation adapted 
from van den Bos and Maas (2009). All texts from this measure were translated into German 
language for the purpose of this study. The texts that are printed here are back translations from 
the German texts that were applied in this study. On a first page, participants read a text on either 
System 1 mindset or System 2 mindset, depending on their respective condition. Both texts are 
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shown in Table 19. 
After reading the respective text, participants were asked to think for 45 seconds about 
how they would read a text and process the information in the described way. After this time, the 
page changed and they read the following: Please let us know what came to your mind when 
thinking about reading a text and processing the information expressively [evaluatively] and 
impulsively [analytically]. What do you think, how would you react to the information? 
Participants were asked to enter their answers into a textbox below. 
In a second step, they were instructed to read a short text and to answer two open-ended 
questions on that text.  
The instructions further specified how to read and process the information in the text that 
they were about to read. Again, the instructions differed for the two conditions. They are shown 
in Table 20. 
Table 19 
Information on Information Processing Mindsets 
System 1 mindset System 2 mindset 
Various studies have shown that we process 
the information that we read differently. 
Often, we develop many associative thoughts 
while reading materials. This implies that we 
connect the contents to our own experiences 
and visualize what is described. Based on 
intuition, gut feelings, own experiences, and 
associations impulsively evoked by the 
information that we read, we form our 
opinions about the information that we 
process. This way of information processing 
can be labeled as “expressive” and 
“impulsive.” Furthermore, we then often say 
what we think and what is on our minds. 
Various studies have shown that we process 
the information that we read differently. 
Often, we read and process the texts 
carefully, weighing the pros and cons of what 
we read in logical and analytical ways. Based 
on logical evidence and precise information 
processing, we form our opinions about the 
information we process. This way of 
information processing can be labeled as 
“evaluating” and “analytic”. 
Note. Differences in the text between the two conditions italicized. Adapted from “On the 
Psychology of the Belief in a Just World: Exploring Experiential and Rationalistic Paths to 
Victim Blaming” by K. van den Bos & M. Maas, 2009, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35(12), p. 1570f. 
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Below the instructions, all participants saw a short summary in the form of four bullet 
points, highlighting the most core ideas (e.g., “Be as expressive as possible in your reactions.” 
or “Try to weigh the pros and cons and take different viewpoints.”). After reading the 
instructions, they proceeded to the next page where they read the actual target-text. In the 
original manipulation, van den Bos and Maas (2009) used an adapted version of a text by Haidt 
(2001). The text on a sibpair having sex with each other might be a good choice for research on 
moral judgement, which was the field of interest in those papers. However, for the present study 
an own text was formulated that is closer to the area of consumption decisions and does not 
stress ethical issues. In both conditions this text reads: 
Vera and Mark are friends. They want to cook together and for that purpose they 
go grocery shopping. Mark wants to buy Fairtrade products only, to support the 
Table 20 
Instructions on how to read a given text 
System 1 mindset System 2 mindset 
We would like to ask you to read the 
following text and answer the questions in the 
way just described to you. Read the text and 
react to it as expressively and impulsively as 
possible. Furthermore, you can form your 
opinion about what you read on the basis of 
your gut feeling and intuition. You can write 
down anything you want while expressing 
your point of view. The first thing that comes 
to mind is often what you are thinking and we 
would be happy if you share your thoughts 
with us. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Thus, everything that you type in will be fine, 
as long as it is your first reaction that crossed 
your mind when reading the text. Your 
answers will be treated confidentially and 
anonymously. 
We would like to ask you to read the 
following text and answer the questions in the 
way just described to you. Read the text and 
react to it as evaluative and analytically as 
possible. Try to weigh the pros and cons of 
what you read, and to think as 
rationalistically as possible about the 
contents of the text before forming an opinion 
and stating it. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Thus, everything that you type in 
will be fine, as long as you have thought 
carefully about your reaction. Your answers 
will be treated confidentially and 
anonymously. 
Note. Differences in the text between the two conditions italicized. Adapted from “On the 
Psychology of the Belief in a Just World: Exploring Experiential and Rationalistic Paths to 
Victim Blaming” by K. van den Bos & M. Maas, 2009, Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 35(12), p. 1570f. 
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producers financially and to make a statement for responsible consumption. Vera 
argues that eliminating market mechanisms promotes overproduction and 
suppresses incentives to improve the product quality and to adapt to innovations. 
After a short argument, on whether they would support a sustainable and positive 
development for the producers or rather cause harm to them by buying Fairtrade 
products, they decide to flip a coin. In case of heads, they will buy Fairtrade 
products and in case of tails they will buy products without the seal. 
Participants were asked to write down their answers on the questions “What do you think 
of this situation? Was it the correct decision of Vera and Mark to resolve the argument by 
flipping the coin?” and “What do you think of Vera and Mark?” into the provided textboxes. 
Product and credit offer. 
Every page with a product and credit offer was set up in the same way: At the top of the 
page, participants read a reminder of the information processing mindset manipulation. Below, in 
the left half of the screen, they saw a picture of a product. Participants were asked to imagine a 
scenario regarding the intended use of the product that was described below the picture. Under 
this text, they saw details on the 0%-credit offer and explanations on the financial terms used in 
the credit offer. Below the reminder of the information processing mindset manipulation, in the 
right half of the screen, participants were asked to evaluate the credit offer by answering four 
questions on it. The single elements on this page will be described in further detail in the 
following sections. 
Reminder of the information processing mindset manipulation. 
The reminder summed up the previously given instructions on how to process  
information. Therefore, it differed between the two conditions. The respective texts are shown in  
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Table 21 
Reminder of the information processing mindset manipulation 
System 1 mindset System 2 mindset 
We would like to ask you to read the 
following offer and answer the questions in 
the way that was described to you earlier. 
Read the offer and react to it as expressively 
and impulsively as possible. Furthermore, you 
can form your opinion about what you read 
on the basis of your gut feeling and intuition. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Thus, 
every answer will be fine, as long as it 
mirrors the first reaction that crossed your 
mind when reading the offer. 
We would like to ask you to read the 
following offer and answer the questions in 
the way that was described to you earlier. 
Read the offer and react to it as evaluatively 
and analytically as possible. Try to weigh the 
pros and cons of what you read, and to think 
as rationalistically as possible about the 
contents of the offer before answering the 
questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Thus, every answer will be fine, as 
long as you have thought carefully about it. 
Note. Differences in the text between the two conditions italicized.  
 
Table 21.  
Intended use of the product. 
Participants were asked to imagine a situation that described the intended product use to 
be of either rather hedonic or utilitarian nature. The scenarios provided a reason for the purchase 
of the product and included expectations stemming from the specific needs of the intended use.  
Table 22 
Hedonic und utilitarian scenario describing the intended product use 
Hedonic product use Utilitarian product use 
You need a new multimedia laptop. The 
product needs to meet the latest standards to 
stream and play movies and series without 
delay. In addition, you want to use the laptop 
for digital image processing and to play the 
latest games in best quality without any lags. 
Related to this, the laptop also needs to meet 
the latest standards in networking and 
graphics, to connect well with all your other 
entertainment devices and to guarantee the 
best entertainment experience without any 
connectivity problems or communication 
errors between the devices. In your search, 
you find the following offer for students: 
You need a new laptop for your studies and 
your side job. The product needs to meet the 
latest standards to ensure fast and error-free 
multitasking, to allow you to work on several 
programs at the same time without any 
capacity losses. In addition, the product needs 
to meet the newest security standards and be 
able to adapt well to long and demanding 
work- sessions (e.g., in the exam phase). 
Related to this, the laptop also needs fans that 
are able to protect it from overheating under 
intense use but also work as silent as 
possible, to ensure maximal concentration. In 
your search, you find the following offer for 
students: 
Note. Differences in the text between the two conditions italicized 
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They were equally long and structured in a comparable way in both conditions of intended 
product use and for all products. As an example, the scenario for the laptop is shown in Table 22. 
Selection and presentation of products. 
The products used in this study were selected based on the results from a pretest with 
students (N = 36). This pretest assessed ratings of personal relevance for each product as well as 
hedonic and utilitarian dimensions of participants’ attitudes towards the product in the given 
scenario. The five products were selected due to a high personal relevance among students and a 
good differentiability between hedonic and utilitarian perceptions. They comprised a laptop, rent 
deposit, tent, bike and office chair.  
All pictures were presented against a neutral background. No brand names were visible. 
In one corner of the picture, participants saw a red price tag that included the name of the 
product, a prominent placement of 0% and the product’s price.  
Details on the 0%-credit offer and explanation of the financial terms. 
A text contained information on a 0%-interest credit offer for students. Participants were 
informed about the annual percentage rate, the credit period, a required down payment, the 
monthly installment rates from the second month on, dunning fees, an early repayment fee and a 
residual debt insurance. The annual percentage rate was 0% and the credit period was 12 months 
for all offers. The required down payment always amounted to 20% of the price for the 
respective product and was expressed as an absolute amount in Euro. The latter also holds for the 
monthly installment rates which were calculated as the price of the product minus the down 
payment and divided by 11 months. The dunning fee ranged from € 5.30 for the cheapest product 
to € 8.95 for the priciest product, while the early repayment fee ranged from € 5.30 for the 
cheapest product to € 9.45 for the priciest product. For all products, the residual debt insurance 
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ranged from 13% to 17% of the price for the respective product.  
The random variation in dunning fees, early repayment fees and residual debt insurances 
was predetermined and used for all participants. It served the purpose to make the offers more 
realistic. All specific details were in line with the German statutory provisions and comparable to 
real credit offers. 
The terms annual percentage rate, late payment, early repayment and residual debt 
insurance were marked with superscripts. Below the credit details, the meaning of those terms 
was explained in very simple words. These explanations were provided to ensure the same level 
of understanding for all participants. 
Credit evaluation. 
Next to the product picture and credit offer, on the right side of the screen, participants 
were asked to evaluate the credit offer. This was done as in studies 5 and 6. Cronbach’s alpha 
ranged between α = .83 and α = .92 for the 5 products. 
Manipulation check for information processing mindset. 
In order to check whether the manipulation of information processing mindset was 
successful, participants answered five questions on how they reacted to the text about Vera and 
Mark in the manipulation, adapted from van den Bos and Maas (2009). Regarding the first four 
questions, participants stated whether they, while reading the text answering the according two 
questions, (1) thought things through thoroughly, (2) weighted the pros and cons before reacting, 
(3) reacted intuitively to the questions and (4) reacted impulsively to the questions by typing in 
the first that came to their minds. The answers to those four questions ranged from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The fifth question asked whether participants reacted more 
rationalistically and analytically or more impulsively and intuitively to the text (1 = very 
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analytically and rationalistically, 7 = very intuitively and impulsively). After recoding the last 
three questions, all five questions were averaged to form an index to check on the information 
processing mindset manipulation with lower values indicating System 1 mindset and higher 
values indicating System 2 mindset. Cronbach’s alpha was α = .86. 
Manipulation check for intended product use. 
In order to check whether the manipulation of intended product use was successful, 
participants answered one question on each product that they previously saw. The question asked 
how they would judge the respective product in the situation that was described to them. 
Answers ranged from 1 = mainly for functional use to 7 = mainly for one’s own pleasure. 
Because of a low value for Cronbach’s alpha (α = .23), the items were not averaged to form an 
index.  
Control variables. 
The cognitive reflection test described in study 6 was used in the same format in the 
present study. Cronbach’s alpha was α=.63. Participants’ self-control in the domain of consumer 
spending was measured as in study 6. 
Participants’ attitude to debt was measured using an attitude scale by Davies and Lea 
(1995) that was designed particularly for students. It consists of 14 items (e.g., “Taking out a 
loan is a good thing because it allows you to enjoy life as a student”) that are assessed on a 7-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The questions were recoded and attitude 
to debt was computed as the mean value of the 14 questions (α=.64) with higher values 
indicating a more positive attitude towards debt. 
Participants’ need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) 
was measured using a short scale developed by Beißert, Köhler, Rempel, and Beierlein (2014). It 
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consists of four items (e.g., “Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the reasons 
for the answer to a problem is fine with me.”) that are assessed on a 7-point scale (1 = applies 
completely to 7 = doesn’t apply at all). Because of a low value for Cronbach’s alpha (α = .47), 
the items were not averaged to form an index. 
Participants’ propensity to plan for money was measured using a scale adapted from 
Lynch et al. (2010). It consists of six items (e.g., “I like to look to my budget for the next 1-2 
years in order to get a better view of my spending in the future.”) that are assessed on a 6-point 
scale (1 = strongly agree to 6 = strongly disagree). The questions were recoded and propensity to 
plan was computed as the mean value of the six questions (α=.92) with higher values indicating a 
stronger propensity to plan. 
Several questions assessed participants’ understanding of credit-related terms and their 
perceived understandability of the credit offers. Four questions asked participants to select the 
correct meaning of the terms annual percentage rate, dunning fee, early repayment fee and 
residual debt insurance. For each question, two to four answer options as well as a “don’t know” 
option were provided. The correct answer was a copy of the superscript explanation that was 
provided on the credit-offer pages. An index of participants’ understanding of credit-related 
terms was calculated by giving 1 point for every correct answer and summing up these points. 
Therefore, a higher score indicates a better understanding.  
Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate the understandability of the credit offers 
(1 = very understandable, 7 = not at all understandable) and whether they had all the information 
necessary to form a judgement on the offers (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). If 
participants gave an answer below the midpoint to the latter question, they were asked to name 
any piece of information that they would have wished for. 
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In order to assess whether or not participants were reading the instructions in the study 
carefully, the instructional manipulation check (Oppenheimer et al., 2009) was adapted as 
described in study 6. 
Involvement was measured individually for every product using a subset of six items 
from the personal involvement inventory by Zaichkowsky (1985). A question read “If you think 
about the [product]: Personally, to what extent do the following descriptions apply?”, followed 
by the six items in the form of semantic differentials (e.g., 1 = of no concern, 6 = of concern to 
me). The reason for using only six items of the original 20-item scale consists in a potential 
confound of the other items with the manipulation of intended product use. For example, the 
item unexciting – exciting would probably be scored lower by participants in the utilitarian 
condition as compared to participants in the hedonic condition, regardless of involvement. For 
the selected six items, no such problems were anticipated. The questions were recoded and 
involvement was computed as the mean value of the six questions. Higher values indicated a 
stronger involvement. Over the five products, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from α = .84 to α = .93.  
In the last part of the study, participants indicated whether their data should be used in the 
analysis. The question was the same as in study 6. 
Results. 
Preliminary analyses. 
Manipulation checks. 
In a first step, the manipulation checks of information processing mindset and intended 
product use were analyzed.  
Due to non-normality of the index created from the questions referring to the text about 
Vera and Mark, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted. Results indicate that participants in the 
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System 1 mindset condition reacted more spontaneously and intuitively (Mdn Rank= 43.86), 
while participants in the System 2 mindset condition reacted more analytically and rationally on 
the text (Mdn Rank = 97.01), U(141) = 611.00, p < .001 (one-tailed). Furthermore, participants 
in the System 1 mindset condition took significantly less time to answer the questions on credit 
attractiveness (Mdn Rank = 63.86), as compared to participants in the System 2 mindset 
condition (Mdn Rank = 77.85), U(141) = 1991.00, p = .021 (one-tailed). With fast decisions 
being related to System 1 processing and slow decisions being related to System 2 processing 
(Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013) it was concluded from these results that the 
manipulation of information processing mindset was successful.  
In order to check for a successful manipulation of intended product use a MANOVA was 
conducted with participants’ individual ratings of hedonic or utilitarian quality of the products 
serving as dependent variables. Intended product use served as the independent factor. Pillai’s 
trace showed that there was a significant effect of intended product use on participants’ ratings of 
hedonic and utilitarian quality of the products, V = 0.30, F(5, 135) = 11.67, p < .001. In the 
individual follow-up ANOVAs participants presented with products with intended hedonic use 
rated them as more hedonic as compared to participants who were presented with products with 
intended utilitarian use in case of the laptop (M = 4.22, SD = 1.61 vs. M = 2.76, SD = 1.41, F(1, 
139) = 32.67, p < .001), the rent deposit (M = 3.30, SD = 2.08 vs. M = 2.26, SD = 1.50, F(1, 
139) = 11.66, p = .001) and the tent (M = 5.45, SD = 1.84 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 1.85, F(1, 
139) = 10.17, p = .002). However, for the bike the effect was reversed: Participants presented 
with a bike with intended hedonic use rated it as less hedonic (M = 3.87, SD = 1.61) as compared 
to participants who were presented with a bike with intended utilitarian use (M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.65), F(1, 139) = 5.03, p = .026. While the pattern held true or the office chair as well 
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(M = 3.00, SD = 1.74 vs. M = 3.28, SD = 1.94) the difference was not significant, F(1, 
139) = 0.80, p = .373. While the unexpected effect for the bike was somewhat puzzling, the 
multivariate test indicated a successful manipulation of intended product use. 
Next, participant’s answers to the questions on the understanding of the credit details 
were analyzed, to check whether they were able to comprehend the credit offers as a prerequisite 
to meaningful judgements. A score was calculated as the sum of correct answers to the four 
factual questions. While 35.46% of the participants answered at least three questions correctly, 
74.47% answered at least half of the questions correctly. Only 9.22% of the participants 
answered none of the questions correctly. After recoding the question on general 
understandability of the credit offers to range from 1 = not at all understandable to 7 = very 
understandable, respondents answered with M = 4.17 (SD = 1.64). Their mean score on the 
question whether they had all the information necessary to form a judgement (M = 3.87, 
SD = 1.79) indicated rather some missing information. Of the 65 participants who answered the 
questions below the midpoint and therefore were asked what pieces of information they had 
wished for, most (n = 17) indicated a problem of understanding that lies beyond the terms used. 
Few asked for information that was in fact given (n = 4) and some more asked for the total costs 
of the credit offers (n = 6). Furthermore, participants rather wished for missing information on 
the situation (e.g., budget) (n = 12) than for detailed information on specific aspects of the 
credits that was indeed not given (n = 7). Overall, participants seemed to have had problems 
understanding the credit offers. It seems as if this is less a consequence of specific terms or 
mathematical understanding but rather the result of a somewhat vague and diffuse understanding 
of the credit concept beyond the single aspects. Nevertheless, the overall understanding can be 
interpreted as satisfactory and the majority of participants stated to have had all the necessary 
199 
 
 
information to form a judgement. 
Descriptives. 
Means, standard deviations, correlation coefficients and reliabilities for the variables in 
this study are shown in Table 23.  
As can be seen, credit attractiveness was on average rated slightly worse than in studies 5 
and 6 (M = 3.30, SD = 1.06). The rather high rating of product involvement (M = 3.85, 
SD = 0.64) indicates that the products selected in this study are to a certain degree typical to 
student purchases.  
Although being a little lower as compared to studies 5 and 6, the average rating of credit 
understanding of M = 4.17 (SD = 1.64) is a positive signal that participants were able to grasp 
the credit offers and understand the single aspects of the offers. Participants answered on average 
one of the three questions of the cognitive reflection test correctly, which is comparable with the 
result from the previous use of this measure. Furthermore, the same is true for spending self-
control (M = 5.16, SD = 1.18), which is positively correlated with product involvement.  
Participants rather tended to plan ahead regarding their monetary situation (M = 4.46, 
SD = 1.32). Unsurprisingly, this correlates with spending self-control, such that participants who 
stated that they are making plans for the future also reported higher levels of self-control, r = .44, 
N = 141, p < .001. The items for need for cognition averaged between M = 2.94 (SD = 1.60) and 
M = 5.69 (SD = 1.60). Interestingly, none of the items is correlated with the cognitive reflection 
test score. 
Finally, participants’ credit attitude was on average M = 3.98 (SD = 0.68). In the sample, 
a more positive attitude towards credit is linked to a higher credit attractiveness (r = .18, 
N = 141, p = .034), although the connection is rather weak. Additionally, credit attitude 
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correlates negatively with spending self-control (r = -.17, N = 141, p = .050), such that a more 
positive attitude comes with lower levels of self-control. 
Main analyses. 
The overall and product specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness, 
split up for the four conditions resulting from the 2x2 design, are shown in Table 24.  
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that there would be a mean 
difference in credit attractiveness between System 1 mindset and System 2 mindset. 
Furthermore, intended product use and the interaction with information processing mindset was 
included as independent factors, to test the hypothesis that in System 1 mindset hedonic product 
use leads to higher credit attractiveness as compared to utilitarian product use. No significant 
effect of information processing mindset was obtained, F(1, 137) = 0.19, p = .665. While the 
effect of intended product use on credit attractiveness was significant (F(1, 137) = 5.04, 
p = .026), the interaction between the two factors was not, F(1, 137) < 0.01, p = .973. Regarding 
the descriptive results, credit attractiveness was at the same level for participants in the System 1 
mindset condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.09) as compared to participants in the System 2 mindset 
condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.05). Furthermore, credit attractiveness was higher for participants in 
the utilitarian product use condition (M = 3.49, SD = 1.04) than for participants in the hedonic 
product use condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.06).  
Next, the model was extended to a two-way ANCOVA by adding consumer spending 
self-control, credit attitude, propensity to plan and the four items on need for cognition as 
covariates. As in the ANOVA, there was no significant effect of information processing 
manipulation on credit attractiveness, F(1, 130) = 0.32, p = .576. The effect of intended product 
use was no longer significant, (F(1, 130) = 3.09, p = .081) and the interaction between the two 
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factors was not significant as well, F(1, 130) = 0.19, p = .661. Among the covariates, only credit 
attitude obtained a significant effect with a more positive attitude resulting in greater credit 
attractiveness, F(1,130) = 4.69, p = .032. 
The results suggest to reject the hypothesis that participants relying on System 1 mindset 
perceive credits to be more attractive than participants relying on System 2 mindset. 
Furthermore, there is no significant interaction between the two factors information processing 
mindset and intended product use. 
Exploratory analyses. 
Potential problems with attention paid by the participants. 
As pointed out earlier in study 5, measurement error can be caused by participants who 
for various reasons do not pay enough attention to reading and answering the questions (Greszki 
et al., 2015). As a consequence, it can lead to a decrease in data quality. As in study 6, it was 
decided to reanalyze the data for those participants who passed the instructional manipulation 
check, using the ANOVA model from the main analyses, to circumvent problems stemming 
from data quality. A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation 
between information processing mindset and passing the instructional manipulation check. The 
relation between these variables was insignificant, χ2(1, N = 141) = 0.55, p = .614. The same is 
true for intended product use and passing the instructional manipulation check, χ2(1, 
N = 141) = 0.68, p = .737. Passing the check was not affected by participants’ condition. For 
those participants who passed the instructional manipulation check (n = 72), as in the main 
analysis, no significant effect of information processing mindset on credit attractiveness 
(M = 3.35, SD = 1.06 and M = 3.29, SD = 0.89 respectively) was obtained, F(1, 68) = 0.14, 
p = .707. Furthermore, intended product use did not have a significant effect on credit 
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attractiveness (F(1, 68) = 3.42, p = .069) and the interaction between the two factors was 
insignificant (F(1, 68) = 1.81, p = .183), as well. Regarding the descriptive results, credit 
attractiveness was at the same level for participants in the System 1 mindset condition (M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.06) than for participants in the System 2 mindset condition (M = 3.29, SD = 0.89). 
Furthermore, credit attractiveness was higher for participants in the utilitarian product use 
condition (M = 3.51, SD = 1.00) than for participants in the hedonic product use condition 
(M = 3.10, SD = 0.91). 
Potential problems with the understandability of the credit offers. 
As already noted, credit understanding did not show overly positive results. Therefore it 
was decided to rerun the analyses for the subsample of participants who answered at least two of 
the four questions on credit details correctly, using the ANOVA model from the main analyses. 
Prior to this, a chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the score on the credit 
understanding questions for participants in the System 1 and System 2 mindset conditions. No 
significant effect was found, χ2(4, N = 141) = 4.78, p = .316. Similarly, the relation between 
intended product use and the score on the credit understanding questions was also insignificant, 
χ2(4, N = 141) = 3.17, p = .538. For those who answered at least two questions on the credit 
details correctly (n = 105), as in the main analysis, no significant effect of information 
processing mindset on credit attractiveness was obtained, F(1, 101) = 0.13, p = .720. The same is 
true for the second hypothesis on the interaction of information processing mindset and intended 
product use, as the interaction in the model remained insignificant (F(1, 101) = 0.20, p = .887), 
as well. As in the ANOVA from the main analysis, the effect of intended product use on credit 
attractiveness was significant in this subsample as well, (F(1, 101) = 6.12, p = .015): Utilitarian 
intended product use evoked a higher credit attractiveness (M = 3.64, SD = 0.98) as compared to 
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hedonic intended product use (M = 3.15, SD = 1.03). 
Potential problems with the involvement with the products. 
Next, it was decided to take a closer look at participants’ involvement with the products. 
As outlined in study 5, it could be possible that the participants perceived the products to be 
different from their everyday purchases. If that was the case, they could have had problems to 
relate to a situation where the purchase of such products is the central element, thus giving more 
or less random answers, leading to decreased data quality. However, product involvement ranged 
from M = 3.28 (SD = 1.33) for the rent deposit to M = 4.83 (SD = 0.87) for the laptop with the 
exception of M = 2.98 (SD = 1.36) for the tent. Being measured on a 6-point scale this indicates 
a medium level of involvement. Nevertheless, this value was interpreted as high enough to 
assume that a lack of involvement is not a primary concern. 
Potential problems with the time spent on the evaluation task. 
While the manipulation check for information processing mindset indicated a successful 
manipulation, it is unclear how long it remained effective. Although the questions used for the 
corresponding manipulation check were asked after all measures of the dependent variables, they 
referred to the moment when information processing mindset was manipulated. While the pages 
with the product presentation and credit evaluation also included a reminder to emphasize 
System 1 or System 2 mindset, it cannot be said for sure that the manipulation was effective over 
all products. However, because System 1 mindset is characterized to be comparably fast (Evans, 
2008), it was decided to use the time spent on the credit attractiveness rating as a proxy for 
System 1 or System 2 mindset usage and analyzed credit attractiveness depending on this 
duration. To this end, participants were allocated to two groups via a median split on time spent 
on the five product pages. In the fast pace group, participants spent on average M = 4m14s 
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(SD = 49s) on the product pages compared to M = 7m41s (SD = 1m44s) in the slow pace group. 
Analogous to the main analysis, no significant effect of time spent on the pages on credit 
attractiveness was obtained, F(1, 137) = 2.68, p = .104. The same is true for the interaction of 
time spent and intended product use, (F(1, 137) = 1.99, p = .161). As in the ANOVA from the 
main analysis, the effect of intended product use on credit attractiveness was significant is this 
model as well, (F(1, 137) = 4.16, p = .043): Utilitarian intended product use evoked a higher 
credit attractiveness (M = 3.49, SD = 1.04) as compared to hedonic intended product use 
(M = 3.10, SD = 1.06). 
Potential problems with System 1 / 2 information processing as a stable disposition. 
As in study 6, the relationship between the cognitive reflection test score as an indicator 
for a stable disposition towards System 1 or System 2 information processing and credit 
attractiveness was analyzed. Kendall’s tau was calculated in order to determine if there was such 
a relationship. Contrary to the assumption, the two variables were not significantly correlated, rτ 
(141) = -.08, p = .100 (one-sided). The result suggests that a stable disposition towards System 1 
or System 2 information processing as measured with the cognitive reflection task is unrelated to 
credit attractiveness. 
Product-specific analysis. 
In a last step, the relationship between information processing mindset, intended product 
use and credit attractiveness was analyzed in detail for each offer, to see whether the 
hypothesized effects exist for some products but vanish in the aggregation. To this end, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with the individual ratings of credit 
attractiveness serving as dependent variables. Information processing mindset and intended 
product use served as independent factors. In addition, the interaction between the two was 
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included. Using Pillai’s trace, there was no effect of information processing mindset on credit 
attractiveness, V = 0.01, F(5, 133) = 0.32, p = .899. However, when participants were presented 
with products with an intended utilitarian use, credit attractiveness was higher (M = 3.66, 
SD = 1.77) than when presented with products with an intended hedonic use (M = 3.23, 
SD = 1.67), V = 0.08, F(5, 133) = 2.37, p = .043. The interaction between the two factors was not 
significant, V = 0.02, F(5, 133) = 0.49, p = .786. In the individual follow-up ANOVAs the only 
significant effect was a main effect of intended product use on credit attractiveness for the tent 
(F(1, 137) = 8.89, p = .003): Utilitarian intended product use led to greater credit attractiveness 
(M = 4.02, SD = 1.59) as compared to hedonic intended product use (M = 3.62, SD = 1.66). The 
overall and product specific means and standard deviations of credit attractiveness are shown in 
Table 24. 
Discussion. 
The purpose of the present study was to extend research on credit choice by examining 
credit attractiveness for products with different intended use in different modes of information 
processing. To this end, a laboratory experiment was conducted in which intended product use 
was manipulated to be either hedonic or utilitarian and information processing mindset was 
manipulated to be either System 1 mindset or System 2 mindset. Credit attractiveness was 
measured for several 0%-interest credit offers that were presented with products thought to be 
relevant to students. No significant difference in credit attractiveness was found between the 
System 1 mindset and System 2 mindset conditions. This finding was consistent throughout the 
analyses and rejects the hypothesis that participants in System 1 mindset perceive 0%-interest 
credits to be more attractive as compared to participants in System 2 mindset. Surprisingly, 
several analyses showed that utilitarian intended product use led to higher credit attractiveness as 
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compared to hedonic intended product use. Furthermore, the interaction between the two factors 
was not significant in any of the analyses. Therefore, the hypothesis that participants in System 1 
mindset evaluate credits for products with hedonic intended use more positively than credits for 
products with utilitarian use has to be rejected as well. 
Lee, Lee, Bertini, Zauberman, and Ariely (2015) found that monetary considerations 
trigger the use of System 2 information processing. They argue that thoughts about money 
activate a value-maximization goal and considerations of economic value. Similarly, Su and Gao 
(2014) showed that participants primed with money (as opposed to time) engaged in more 
analytical processing, leading to a more fine-grained attribute-based (as opposed to alternative-
based) evaluation strategy for different products. If the concept of money universally causes 
people to focus on cost-benefit considerations and piecemeal assessment over enjoyment and 
holistic assessment, the manipulation of information processing mindset that was used in the 
present study is likely to be unsuitable for the purpose. It activates either a mindset highlighting 
controlled information processing or a mindset highlighting automatic information processing 
and tries to uphold the respective mindset via the reminder in the credit evaluation task. 
However, when participants made their judgement on the credit offer, they had to consider 
monetary aspects. Given that the presented results on money priming hold true, this should have 
led participants to ignore contrary instructions (in the System 1 mindset condition) and engage in 
System 2 mindset in any case. In contrast to studies 5 and 6, no further obstacle like a lack of 
cognitive resources should have prevented this from happening. Following this argument, even a 
successful manipulation of information processing mindset as judged by the significant 
manipulation check would not prevent participants to process the credit offers in a rather 
analytical and rational way, thereby rendering the manipulation unsuitable.    
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The finding that information processing mindset had no effect on credit attractiveness 
stands in contrast to the theory-based assumptions in the literature. For example, Strack et al. 
(2006) argue that impulse buying can be linked to arousal and emotions. They state that the 
active use of cognitive resources is a prerequisite to overcome such impulses. Put differently, 
relying on System 1 information processing where arousal and emotions play a strong role 
should make people susceptible to impulse purchases. As a credit is a financial tool that enables 
people to act in line with their intention, regardless of their cash restrictions, it should be seen as 
more attractive. 
One possible explanation for the shortcoming of the present study to find an effect where 
previous research indicated a linkage might be that the manipulation used was not strong enough 
to show the hypothesized effect. This point will be discussed in more detail in the next section.   
Problems with the information processing mindset manipulation. 
The manipulation of information processing mindset was successful, as indicated by the 
manipulation check. However, it is less clear how long participants followed the instruction to 
process information either expressively and impulsively or evaluatively and analytically. 
Although the questions for the manipulation check were placed at the end of the questionnaire, to 
allow for a minimization of the time between the manipulation and the credit evaluation task, 
they referred directly to the time point when participants completed the manipulation. While the 
reminder served to uphold the mindset manipulation during the credit evaluation task, there is no 
further direct measure for the success of it. In this context, it is important to note that participants 
in the System 1 mindset condition took less time to answer the questions on credit attractiveness, 
as compared to participants in the System 2 mindset condition. With fast decisions being related 
to System 1 information processing and slow decisions being related to System 2 information 
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processing (Evans, 2008, Evans & Stanovich, 2013) this result indicates a lasting effect of the 
manipulation. Nevertheless, the time taken to complete the credit evaluation task is no guarantee 
for a lasting effect of the manipulation for two reasons. First, enhanced speed is a correlate but 
not a defining characteristic of System 1 information processing. Therefore, it should not be 
interpreted as proof for engaging in System 1 mindset. Second, participants took less time to 
evaluate the credit offers in the System 1 mindset condition over all five products. However, this 
is driven by a significant difference in only the first two products that were presented. Thus, 
while the manipulation of information processing mindset was successful it cannot be said with 
certainty how long the effect lasted. 
Concerning the second experimental factor, intended product use, the manipulation was 
successful. Participants presented with products with intended hedonic use rated them as more 
hedonic as compared to participants who were presented with products with intended utilitarian 
use. While this is true on the aggregate level, the finding also holds for the majority of products 
when analyzed individually. Therefore, the manipulation of intended product use was successful.  
Problems with the credit evaluation task. 
While the mindset manipulation represents one possible explanation for the absence of 
the hypothesized effect of information processing mindset on credit evaluation, the design of the 
evaluation task might contribute to the problem as well. Although the task was considerably less 
complex as compared to the one in the previous studies, the amount of information to be 
processed might still have been too high in general. For each of the five products participants 
were asked to process information on the product from the details on the price tag and the picture 
of the product to form a judgement on the product. Furthermore, they had to make sense of 
various credit aspects that might have been unfamiliar to them and process them in a certain way 
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to form a judgement on the credit offer. This was accompanied by imagining wanting to buy the 
product for a specific hedonic or utilitarian reason. Over the course of the products, participants 
might have felt more and more depleted because of the high level of attention needed in the task 
and the information processing involved in evaluating the credit offers. As the literature 
suggests, a great expense of attention leads to impaired subsequent higher order cognitive 
processing (Schmeichel et al., 2003). Thus, for the later products, participants in the System 2 
mindset condition might have processed the given information in the same way as participants in 
the System1 mindset condition. Although they were instructed to apply a System 2 mindset, the 
overall amount of information in the study to be processed could have decreased their cognitive 
resources to a minimum. Analyses of the influence of information processing mindset on credit 
attractiveness for only the first presented product (the laptop) revealed no significant effect 
(results not shown). Even though this result does not rule out the described effect of overall 
information load on information processing mindset, it shows that such an effect was of marginal 
importance in the present study.  
Intended product use and credit attractiveness. 
As already noted, several analyses showed that utilitarian intended product use led to 
higher credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic intended product use. As no such hypothesis 
was stated, this represents a surprise. At first, the effect seems puzzling. Okada (2005) found that 
consumers prefer hedonic over utilitarian alternatives, when just one of the two alternatives is 
offered. She argued that the benefit from hedonic goods in the form of experiential enjoyment 
seems more appealing compared to the benefit from utilitarian goods in the form of practical 
functionality. Such a setting of separate judgement corresponds to the present study, as 
participants read either a scenario with hedonic intended product use or utilitarian intended 
212 
 
 
product use, in a between subjects design. Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) confirmed the 
preference for hedonic over utilitarian goods only for situations in which consumers had to 
decide which of several items to give up. In contrast, they found no difference in preferences for 
buying situations. Similarly, O’Curry and Strahilevitz (2001) demonstrated that the preference 
for hedonic over utilitarian goods held true for gift selection but not for purchase situations. 
According to Kivetz (1999), spending money on hedonic goods is perceived as more painful as 
compared to spending on utilitarian goods because the former represents non-essential spending 
by definition. In line with this argument, Diefenbach and Hassenzahl (2011) found that 
consumers in a buying scenario preferred a primarily utilitarian mobile phone over a primarily 
hedonic mobile phone. This preference was correlated with the need for justification: The more 
participants felt the need to justify their choice, the stronger they preferred the utilitarian mobile 
phone. Furthermore, when information was provided that made hedonic attributes appear more 
legitimate, thereby enhancing justifiability, participants preferred the primarily hedonic mobile 
phone. Overall, there are many situations in which consumers prefer hedonic over utilitarian 
products (for an overview see Alba and Williams (2013)). Nevertheless, in buying situations they 
rather seem to prefer utilitarian products because the purchase of such goods is easier to justify, 
usually, because there is a clear need for them. In the present study, participants found 
themselves not only thinking about a purchase of a given good but more specifically about 
buying it on credit. Because such purchases mostly exceed own available cash reserves, it can be 
argued that the issue of justification is of major importance. Under such conditions, the finding 
that utilitarian intended product use led to higher credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic 
intended product use is in line with the picture painted by previous research. 
Problems with the intended product use manipulation. 
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Another possible explanation for the obtained finding that utilitarian intended product use 
led to higher credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic intended product use could be the 
manipulation of intended product use. Participants were asked to imagine a situation that 
described the intended product use to be of either rather hedonic or utilitarian nature. The 
scenarios provided a reason for the purchase of the product and included expectations stemming 
from the specific needs of the intended use. This could have made it possible that participants 
formed a reference against which the presented product was compared. Because of the different 
expectations towards the product in the two conditions, it is likely, that such references differed 
from one another. For example, in the hedonic intended product use condition participants were 
asked to imagine wanting to buy a laptop to play the latest video games in best quality. Contrary, 
participants in the utilitarian intended product use condition were asked to imagine wanting to 
buy a business laptop, focusing on a powerful battery. By forming a reference from the scenario, 
participants in the hedonic intended product use condition would probably have thought of an 
expensive high-end laptop, while participants in the utilitarian intended product use condition 
would probably have thought of a less highly-prized laptop, sufficient for business purposes. 
Following the argument, participants in the former condition could have been disappointed by 
the presented product, as the price signals that this is clearly not a high-end laptop. Contrary, 
participants in the latter condition could have been pleased to be offered a product that seems to 
fit with their reference. As it was shown in the previous studies, product evaluation correlates 
with the evaluation of the credit offers. Thus, it is plausible that a better fit between participants’ 
reference created through the manipulation of intended product use on the one hand and the 
presented product on the other hand led to higher credit attractiveness.  
However, in order to explain the finding that utilitarian intended product use led to higher 
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credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic intended product use, the reference-mechanism 
outlined above must have been present for the majority of presented products. Unfortunately, the 
data does not allow to test whether and to which degree this was indeed the case, because 
expectations towards the product described in the intended product use manipulation were not 
assessed. 
General Discussion on Part III 
The main purpose of studies 5, 6 and 7 was to extend research on credit choice by 
examining credit attractiveness under System 1 and System 2 processing. To this end, laboratory 
experiments were conducted in which System 1 / 2 processing was manipulated using either 
cognitive load manipulations (studies 5 and 6) or an information processing mindset 
manipulation (study 7) In all three studies, credit attractiveness was measured for several 0%-
interest credit offers that were presented with products thought to be relevant to students. No 
significant difference in credit attractiveness was found between the System 1 and System 2 
processing conditions in any of the studies. This finding was consistent throughout the additional 
analyses and rejects the hypothesis that participants relying on System 1 information processing 
perceive 0%-interest credits to be more attractive as compared to participants relying on System 
2 information processing. Surprisingly, participants who were presented with products in a 
descending price order perceived the credits to be more attractive as compared to participants 
who were presented with products in an ascending price order (study 5). Furthermore, several 
analyses showed that utilitarian intended product use led to higher credit attractiveness as 
compared to hedonic intended product use (study 7). No interaction between neither the 
respective System 1 / 2 information processing manipulations used in the studies nor price order 
or intended product use was significant in any of the analyses (studies 5 and 7). Therefore, the 
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hypothesis that participants using a System 1 mindset evaluate credits for products with hedonic 
intended use more positively than credits for products with utilitarian use has to be rejected as 
well. 
Limitations with the sample composition. 
Considering the results, it is important to keep in mind that all 3 studies used student 
samples. This segment of the population might not be likely to represent the general public 
regarding their judgements of credits. Several authors report a rather low level of credit 
knowledge for students (Jones, 2005; Lachance, Beaudoin, & Robitaille, 2006), especially in 
comparison to employed, unemployed and other population groups (Lyons, Rachlis, & Scherpf, 
2007). While the situation is a little better for students who hold or held a loan as compared to 
inexperienced students (Lyons et al., 2007), it can be argued that this subgroup is rather small in 
the samples used in the present studies. In Germany, only 2.7% of 18- and 19-year olds and 
11.3% of 20 to 24-year olds hold installment credits (SCHUFA Holding AG, 2016). As the 
attitude towards credit correlates positively with credit knowledge (Lachance et al., 2006), it can 
be argued that students have a less positive attitude towards credit than other parts of the 
population. This corresponds to the finding that 57% of 18 to 20-year olds in a representative 
German sample strongly agreed to an item stating that credit should be used exclusively in case 
of financial problems (SCHUFA Holding AG, 2013). Partly attributable to the absence of tuition 
fees, their low involvement with credits seems to discourage German students from using credit 
at least when other options are available. It seems likely that this also shows in their ratings of 
credit attractiveness. People with more personal experience with credits or higher financial 
knowledge in general might have shown different results in the present studies. It is up to future 
studies to further explore potential connections between mode of cognitive processing and credit 
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evaluation for non-students. 
Limitations with the relevance of the products used. 
As already noted in the individual discussion sections of studies 5 to 7, relevance of the 
presented products is crucial for data quality and thus for a thorough test of the hypotheses. It 
could be possible that the participants perceived the products to be different from their everyday 
purchases. If that was the case, they could have had problems to relate to a situation where the 
purchase of such products is the central element, thus giving more or less random answers. In 
order to address this problem, the products used in the 3 studies were selected according to 
perceptions being characteristic to student purchases. Regarding study 7, it might seem 
overstretched that students actually consider to take a credit for hedonic goods. Nevertheless, 
when asked for the purpose of taken small instant loans, young adults most often named 
celebration (62%) as well as beer, wine and tobacco (61%; Autio et al., 2009). Also beyond 
everyday goods, hedonic consumption is an important driver of credit take-up, as the respective 
numbers for leisure time activities (20%) and travelling (14%) show. While these results refer to 
Finnish consumers, young Germans seem to be comparable. When they were asked for the 
purpose of their loans, travelling was named nearly as often (12%, SCHUFA Holding AG, 
2013). However, they most frequently named consumer electronics (43%) which were used in all 
three present studies. Furthermore, even buying a car - the most expensive product used in the 
present studies - was named as a reason for taking up a credit (8%). Overall this shows that the 
products used in studies 5 to 7 are somewhat typical for credit financed purchases in the target 
group.  
Concluding Discussion 
Consumer credit is an integral part of consumers’ everyday lives. Enabling them to 
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acquire needed products now and pay for them later with an interest premium, credit use is a 
useful tool to deal with low present financial means. However, a lack of responsibility, financial 
skills, and knowledge about the future income situation can have severe economic and 
psychological consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand how consumers make 
decisions about credit use. In this context, the individual decision to enter a specific credit is of 
particular importance. It marks the point where needs, attitudes, hopes, and ideas translate into 
actual behavior and thus unfold into tangible consequences of any kind. This thesis contributes to 
the understanding of this decision by regarding the cognitive processes that lead to it from a 
psychological point of view. To this end, seven lab studies were conducted. 
The first two studies focused on answering the question whether mental abstraction 
influences credit choice. Although some studies discuss potential links between the two concepts 
(Auh et al., 2008; Chatterjee & Rose, 2012; Chen et al., 2016; Hansen, et al.,2013) none 
investigated the relationship empirically. Building on one of the core elements of construal level 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2011) – closeness to the self in the here and now – it was assumed 
that some credit aspects are more prone to be part of high-level credit construals, while others are 
more prone to be part of low-level credit construals. Thus, depending on their credit construals, 
people should either prefer those credits that are advantageous on low construal level aspects or 
those credits that are advantageous on high construal level aspects. Contrary to the hypotheses, 
construal level did not influence the importance of different credit aspects for either evaluations 
of credit attractiveness or for credit choice. Furthermore, construal level did not affect what 
credit aspects were important to people when no particular offer was made. Even though the 
manipulations used in the two studies were well-established measures (Gilead et al., 2014), 
results for a successful manipulation were mixed. It remains an open question whether the 
218 
 
 
absence of significant differences between the experimental conditions must be attributed to 
construal level not being related to the credit evaluations and decisions in the two studies or 
whether this is due to the manipulations not being successful. 
The third and fourth study followed-up on the idea of mental abstraction and transferred 
it to a relatively new form of credit: 0%-interest credit offers. They focused on answering the 
question how mental abstraction and the 0 in 0%-interest credits interact to influence credit 
evaluation as well as the choice of the product that is to be financed. Previous research 
demonstrated that 0 as a price leads to an overly strong increase in demand for the respective 
product as compared to very low prices like 1¢ (Baumbach, 2016; Hossain & Saini, 2015; 
Murata, 2017; Nicolau, 2012; Shampanier et al., 2007). Palmeira (2011) argued that the number 
is harder to compare, relative to other numbers, thus introducing the idea of a more abstract 
nature of 0. Experiments in the domain of judgement and decision making further found that 
people favor information that matches their construal level over information that does not match 
(e.g., Kim & John, 2008; Nussbaum et al., 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2000). Combining these 
findings in the credit context, the studies 4 and 5 investigated whether there is a relationship 
between 0 and high construal level, with one activating or emphasizing the other. The results 
showed suggest that this is not the case. The number 0 did not induce a higher construal level 
than other numbers nor did a high construal level lead to an overly strong positive reaction 
towards a 0%-interest credit offer. Again, there were problems with the manipulations in both 
studies. However, it seems unlikely that the lack of significant results can be attributed solely to 
these technical aspects. The pattern of results throughout the analyses rather suggests that, at 
least in the credit context, 0 is not more abstract than positive numbers.  
Turning towards another theory in the area of information processing, the last three 
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studies continued to investigate attractiveness and choice of 0%-interest credits from the 
perspective of System 1 / 2 information processing. The studies focused on answering the 
question whether consumers are more willing to take up a 0%-interest credit when they process 
information in a more intuitive and heuristic way. It was assumed that in System 1 information 
processing the central element – an annual percentage rate of 0 – diverts attention from less 
advantageous aspects of such credits like, for example, mandatory residual debt insurances or 
high dunning fees. Using cognitive load manipulations and an information processing mindset 
manipulation, no significant difference in credit attractiveness was found between the System 1 
and System 2 processing conditions in any of the studies. Surprisingly, participants who were 
presented with products in a descending price order perceived the credits to be more attractive as 
compared to participants who were presented with products in an ascending price order (study 
5). This finding fits well with the literature on evaluation of sequences (Hassenzahl, 2005; Hoelzl 
et al., 2011; Langer et al. 2005). When financing something on credit is seen as a monetary loss, 
the effect can be interpreted as a preference for improvement in a sequence of potential losses. 
Furthermore, several analyses in study 7 showed that utilitarian intended product use led to 
higher credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic intended product use. Several studies found 
opposite effects of utilitarian and hedonic preferences in domains other than spending (O’Curry 
& Strahilevitz, 2001; Okada, 2005; Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000). In contrast, spending money on 
hedonic goods is perceived as more painful as compared to spending on utilitarian goods because 
the former represents non-essential spending Kivetz (1999). In line with this argument, 
Diefenbach and Hassenzahl (2011) showed that consumers in a buying context prefer primarily 
utilitarian products over primarily hedonic products. Thus, the finding that utilitarian intended 
product use led to higher credit attractiveness as compared to hedonic intended product use is in 
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line with the picture painted by previous research. 
To date, research taking a cognitive perspective on the actual credit take-up decision 
focused mostly on biases in the perception of individual credit aspects (e.g., Ranyard & Craig, 
1993 for repayment duration) and the limited understanding of them (e.g., Lewis & van 
Venrooij, 1995 for annual percentage rate). The present thesis contributed to the existing 
literature by examining not the individual aspects as such, but the cognitive processes that 
underlie the integration and evaluation of these aspects to form an overall judgement on specific 
credit offers and ultimately make a credit decision. Highlighting the importance of cognitive 
processes is overdue as the majority of credit contracts is signed at the point of sale 
(Bankenfachverband, 2015). The amount of cognitive resources available in such situations and 
peoples’ motivation to make a good decision can vary to a great extent. Especially the 
combination of a high social acceptance of credit use (Merskin, 1998; Watkins, 2000) and the 
widespread availability of the relatively new 0%-interest credit offers with less obvious 
disadvantages (GfK Finanzmarktforschung, 2014) is likely to result in more financial problems 
at least for those with low credit understanding. Understanding the underlying processes at credit 
take-up can help to protect potential debtors from making bad decisions by providing them with 
proper decision rules (e.g., to actively mentally separate the product to be financed from the 
credit offer when the product is tempting) or by initiating legal adjustments (e.g., outlawing the 
overly prominent display of “0%” in 0%-interest credit offer advertisement and marking 
additional costs more clearly). 
The absence of significant results coincides with problems of the manipulations used in 
the sections on construal level. This is particularly surprising because the manipulations were 
well-established measures (Gilead et al., 2014). Two specific circumstances of the present 
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studies could contribute to an explanation to this.  
First, all studies reported here were conducted in a computer lab where participants 
worked on individual PCs. In contrast, a check-up on the methodology in 2015 found no single 
study documenting the successful use of one of the applied manipulations in a setting different 
from pen and paper (J. Rudzińska-Wojciechowska, personal communication, September 8, 
2015). Detailed analyses of participants’ data entries in the present manipulations revealed that 
many participants did not follow the instructions exactly in the specified way or did not complete 
all subsections of the manipulation with the necessary accuracy. Maybe the possibility of 
reaching the next step in a given study with just a mouse click leads to more carelessness than 
having a sheet of paper in front, which does not disappear from one’s field of view when 
proceeding with the study. 
Second, both the manipulations as well as the Behavior Identification form place great 
emphasis on linguistic aspects. Translating these measures into German language could have 
affected their proper functioning.  
Because of these and other potential problems with the designs of the studies in the 
present thesis, futures studies should focus on replications that take these shortcomings into 
account and test the hypotheses in a revised manner. It would be premature to conclude that the 
absence of significant findings is a clear sign that the theoretical assumptions were wrong. 
However, this possibility cannot be excluded. Furthermore, future studies should concentrate on 
gathering data directly at the instance when people make real credit decisions. Asking people to 
imagine buying a specific product – and in study 7 also to imagine the intended product use – 
and then to decide on fictitious credit offers is somewhat problematic. The situation is very 
theoretical and there are no financial consequences. However, such consequences are always real 
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when actual credit decisions are made. This could have led to a significant bias in participants’ 
involvement in the lab experiments as compared to an actual credit decision setting, thus 
potentially affecting cognitive processing.  
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